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Abstract  
 
This dissertation maps out the epistemological and political coordinates of 
contemporary Virtual Reality (VR) aesthetics through a hybrid inquiry that combines 
conventional academic research practices with artistic experiments. Since its inception, 
both conceptually and technologically, VR has emerged as a model for a techno-utopic 
paradigm that seeks to construct an autonomous image not only from the mediation of 
artist, but also from the material, spatial, and by extension social and political 
determinations of reality. With the differences in the formal techniques and strategies of 
each instance of the media constellation that this teleological paradigm conglomerates 
such as cinema, early proto-cinematic devices, stereoscopic 3D, and cybernetics, the 
objective is always the same: to develop an immediate and autonomous interface shorn of 
limitations configured according to the subjective and bodily conditions of the viewer. 
In both practice and theory this dissertation attempts to problematize the question 
of autonomy and by extension heteronomy, which have been distributed in a binary 
opposition in 20th century artistic practices. I contend that aesthetic practices emerge 
within the dynamic and interlocked relation between heteronomy and autonomy. Neither 
artistic practices nor image technologies are autonomous from the political and historical 
context in which they became possible both technologically and conceptually. Moreover, 
I argue that artistic practices become critical insofar that the question of autonomy 
appears sensibly as a problem. Through a threefold inquiry on the question of autonomy 
and heteronomy, this dissertation has aimed to problematize the very context that made it 
possible. First, I problematized the autonomy of art purported to be the grounding gesture 
of the critical nature of research-creation; second, the autonomy purported to be inherent 
to VR as an immersive and interactive image technology was called into question; and 
third, as the extension of the second, I problematized the autonomy of the viewer and 
virtual images in the VR experience that constitutes the artistic experiment component of 
the dissertation.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Beyond Autonomy: Virtual Reality, Art and Boundaries   	
My first encounter with virtual reality (VR) was an immersive 360-degree 
documentary called NOMADS: MAASAI,1 which follows the mundane life of the semi-
nomadic Maasai people in Eastern Africa, during the Hot Docs Festival in 2015. Despite 
its problematic colonialist substrata, its visual structure was radically different from my 
previous experience with media, and the level of freedom and power I felt as a viewer 
was so immense that it eclipsed the narrative unfolding within the documentary. Amidst 
my shattered and fragmented memories, the most vivid image I can recall was a scene 
where dozens of men, both young and old, were performing a dance ritual. Located in the 
epicenter of the circular dance performance, I was given the freedom to look at or follow 
whichever points I wanted, yet for some reason I was fixated on one particular child, 
especially on his hands. There was nothing particularly interesting about him; he did not 
have a specific role in the ritual, nor any moves or clothing that set him apart. He was 
neither the youngest nor the eldest. Still, there was something extraordinary about the 
visual experience: an invisible surplus that unfolded itself in the ordinariness of this child 
and his hands. It was a sense of immediacy, of the freedom of visual organization and of 
lack of mediation that is typically present in the cinematic experience or in other screen-
based image technologies.  
 
																																																								1 Felix Lajeunesse, and Paul Raphael. Nomads: MAASAI. FELIX & PAUL STUDIOS, 2015. 
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Image 1. Screenshot from Nomads: MAASAI, Felix, Lajeunesse, and Paul Raphael, 2015 
 
Immediately after watching NOMADS: MAASAI, and before I had the chance to 
ponder its bewildering effect, I experienced another VR documentary. Seated in the same 
chair, in the same room that was assigned for the DocX section of Hot Docs 2015, I 
viewed NOMADS: HERDERS.2 With a very similar structure to the previous film, this 
one depicted the everyday life of Mongolian nomads. Again, I have only fragmented 
memories of the documentary, yet I have a vivid recollection of one particular scene 
which had an immense effect on me: As with the previous film, it was a mundane scene 
in which a Mongol family was sharing a meal, but then something extraordinary captured 
my attention. I was struck by a feeling of shock, both due to the level of perceptual 
realism and the fractional disavowal inherent to this very realism—while I could see and 
hear even their most minuscule gestures, my virtual counterparts were not able to see me. 																																																								2 Felix Lajeunesse, and Paul Raphael. Nomads: HERDERS. FELIX & PAUL STUDIOS, 2015. 
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While I had absolute power in the visual field in the sense that nothing could escape my 
vision, I, myself, was invisible not only to them but also to myself. Despite the immediate 
feeling of presence due to the advanced level of immersion, there was something 
essentially missing in the scene: the missing element was me. While bestowing the 
viewer with purported power, as result of purported lack of the mediation of the artist and 
the limitations unique to early media practices, the intended political and aesthetic results 
of these documentaries was happening at the price of my erasure. 
 
 
Image 2. Screenshot from NOMADS: HERDERS, Felix, Lajeunesse, and Paul Raphael, 
2015 
My naïve reaction to these two documentaries, similar to the reaction of early 
cinema audiences, became the defining feature of each VR work I later experienced and 
was the point of departure for my own artistic experiment in VR. This initial reaction 
compelled me to revisit the conventions of VR aesthetics. Despite their fascinating visual 
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regime, which dissociates the classical distributions of spectator and spectacle inherent to 
other media experiences, the intended aesthetic outcomes struck me as rather problematic 
in their artistic and political assumptions pertaining to the immediacy claim.  
From this context, this dissertation takes up the immediacy and autonomy claim in 
VR in a threefold examination, through a holistic inquiry that combines conventional 
academic research practices with artistic experiments: first, conducting research on VR; 
second, carrying out artistic practices in VR; and third, developing a method to bridge the 
two. This process, however, has never been linear. Oscillating between the dichotomous 
positioning of research and creation, theory and practice, and text and image, the relative 
position of each component (i.e., textual, visual and methodological) in writing and 
making this dissertation has gone through a tumultuous trajectory that has involved 
constant revision of each component according to the experiments and funding that 
emerged in the others. Different in language, methods and means, each one was regulated 
and redefined ultimately in and by each other. Thus, the central task of this project 
gradually became attempting to reconfigure and deconfigure the relation between 
historically and conceptually polarized concepts. This goal provided a conceptual 
connection that traverses all three aspects of this dissertation. It is the question of 
autonomy—and by extension heteronomy—that each component of this dissertation 
attempts to problematize: first, autonomy in art, which is purported to be the grounding 
gesture of the critical nature of research-creation; second, the autonomy purported to be 
inherent to VR as immersive and interactive in its contemporary conventions; and third, 
as an extension of the second, the autonomy of the viewer and virtual images in the VR 
experience that constitutes the experimental artistic component of this dissertation.  
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1.2 Autonomy in Art  
 
The first part of the threefold study addresses the question of autonomy in the 
context of research-creation. According to three schemata (that of Manning-Massumi, 
that of Springgay-Irwin-Kind, and that of Chapman-Sawchuk) developed in the Canadian 
context, the power of research-creation and, by extension, aesthetic creation, stems from 
its “anti-essentialist essence.” Due to the impossibility of subsuming it under a universal 
formula, research-creation is posited as autonomous from any pre-given external 
principle and therefore as a method of critical inquiry. However, I argue, the schemata 
reinforce dualism and essentialism in their attempts to establish the anti-essentialist and 
anti-dualistic nature of research-creation. In order to break the circle of essentialism and 
anti-essentialism, dualism and anti-dualism, autonomy and heteronomy, my dissertation 
works to historicize research-creation. It consists of two instances of historicization: first, 
mapping the historical background of the grounding presumptions of research-creation, 
and second, attempting to implement historicity in the processes of research and creation. 
For the former moment of historicization, I argue that the autonomy claim of research-
creation as a methodology is an extension of an aesthetic paradigm that emerged in the 
late 19th century and became the defining point of 20th-century aesthetic debates. To 
illustrate, I argue that three instances (Deleuze, Badiou and Rancière) of philosophy in 
the 20th century where cinema was taken as a model political paradigm and present a 
remarkable similarity to the aesthetic and political presumptions of research-creation. 
Common to the work of these three figures is the conception that cinema is first of all a 
hybrid art with its temporal structure, image regime and its relation to other art genres. In 
fact, what constitutes cinematic expression is the hybridization or juxtaposition of that 
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which is incompatible. Therefore, it is postulated that with its hybrid structure, much like 
research-creation, cinema is anti-metaphysical and is, by extension, anti-dualist and anti-
essentialist. In other words, for each of these three figures, cinema, with its temporal and 
image construction, is a hybrid art, which can be mobilized as a means to dismantle 
hierarchical models of dualism. However, the problem in both the research-creation 
schemata and philosophical conceptualization of cinema that I analyse is one of 
essentialism: namely, that each of these approaches reinforces the very essentialism they 
aim to expostulate. They further presuppose an essential link between the hybrid structure 
of cinema and research-creation and their critical, political and aesthetic functions.  
I contend that the formalist supposition that links the political function of research-
creation to its inner structure is trapped in the false dichotomy of autonomy and 
heteronomy, similar to aesthetic debates starting from the 19th century where the 
narratives of autonomy and heteronomy were posed as mutually exclusive. However, 
following Schiller, Adorno and Cavell, I argue that artistic practice emerges through a 
reciprocal interlocking of autonomy and heteronomy. Artistic practices are always 
predetermined by pre-existing and preestablished clichés, which are the result of the 
material and technological constraints of the given medium and the historical paradigm in 
which the medium itself becomes technologically possible. They emerge within the 
dynamic and interlocked relation between heteronomy and autonomy. Following 
Lütticken, I argue that “artistic practice becomes properly aesthetic practice when 
problematizing the limits of art and of artistic autonomy.”3 The task then is to push 
artistic practice to its limit where the very question of autonomy is problematized:   																																																								3 Sven Lütticken, “Autonomy as Aesthetic Practice.” Theory, Culture & Society 31, no. 7–8 (December 1, 
2014): 81–95. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276413496853. 
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If the aesthetic problematizes the relationship of autonomy and heteronomy, then 
this means that an act can be termed aesthetic insofar as it lets autonomy appear 
sensibly as a problem—in a world where subjectivities and objectifications are 
profoundly entangled, where different agencies coexist and collide.4  
 
My method thus amounts to inverting the discursive operation that deploys the false 
dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy to explain what an artistic practice is. In other 
words, the false dichotomy that is often used to explain artistic practices are what my 
artistic practices, in turn, set out to grapple with. In a more radical sense, I argue, what 
defines artistic practices in general is to problematize the distribution of concepts such as 
freedom and constraint, or autonomy and heteronomy. In order to make the question of 
autonomy emerge as a problem, I argue that it has to engage both with the historical 
conventions and the technological determination of the medium in question. It is for this 
reason, after engaging with the VR convention in a historical fashion, that I attempt to 
engage with the technological structure of VR as well. Thus, the next instance that 
informs my artistic practice is the Cavellian idea of creating medium. For Cavell, in the 
process of artistic creation, what constitutes the artist’s practice is to invent a new 
medium. However, invention as he defines it is not to create a medium from scratch but 
to redistribute the association and disassociation that defines the artistic program as both 
discourse and technology. As Diarmuid Costello stated in “Automat, Automatic, 
Automatism: Rosalind Krauss and Stanley Cavell on Photography and the 
Photographically Dependent Arts,”5 the Cavellian program seeks “new ways of securing 
value within their medium, that is, new ways of using its resources and thereby 																																																								4 Ibid., 11. 5  Diarmuid Costello, “Automat, Automatic, Automatism: Rosalind Krauss and Stanley Cavell on 
Photography and the Photographically Dependent Arts.” Critical Inquiry Vol.38 (2012): 819–54.  
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extending-by-transforming the tradition they inherit.”6 It is to reconfigure what is given 
in the medium both technologically and conceptually in order to allow a new medium to 
“emerge through a process of gradual accretion, revision, translation, and cross-
fertilisation.”7 
I therefore argue that to some extent each research-creation dissertation is in its 
essence an attempt to problematize the very research-creation itself. Each dissertation not 
only has to embrace the internal impasse of hybrid methods but also posit it as a problem. 
Each must problematize the departure points that define the artistic strategies of the 
medium in question. It is a circular process wherein both the artistic practice and research 
are interrelated; they affirm and negate and problematize one another. However, this 
circular structure can go beyond the self-regulating process by implementing historicity 
in the research. The critical character of research-creation is never a given; it is an 
intentional process of mapping out political and aesthetic coordinates of the elements that 
collide and coexist in the process of creation. 
1.3 Autonomy in VR 
 
The second part of the threefold study is an analysis of the hyperbolic discourses of 
empathy and immediacy in VR, where the question of autonomy is crystallized. Since its 
inception, VR has emerged both conceptually and technologically as a model for a 
techno-utopic paradigm that seeks to construct an autonomous image, not only from the 
mediation of the artist but also from the material, spatial, and, by extension, social and 
political determinations of reality. Even with differences in the formal techniques and 																																																								6 Ibid., 24.  7 Ibid., 32.  
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strategies of each instance of the media constellation that this teleological paradigm, such 
as cinema, early proto-cinematic devices, stereoscopic 3D, and cybernetics, the objective 
has always been the same: to develop an immediate interface that is organized according 
to the subjective and bodily conditions of the viewer. Phantasmagorical in its strategies to 
construct the illusion of immediate and unlimited imagery, in this particular visual 
paradigm, the objective limitations of the image are concealed beyond the subjective 
limitations of the viewer to the extent that the visual field contains only those limitations 
which are inherent to the viewer’s vision. In this context, I have analysed two 
fundamental operations that serve to realize the claim of immediacy purported to be 
inherent to VR. The first one consists of analyzing VR’s immersive strategies: in general, 
given the supposed absence of any visible spatial boundary in its objectivity, VR 
ostensibly provides the unlimited character of reality in terms of spatiality. Accordingly, 
this presumed limitlessness of VR is delegated to the viewer as the power to perform her 
or his own selections. Concomitant to the absence of spatial limitation, as is the case in 
screen-based image systems, the viewer is presumed to be emancipated from the 
mediations of an artist whose fundamental operation is to limit the image in time and 
space. It is presupposed that, free to look wherever she or he wants, the viewer in VR is 
given power and control over the image itself. Therefore, VR, as the result of this 
putative absolute immersion, is considered to be an immediate image. This is since, first, 
it represents the unlimited character of reality, and second, it cancels out the mediation of 
the artist. However, VR constructs its claim to immediacy and autonomy by concealing 
the means of production beyond the peripheral vision of the viewer. The general 
mechanism of the autonomy claim in these image technologies can be boiled down to one 
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single discursive and technological operation: cancelling-by-concealing boundaries that 
defines visual structure. Thus the locus of this immediacy claim—as autonomous from 
the mediation of the artist and objective determinations of the medium itself—is the very 
finitude of the viewer. It assigns to the finitude of human vision a dual role as both the 
condition and means to transgress these limitations. Similarly, with respect to 
interactivity, VR doubles the function of the viewer both as the subject and object or the 
viewer and maker at once. By integrating the viewer into the image through her or his 
bodily determinations and aiming to increase the viewer’s control through the visual and 
temporal structure of the image, interactivity enforces a circular experience where the 
viewer can experience power over the image, as both a maker and viewer. 
These strategies, I argue, are the result of an episteme unique to modernity in which 
the subjective conditions of vision, particularly the bodily limitations of the subject, 
became the defining point of visual culture starting in the 19th century. Integrating 
corporeal determinations of the viewer into image technologies, the function of the 
viewer in this paradigm is doubled in the sense that she or he becomes both external to 
the image as a viewer and an integral part of its construction. For instance, as part of this 
paradigm where the viewer is integral part of the image as interface, stereoscopic 3D 
constructs the depth impression through the binocularity of the viewer, or in cinema it is 
the subject which constructs the illusion of continuity of the discrete frames. Similarly, as 
N. Katherine Hayles (Hayles, 1996) states, by the second half of the 20th century, this 
neutral interface—which enables an immediate representation of the world—was 
replaced by an idea of auto-generating autonomous systems. The emphasis on autopoiesis 
in the third wave of cybernetics (i.e., that which VR instantiates) has enabled a shift 
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towards understanding VR as being autonomous from the logic of representation 
altogether. As an extension of this emphasis on autonomy, it has become a commonly 
expressed idea that what is unique to VR is that it enables a disembodied experience 
where the viewer transcends its bodily determinations. To take one rather obvious 
example, the VR work Gender Swap claims to render an experience where two viewers 
of the opposite sex experience each other’s bodies. With the conspicuous reduction of 
gender difference to a digital image, this experience works, at best, as an allegory. While 
recognizing the allegorical value of the work, I contend that its affiliation with techno-
utopic discourses is problematic. In fact, its claim that viewers can experience bodily or 
gender difference must necessarily fail, lest the project fall into a techno-utopic discourse 
that reduces social, political and material differences to mere visual ones, thereby 
implying that gender difference can be overcome through technological means. In my 
view, the allegorical value of the piece is only valid if it fails to realize its false promise 
to abolish the sexual or gender chasm.  
From this foundation of empathy and autonomy claims in VR, I move to excavate 
the epistemological background of formal strategies that define both the technological 
and aesthetic conventions of contemporary VR practices. Echoing Foucault’s analysis of 
modernity, 8  I argue that VR originates in a particular episteme that is unique to 
modernity, one where the very limitations of the subject become the means of 
transcending these limitations. In this double logic of modernity, as Foucault frames it, 
the subject emerges as a condition for the laws to comprehend the external world. 
Trapped in a logical impasse of this specific episteme, which “offends or reconciles, 																																																								
8 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994.) 
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attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but liberate and 
enslave,” Foucault argues, “man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of 
knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator.”9 
Furthering Foucault’s critique into the context of neo-liberalism and the contemporary 
political subject, Byung-Chul Han underlines the paradoxical reconfiguration of freedom 
in the era of the internet, which has been celebrated as a medium of boundless liberty. 
Caught in a tragic moment, the contemporary subject, deemed to be “free of external and 
alien limitations,”10  Han argues, subjugates “itself to internal limitations and self-
constraints, which are taking the form of compulsive achievement and optimization.”11 
Equipped with new discursive and technological apparatuses, the subject becomes at once 
its own master and slave. Similar to Foucault’s “enslaved sovereign” or “observed 
spectator,” for Han the contemporary subject is trapped in the duality of freedom. He thus 
maintains that the very freedom that is epitomized as absolute political purpose is now 
producing coercion.12 What is more striking in this idea of freedom, where the subject 
auto-exploits itself in its isolation, is that “no political We is even possible that could rise 
up and undertake collective action.”13 Echoing both Foucault and Han, I argue this is why 
the political claim to develop an understanding of the other in the purportedly democratic 
site of VR is, in its essence, individualist, self-regulating, and self-exploiting 
1.4 Reinstating Boundaries  
 																																																								9 Ibid., 340. 10 Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. Translated by Erik 
Butler. (London: Verso, 2017.) 7.  11 Ibid., 7.  
12 Ibid., 7-8.  
13 Ibid., 12.  
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The third and final part of this dissertation engages with the question of autonomy 
through my artistic experiment in VR. The general mechanism of the autonomy claim in 
VR can be boiled down to one single discursive operation: cancelling-by-concealing 
boundaries that defines visual structure. Therefore, in order to respond to this set of 
conventions, I set out to reinstate the boundary as a problem. I argue that “boundary”—in 
the sense of a limit or threshold and as a technology that both separates and juxtaposes 
elements—is a unique aesthetic means to re-examine the associations and disassociations 
within concepts that define the artistic experience in VR, for example, autonomy and 
heteronomy, real and image, and actual and virtual. Boundary separates as soon as it 
brings elements together, associates and disassociates, bounds and unbounds at once. It is 
the locus that neither belongs to any of those it brings together nor depends on them. It is 
the touchstone where two elements express difference and sameness at once. It is neither 
autonomous nor heteronomous but both at once.  
Therefore, my intention is to push the immediacy claim to its limits to create a 
crisis in its conventions in such a way that the question of autonomy become visible as a 
problem. In order to do that, following the Cavellian formula, I have reconfigured the 
technological structure of the VR headset. To re-examine the associations and 
disassociations of the core concepts that define contemporary VR conventions—e.g., 
autonomy and heteronomy, immediacy and mediation, passivity and activity, and 
invisibility and visibility—my VR experience formally deploys immersive and 
interactive techniques that aim to problematize the concept of boundary. I aim to make 
both the perceptual boundaries of the viewer and the boundary that separates the actual 
space from the virtual visible as problems through the very construction of the immersive 
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and interactive aspects of the VR experience I have developed. While the former is 
deployed as an aesthetic means to unfold narrative structure and interactivity, the latter is 
deployed to push the discursive fabric of an unlimited image where real and actual 
becomes indiscernible into the extreme.  
1.5 Practice and Literature Review 
 
This section will provide an overview of the diverse ways in which VR has been 
deployed and considered in both artistic practices and in research in the academic 
context. I argue that two fundamental streams, each of which is quite diverse and 
complex, can be identified: the first one, which will be analyzed in depth in this 
dissertation, aims to use the immersive and interactive features of VR to achieve realistic 
representation of events, subjectivities from different walks of life, and places, while the 
second one encompasses the diverse aesthetic attempts to employ VR to present 
alternative perceptual regimes that are not immediately given in reality and existing 
media practices. In this context, I will call the first one the “representational regime” and 
the second the “presentational regime.”  
The first tendency falling within the representational regime is the journalistic use 
of VR that is employed by several media organizations in order to diversify their means 
of representation. In general, in the journalistic context, VR serves as a means to provide 
direct and affective engagement with extraordinary places, individuals and events. 
Initiated by the New York Times (NYT), which distributed over a million cardboard 
viewers to its print subscribers and created a high-end VR-specific smartphone 
application, many organizations such as VICE, the Wall Street Journal, PBS Frontline, 
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and the Guardian have experimented with the medium as a journalistic tool. The NYT 
has produced dozens of VR films to explore topics including remote places such as 
Antarctica (Under A Cracked Sky,14 Three Six Juliet,15), Northern California’s redwood 
forest (Be Still Among the Redwoods16) and Pluto (Seeking Pluto’s Frigid Heart17) as 
well as civil rights issues including the ongoing war in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan (We 
Who Remain18) and the stories of three child refugees (Displaced), or to provide a multi-
media experience which traces the history of the Olympic Games by incorporating 
archival photographs from the start of modern Olympics in 1896 to present time (The 
Modern Games19). Similar to the NYT, the Guardian has been experimenting with the 
medium and produced several 360-degree videos and VR experiments that engage with 
different social and political issues spanning from an immersive journey through 
Patagonia (Wilderness20), a 360 film about the mating season of frogs (The Joy of 
Frogs 21 ), a virtual experience of a forensic investigation (Crime Scene 22 ), and 
documentaries about autism (The Party23) and solitary confinement (6x924). The last 
																																																								
14 “Under a Cracked Sky,” YouTube Video, 09:47 posted by “The New York Times,” May 18, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecmGq5LGNx8 
15 “Three Six Juliet,” YouTube Video, 11:20 posted by “The New York Times,” May 18, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNr7B4ecbQU 
16 “Be Still Among the Redwoods,” The New York Times Video, 05:00, October 7, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/well/100000004693124/be-still-among-the-redwoods.html. 
17 “Seeking Pluto’s Frigid Heart,” The New York Times Video, 07:43, September 20, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/science/100000004657443/seeking-plutos-frigid-heart.html 
18 “We Who Remain,” The New York Times Video, 15:00, March 13, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/magazine/100000004980989/we-who-remain.html 
19 “The Modern Games,” The New York Times Video, 08:38, September 20, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/sports/100000004652044/the-modern-olympic-games.html 
20 “Wilderness,” The Guardian Video, 06:03, June 04, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/video/2018/jun/04/wilderness-an-immersive-360-journey-into-
patagonia-video 
21 “The Joy of Frogs,” YouTube Video, 06:03, posted by “The Guardian” March 29, 2018. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itxS75ftx4Q 
22 The Guardian, Crime Scene, The Guardian VR, v. 5.1, The Guardian, October 4, 2018.  
23 “The Party,” YouTube Video, 07:21, posted by “The Guardian” October 07, 2017.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtwOz1GVkDg 
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experience, for example, combines former prisoners’ testimonies and a virtual reality 
prison in order to replicate the experience of solitary confinement. However, despite its 
higher perceptual realism, journalistic use of VR has raised many ethical questions due to 
its mutable nature that can be manipulated for “ideological or sensational ends.” For 
instance, in their work, Ethics Guidelines for Immersive Journalism,25 Ana Luisa Sánchez 
Laws and Tormod Utne underline the paradoxical practices in journalism to increase the 
authenticity claim of the content, such as deleting the tripod in post-productions of 360-
degree videos.  
 
The second tendency employs the higher perceptual realism inherent to VR for 
travel documentaries and tourism videos. Here, in general, the attempt is to use the 
medium to provide visual access to sites that do not allow immediate access. One specific 
sub-type within this constellation worth noting is the use of VR as a means to enable an 
embodied and visual experience of places to which actual access would have disastrous 
effects: dark tourism. For instance, as Marina Hassapopoulou analyzed in her text 
Playing With History: Collective Memory, National Trauma, And Dark Tourism In 
Virtual Reality Docugames,26 the recently released docugame Chernobyl VR Project27 
“capitalizes on the morbid appeal of dark tourism by turning the site of the 1986 
Ukrainian nuclear power plant explosion into a game of historical exploration.” Another 
																																																																																																																																																																					
24 “6x9,” YouTube Video, 02:50, posted by “The Guardian” April 27, 2016.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odcsxUbVyZA 
25 Ana Luisa Sánchez Laws and Tormod Utne. “Ethics Guidelines for Immersive Journalism.” Frontiers in 
Robotics and AI 6 (2019). https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2019.00028. 
26 Marina Hassapopoulou. “Playing with History: Collective Memory, National Trauma, and Dark Tourism 
in Virtual Reality Docugames.” New Review of Film and Television Studies 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 
365–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/17400309.2018.1519207. 
27 The Farm 51, Chernobyl VR project, Oculus, v. 1.4, The Farm 51, September 28, 2017, Rift, Rift S.  
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VR game, produced by Polish production company The Farm 51, follows the same 
premise to create realistic access to Chernobyl, a site to which an actual visit could 
engender fatal outcomes. Another similar instance of representationalism in VR is the use 
of the medium for the purpose of live or non-live streaming of collective events such as 
concerts, sports, theatre performances, etc. This subcategory aims to democratize 
collective events such as performances by Coldplay and Paul McCartney, sports events 
from boxing to basketball (as offered by different channels such as Fox Sports and ESPN 
which now have streamed content available on Oculus TV), and the Welsh National 
Opera’s performances of Mozart’s The Magic Flute and Puccini’s Madam Butterfly, 
which can be experienced in VR.  
The final instance of representationalism is in the use of VR for education and 
training purposes. This instance, in fact, is the subject of the majority of VR research in 
both the academic and industrial contexts. What is unique to this category is that it 
generally capitalizes on the possibility of overcoming the shortcomings of other media 
used in the fields of education (Hwa, 2016; Lieu et al., 2017; Gulsun and Hakan, 2017; 
Malespina, 2016; Hiltz, 1994; Frerich et al., 2017; Seidel and Chatelier, 2013), 
psychology (Riva, 1998; Giuliana, 2018; Riva, 1997; Riva et al. 2004; Hofmann, 2017; 
Wiederhold and Bouchard, 2014), manufacturing (Ong, 2013, Banerjee, 1999; Banerjee 
and Zetu, 2001; Khan, Raouf and Cheng, 2011; Bartolo, 2007), engineering (Brice, 1997; 
Warwick, Gray, Roberts, 1993; Talaba and Amditis, 2008; Mihelj and et al., 2013), 
medicine, (Riener and Harders, 2012, Peters and et al., 2018), and architecture (Bertol 
and Foell, 1997, Whyte and Nikolić, 2018; Thomsen, 1994; Wang and Schnabel, 2008), 
among many others. With its capacity to create direct experience with the objects in the 
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fields with which these disciplines engage, VR has been used to enhance the educational 
experience.  
 
The second stream, the presentational regime, is much more radically complex in 
its strategies, and classifying and identifying conceptual links between its various 
instances is likewise more challenging. However, I argue that this regime, in general, 
attempts to find ways in which VR can serve as a means to access events to which 
perceptual access is not possible via other media practices, and which transgress human 
perception. For instance, in psychology, VR has been considered as a means to re-enact a 
traumatic event of the past, to which access is impossible, in order to overcome it 
(Brandt, 2013; Westwood, 2001, Garrick and Williams, 2014; Meek, 2011; Safir and et 
al., 2014.). It is generally used in “exposure therapy,” in which patients with anxiety-
related conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are repeatedly 
confronted with the re-enacted version of the cues that trigger their stress reactions. For 
instance, in one of the programs, JoAnn DiFede, a professor of Psychology in Psychiatry 
at Weill Cornell Medical College at Cornell University, employed VR in her research to 
accelerate recovery, creating virtual scenarios for combatants returning from the Gulf 
War and Afghanistan who are experiencing symptoms of acute stress response and 
PTSD.28  
Another instance of presentationalism in VR is the research and artistic endeavours 
that focus on how the body can be re-contextualized in virtual images. For some, it 
troubles the Cartesian dualism of body and mind (Hansen, 2001; 2006; Char 2001; 2002; 																																																								
28 JoAnn DiFede, “Enhancing Exposure Therapy for PTSD: Virtual Reality and Imaginal Exposure with a 
Cognitive Enhancer.” Weill Medical College of Cornell University New York United States, October 1, 
2016. https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1024462. 
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2003; 2004; Katherine 1999). For instance, the work of Char Davies, one of the early VR 
artists, has been the initial departure point in the discussions around embodiment and 
disembodiment and continuity and discontinuity in VR. In her work Osmose,29 an 
experience that combines a “head-mounted display and a motion capture vest with 
breathing and balance sensor,” she says that she “is motivated by the desire to heal the 
Cartesian split between mind/body, subject/object, which has shaped our cultural values 
and contributed to the West's dominating stance towards (and estrangement from) life. In 
this context, Osmose seeks to re-sensitize—reconnecting mind, body and world.” Unlike 
Davies, Rachel Rossin, another pioneer in VR art practices, has put forward the thesis 
that that VR is an aesthetic device that creates visual experiments where physical bodies 
become irrelevant and redundant. Generally considered to be hyperbolic, the discourse of 
disembodiment in VR has been criticized by many scholars. For some, despite its 
intention to invert Cartesian dualism, it is in fact the literal re-enactment of Cartesian 
ontology and is guided by the techno-Utopian ideology of liberation from the body by 
dissolving into the machine (Coyne, 1994, Sardar, 1995, Hayles, 1996). In fact, for some, 
what ultimately defines the VR experience is the very central function of the body. Along 
with its central function to synthesize VR image as interface, the body has been 
considered to be a means to construct the narrative structure through interactivity. For 
instance, in his work Hospital With One Entrance And Two Exits,30 Deniz Tortum argues 
that VR enables an interactive regime where the body is the constitutive locus, and he 
coins the concept of “embodied montage,” which, for him “is the decoupling and 
																																																								
29 Deniz Tortum, Hospital With One Entrance And Two Exits, 04:00, (2016), Virtual Reality 
30 “Osmose,” YouTube Video, 16:55, posted by Immersence, June 03, 2014.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54O4VP3tCoY 
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recoupling of action and perception in virtual reality experiences in order to generate new 
meanings, similar to montage in film.”   
The final moment of VR in this category encompasses the different works that 
feature interplay between the continuity and discontinuity of actual and virtual spaces in 
site-specific art practices. They generally deploy VR in order to engage with the politics 
of space. For instance, in Biidaaban: First Light, 31  an interactive virtual reality 
experience produced by Lisa Jackson, users navigate through “familiar spaces overgrown 
by vegetation while being immersed in the original languages of Tkaronto.” As an 
interplay between actual space and its virtual presentation, First Light is a reflection on 
the space as a juxtaposing of different modalities in language, time and space. Employing 
a similar strategy, VR has also been mobilized to induce reflection on global warming, 
which is an event that is distributed in time and space so diffusely that it defies human 
perception as a singular occurrence. It is believed that VR will help to make climate 
change’s invisible causes visible, its distant effects immediate, and the nebulous harm it 
causes highly personal by allowing viewers to visualize it within their personal space. 
While there is abundant data on the impacts and causes of global warming, making such 
data accessible and relevant to people’s everyday lives is a challenge for which VR is 
believed to be particularly well-suited. By bringing data into personal space, VR is 
employed to enable a unique opportunity to make the problem perceptible. For instance, 
Living Rocks: A Fragment of the Universe,32 by Australian artists James Darling and 
Lesley Forwood, immerses visitors in the Earth of 3 billion years ago to get them to 
imagine the future. Presented by the Art Gallery of South Australia, the work is an 																																																								
31 Lisa Jackson, Biidaaban: First Light, 06:00-08:00, (2018), Virtual Reality 
32 James Darling and Lesley Forwood in collaboration with Art Gallery of South Australia, Living Rocks: A 
Fragment of the Universe, May 08, 2019 - November 24, 2019.  
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installation of a large pool of water and rocks against the backdrop of digital screens 
depicting the early days of an uncontaminated planet. Another example is the This is 
Climate Change33 virtual reality series from Danfung Dennis and Eric Strauss from the 
VR studio Condition One. The first film in the series provides a birds-eye view of the 
Amazon rainforest which is subjected to aggressive deforestation to make room for the 
cattle industry. The second deploys VR to enable the viewer to experience the struggle of 
California's Department of Forestry and Fire Protection during tumultuous wildfires that 
recently occurred. A third film depicts the direct effect of global warming in Somalia and 
nearby African countries which suffer from widespread famine.   
In general these two tendencies in contemporary VR practices differ from each 
other in their approach to real and virtual continuity. While the first one attempts to 
employ aesthetic strategies to increase perceptual realism and sense of presence, the 
other, I argue, capitalizes on the discontinuity between actual and virtual in time, space 
and bodies in order to inspire reflection through difference. The representational regime 
and its intended political outcomes will be analyzed in this dissertation through critical 
engagement with the concepts such as immediacy, autonomy and empathy. And the 
aesthetic strategy that defines the presentational regime as an interplay between the 
associations and disassociations within concepts, events and activities that define the 
aesthetic experience in VR will be a defining point of the artistic component of this 
dissertation.  
 																																																									
33Danfung Dennis and Eric Strauss. This Is Climate Change. Virtual Reality.. 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt8278166/. 	
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1.6 Chapter Summaries  
 
Chapter One critically engages with three research-creation schemata that have been 
developed in the Canadian context: that of Manning-Massumi, that of Springgay- Irwin-
Kind, and that of Chapman-Sawchuk. Common to these schemata, due to the indefinite 
character of the relationship between the elements that they bring together, research-
creation is deemed to be conceptually impossible to subsume under a universalist and 
essentialist formula: in other words, it is always autonomous from any external discursive 
regulations. This is why, according to Manning-Massumi’s schema, research-creation is 
not even a method. It is, in her words, “against method, active in its refutation of pre-
existing modes of existence.”34 In Springgay-Irwin-Kind’s schema of a/r/tography, the 
very function of research-creation is “to resist to the formation of specific criteria” as “it 
is a research process that is fluid, uncertain, and temporal.”35 For Chapman-Sawchuck’s 
schema, research-creation is not a fixed methodological approach, but “each and every 
research-creation project also carries the possibility of acting as an intervention in its own 
right.”36 Due to its hybridity, this autonomy from universalizing and essentialist external 
discourses is what conditions the very function of research-creation; to accommodate the 
elusive and excessive character of aesthetic creativity—which is by definition anti-
essentialist and beyond existing discourses, models, formulas, concepts and means—
research-creation must be posited as autonomous.  
																																																								34 Erin Manning, “Ten Propositions for Research-Creation.” In Collaboration in Performance Practice: 
Premises, Workings and Failures. (New York: Springer, 2016.): 138.  35 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 898.  36  Owen B. Chapman, and Kim Sawchuk. “Research-Creation: Intervention, Analysis and ‘Family 
Resemblances.’” Canadian Journal of Communication 37, no. 1 (April 13, 2012): 23.  
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Therefore, in this doubling logic where the possibility of research-creation is 
simultaneously conditioned by its impossibility, it is postulated that the internal 
contradiction of research-creation as a hybrid methodology is what grounds its critical 
function against given knowledge production processes. This formula, I argue, bears the 
risk of suggesting that the autonomy of research-creation automatically functions as an 
antagonistic and critical method. To put it a different way, these schemata risk falling into 
an automatism or essentialism in the sense that each research-creation project has to 
either translate or radicalize the internal impasse of research-creation into practice in 
order to challenge the hierarchical knowledge model of academia. The means of 
challenging the universalizing, determinist, objectivist and binary logic of academia is a 
priori given in its very hybrid essence, which is automatically or essentially beyond 
binary logic. However, in order to dislodge the essentialism they aim to expostulate, they 
seem to create another: the essentialist link between the autonomy of research-creation 
and the critical or creative function given in its hybridity. In fact, identifying an “anti-
essentialist essence” with its critical function, this automatic antagonism and creativity 
that is supposed to be inherent to research-creation is possible only insofar as research 
and art are posited as oppositional both historically and essentially. I therefore maintain 
that the schemata reinforce and assume the very dualism and binary distribution of 
creativity and research that they aim to trouble. Moreover, the idea that the autonomy of 
research-creation inevitably performs critical and creative action on given knowledge 
production processes is not only essentialist but also eliminates the possibility of critique. 
In this sense, it risks negating its original critical intentions: it reduces the institution or 
the act of critique to a unilateral protocol.  
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Following this discussion, I further historicize research-creation in its aesthetic and 
political presumptions. My analysis consists of two instances of historicization as both 
scholarship and methodology: while the former attempts to map the historical 
background of the doubling logic of present research-creation schemata in contemporary 
philosophy of art, particularly in the context of cinema, the latter consists of 
implementing historicity as a defining character of research-creation. The latter is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four; going beyond the false dichotomy of 
autonomy and heteronomy, which are dynamically related elements of the creative 
process, I argue that art in general and media in particular have to critically engage with 
the historical and material context in which they become possible. More precisely, my 
aim is not simply to recognize the simultaneity or indiscernibility of autonomy and the 
heteronomy of art or of medium but to radicalize the tension between them. I deploy 
them against each other, in the sense that the autonomous character of medium as 
technological organization is mobilized against the historical discursive pattern which 
engendered it as both technology and artistic medium. 
Chapter Two maps out the historical background of the discursive fabric that 
defines contemporary VR aesthetics and its connection to cinema and stereoscopic 3D 
(S3D). Since its inception, VR has been an integral part of and the model for a particular 
paradigm of cinema. Defined by a paradoxical telos where two ostensibly antithetical 
meanings of end overlap, this paradigm seeks to realize the essential promise of cinema: 
its abolishment. It is in this context that the first chapter provides archaeological research 
on the recurrent topic of future cinema, of which VR is the latest iteration.  
	 25	
Following Erkki Huhtamo’s media archaeology schema, built upon Michel 
Foucault’s and Friedrich Kittler’s discourse analysis, the first section of this chapter 
outlines the methodology used. I argue that, as a recurrent topic, future cinema can serve 
as a means to analyze the complex and uneven trajectory of VR within the media 
landscape. In the second section, I outline the conceptual framework of the first future 
cinema model, which was considered to be stereoscopic 3D. Particularly evident in early 
film theory such as that of Hugo Münsterberg, Béla Balázs and Sergei Eisenstein, S3D 
was promoted as a technological model for future cinema that would realize the artistic 
promise of cinema. Through its spatial capacity to blur the limit between screen and 
proscenium, according to these schemata, it would reveal the artistic essence of cinema, 
whose promise was to create an image where spectacle and spectator, image and reality, 
would reach a state of indiscernibility. However, S3D has a double position in the history 
of cinema: it was considered to be both the origin and the future of cinema. The next 
section engages with Jonathan Crary’s and André Bazin’s analyses of S3D, which posited 
it was the inaugural technology of the visual paradigm in the 19th century and culminated 
in the invention of cinema. The fourth section engages with a second instance of future 
cinema, which I associate with VR. Abolishing the limitations inherent to cinema as an 
image technology, VR is linked to utopic political models that aim to eliminate difference 
in favour of social harmony. I conclude the chapter by outlining the main technological 
and aesthetic operations inherent to future cinema as a discursive machine.  
Chapter Three consists of two sections: The first works to examine the formal and 
political presumptions of contemporary VR aesthetics. Built upon the hyperbolic 
presumption that VR enables a non-mediated experience wherein the viewer can interact 
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or identify with different subjectivities, contemporary VR aesthetics is in large part 
characterized by the concept of empathy. It is believed that with its higher perceptual 
realism relative to cinematic image with its immersive and interactive structure, VR 
enables not only a technological utopia where ontological differences between image and 
reality are suspended, but also a democratic site where social, class, gender and racial 
differences can be eliminated. In the second part of this chapter, I historicize the formal 
tenets of empathy discourse through an examination of early architectural and pictorial 
immersive media and also cybernetics.  
I argue that empathy discourse is not only false in its technological presumptions but 
that it is also problematic in its techno-utopic political program. It is, I argue, the result of 
a techno-utopic paradigm that began in modernity, which aims to develop a neutral 
interface to transform the world into immaterial visual information in order to control it. 
Echoing Rancière, I argue that the main problem of empathy discourse stems from its 
claim to unification—namely, that it can bridge the ontological split between real and 
imaginary and build harmony in society through empathetic understanding between 
different social-political categories. Moreover, the empathy/immediacy discourse, as I 
discussed above and expand upon in Chapter Two, is the result of an ongoing techno-
utopic paradigm that seeks to develop a universal, all-encompassing and omniscient 
interface that can enable us to control matter, the world, and nature, and therefore the 
subjectivities that inhabit them. This paradigm in large part assumes an immediate 
interface where the world and its representation, image and reality, spectator and 
spectacle become variable realms. Its fundamental operation can be boiled down to 
eliminating the ontological, social and epistemological boundaries that serve as a 
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discursive technology that constructs difference. Inferred from the spatial structure of VR 
as a limitless image, which is itself hyperbolic presumption, this model aims to translate 
the unbounded formal structure of VR into a political program.  
Chapter Four consists of three complementary sections. It first outlines the 
methodological framework that defines my artistic experiment in VR. Based on the 
critique of three research-creation schemata, which I argue are trapped in the false 
dichotomy of the autonomy and heteronomy of art, I contend that artistic practices in 
general and media in particular communicate and embody the discursive fabrics in which 
they become possible. Following the analysis of four aesthetic discourses on artistic 
autonomy that go beyond this false dichotomy— Kant, Schiller, Adorno, and Cavell—I 
maintain that the autonomy of art can only be posited when its heteronomous nature is 
constructed as a limit to transgress. Art in general and any medium in particular are both 
autonomous and heteronomous with respect to the discursive fabric that defines their 
aesthetic, technological and political coordinates. They are heteronomous in the sense 
that each medium communicates, materializes and embodies the very epistemological 
paradigm in which it becomes possible as a technology, and they are autonomous in the 
sense that they cannot be reduced to essentialist definitions of the epistemological and 
aesthetic paradigm in which they emerge. However, my aim is not simply to recognize 
the simultaneity or indiscernibility of the autonomy and heteronomy of art or of a given 
medium but to radicalize the tension between these dynamically related elements. They 
are, after all, inherent to the material organization of the medium, in the sense that the 
autonomous character of a medium as technological and material organization, and I 
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mobilize this against the historical paradigm which culminated in its invention as both 
technology and artistic means.  
The second section, following this methodological framework, sets out to 
historicize the formal strategies of contemporary VR. Though VR is generally idealized 
as an immediate and unlimited image system that transgresses the limits which separate 
image from reality, and by extension from the viewer, the matter, and so on, I argue that 
contemporary VR conventions embody an episteme developed in the 19th century which 
operates through the double function of the subject through its limitations. Crystallized in 
the immersive and interactive features of VR, the immediacy and, by extension, freedom 
claim of conventional VR aesthetics, I argue, require visual and corporeal limitations of 
the viewer as a precondition. For instance, with respect to immersion, concealing the 
means of production beyond the peripheral vision of the viewer, the phantasmagoric 
effect of the unbounded image system that defines VR as shorn of spatial and material 
limitations is only possible by the bodily limitations of the viewer. It assigns to the 
finitude of human vision a dual role as both the condition and the means to transgress 
these finitude. With respect to interactivity, VR doubles the function of the viewer as 
both subject and object, or viewer and maker, at once. In its technological configuration 
as both an immersive and interactive medium, VR communicates this peculiar idea of 
freedom where it is the viewer’s finitude in its visual and corporeal configuration that 
allows it to experience this freedom. Similar to Foucault’s critiques of modernity, this 
purported freedom presupposes a double function of viewer as both the subject and the 
object of the image. I argue that, as the extension of a particular idea of subjectivity that 
emerged in modernity, the visual regime claimed to be inherent to VR communicates a 
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double logic where viewer is both an “enslaved sovereign” and “observed spectator,” as 
Foucault formulates. The hyperbolic claims of autonomy both from the mediation of the 
artist and from reality gesture towards an aesthetic program where the viewer is trapped 
in an illusion of self-regulating omnipotent political power. Finally, following Han’s 
critique of freedom in the context of neo-liberalism, I argue that this political power that 
is deemed to be inherent to VR, and particularly to 360-degree documentaries, which aim 
to induce empathy, reinforces the a political subjectivity that regresses into its own 
isolated and hermetic omnipotence.  
The last section provides an overview of formal techniques that I develop in my VR 
experience as a response to my conceptual analysis of VR conventions. My intention is 
not to use VR as a medium to communicate a specific social, cultural, subjective or 
geographical event, subjectivity, or character; on the contrary, it is to engage with the 
medium itself through both theoretical critique and artistic experimentation, mobilizing a 
medium against the dominant paradigm that rendered it technologically possible. Parallel 
to the critique that I develop in the previous sections of this chapter, I address the ways in 
which the question of the viewer’s autonomy in VR is subverted through the immersive 
and interactive experience I developed. Therefore, in order to respond to this set of 
conventions, I reinstate the boundary as a problem in virtual space. As a technology 
which both separates and juxtaposes the elements that it mediates, boundary, I argue, is a 
unique aesthetic means to re-examine the associations and disassociations of the sets of 
concepts that define the artistic experience in VR such as autonomy and heteronomy, real 
and image, and actual and virtual. I problematize two different boundaries: The visual 
boundaries of the viewer, and the boundaries between the actual and virtual 
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environments. While the former is deployed as an aesthetic means to unfold the narrative 
structure and interactivity, the latter is deployed to push the discursive fabric of unlimited 
image where real and actual becomes indiscernible into the extreme.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Research-Creation: Historicizing Creativity 
2.1 Introduction  	
 
 Art does not exist in itself; it is an outcome of a complex 
set of relationships between what one is allowed to say, to 
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perceive, and to understand. Events and objects only exist 
within the fabric of discourse, and are perceived as art, or a 
revolution in art, only within this fabric.	−	Jacques	Rancière37 
    
Dr. Nobel Price, the most tragic character on Sesame Street, is a committed 
inventor who lives in his far-off island laboratory. In each episode, after a lengthy 
description, Dr. Price unveils his latest invention to the public; however, what makes him 
tragic is that his creations are always something which has already been invented — only 
the names he gives them are different. For instance, his foot snuggles are just a pair of 
socks, his talky stick is a microphone, his tinker table is a piano, the Sky Finder is a 
helium balloon. It is clear that as a researcher he possesses the high level of technological 
means and understanding to develop and execute a concept. However, his creations lack 
something very essential: creativity. Unfortunately, his problem is not easy to solve, since 
by definition it is beyond the existing models, tools, concepts and means; it’s excessive 
and elusive. In fact, to frame creativity is a paradoxical undertaking. What is created has 
to be radically different from the given means, strategies, styles and conventions which in 
turn condition it. It starts with the clichés and predetermined criteria in order to transgress 
or subvert them. It has to invert the conditions in which it becomes possible. Thus it 
requires the inventor or the artist to have a historical understanding of the very context in 
which they operate. This is what Dr. Price is missing. He has a high level of 
technological skill, but in his autonomous and isolated life on his far-off island he fails to 
develop the understanding of the historical context in which his creative activity is 
embodied. He is a good technologist but a bad historian.  																																																								
37 Jacques Rancière. “The Politics of Art: An interview with Jacques Rancière.” Interview by Anna Wójcik, 
Verso Books Blogs, November, 2015. 
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As a hybrid inquiry method that integrates a creative process, research-creation 
fundamentally grapples with the same problem, but in the context of academia, to move 
beyond traditional text-based dissertations in order to embrace the complex discourses 
possible within the arts. However, as a result of engaging with the indefinite and dynamic 
third site, that of the relationship between seemingly incommensurable concepts or 
activities such as art and science, theory and practice, image and text, etc., it has been 
widely considered as a paradoxical mode of inquiry. For the opponents of research-
creation, since it cannot be governed by pre-established rules and cannot be judged 
according to predetermined criteria, it is an impossible endeavour (Sinner et al. 2006). 
For proponents, this impasse is the very promise of research-creation, since the universal 
formula pertaining to methods for creative research processes is what research-creation 
aims to call into question (Chapman and Sawchuk, 2012; Manning and Massumi, 2014; 
Springgay et al. 2006). Thus, inverting the internal impasse of research-creation, they 
charge it with mobilizing its grounding dilemma, which stems from the coupling of that 
which is deemed to be paradoxical, in order to generate new forms of knowledge that 
exceed and destabilize the horizon of existing methodologies, epistemological procedures 
and power relationships. According to this schema, therefore, each art-based dissertation 
has to embrace this grounding impasse inherent to research-creation as an exploratory 
and experimental epistemological model. This is why it has been called an “epistemology 
of ambiguity,”38 “liquid knowing,”39 “material thinking,”40 “living inquiry,”41 etc. For 																																																								
38 Tom Barone, Touching Eternity: The Enduring Outcomes of Teaching. (New York: Teachers College 
Press, 2001.) 
39 Robin Nelson, Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances. 2013 
edition. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.) 
40 Kathleen Vaughan, “Research creation as material thinking: Reflecting on the context of making of 
projects by two doctoral students at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada” Studies in Material Thinking, 
Vol. 3 (November 2009)  
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instance, Elliot W. Eisner, one of the pioneers of research-creation scholarship, in his text 
“The Promise and Perils of Alternative Forms of Data Representation,” argues that using 
non-textual forms of expression can provide what might be called “productive 
ambiguity.”42  
Thus, according to the proponents, the very promise of research-creation is to 
mobilize its internal impasse in order to challenge the universalizing and essentialist 
definitions of the relationship between research and art, theory and practice etc. I contend 
that this logic where the possibility of research-creation is doubled with its impossibility 
is not only contradictory but also problematic in its political and aesthetic presumptions 
in the sense that it postulates that the hybrid nature of research-creation, in its essence, 
functions as an anti-essentialist methodology. Along with the risk of being trapped in a 
vicious circle of self-determination and self-evidence, the schemata that I will scrutinize 
in this chapter presuppose that research-creation is autonomous from the historical 
context in which it emerged due to its hybrid structure. However, this purported 
paradoxical nature, which enables its autonomy from the historical context in which it 
became possible, I contend, is historically connected to the 20th century aesthetic 
paradigm. In other words, its claim to be trans-historical due to the very impossibility of 
subsuming it under any external criteria that historically precedes it is, I contend, the 
extension of an aesthetic paradigm that was already operative in the 20th century. In this 
context, this dissertation will work to historicize research-creation in its aesthetic and 																																																																																																																																																																					
41 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 898.  
42  Eisner writes “By productive ambiguity, I mean that the material presented is more evocative than 
denotative, and in its evocation, it generates insight and invites attention to complexity. Unlike the 
traditional ideal of conventional research, some alternative forms of data representation result in less 
closure and more plausible interpretations of the meaning of the situation.” (Elliot W. Eisner, “The Promise 
and Perils of Alternative Forms of Data Representation.” Educational Researcher 26, no. 6 (1997): 4–10.)  
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political presumptions. It examines two instances of historicization: as scholarship and 
methodology. I will first map the historical background of grounding presumptions of 
research creation, and then attempt to implement historicity in the very process of 
research and creation of this dissertation. This methodological intervention will be 
addressed in detail in the last chapter, where I frame the specific conceptual approach to 
the methodology of this dissertation. As for the historicizing of research-creation 
scholarship, I will first outline the aesthetic and political presumptions of three research-
creation schemata in the Canadian context; subsequently I will map out their conceptual 
connection with a specific aesthetic paradigm in which, I argue, cinema is the ultimate 
model. I will specifically look at three models (Deleuze, Badiou and Rancière) where 
cinema, similar to research-creation, is framed as an aesthetic means to dismantle the 
dualist and essentialist episteme of Modernity.  
2.2 Three Models for Research-Creation in Canadian Context 
2.2.1 Family Resemblances  
 
The first model I will analyze was developed by Owen Chapman and Kim 
Sawchuk, both in Communication Studies at Concordia University. With its non-textual 
components (i.e., different modes of artistic expression), research-creation, for them, is 
primarily a methodological and epistemological challenge to “the text-based bureaucratic 
culture,” “the logico-deductive or analytic forms of argumentation or presentation,” and 
“formulaic representations of the academic genre and the production of knowledge in 
print cultures.”43 However, instead of simply contrasting it with traditional methods, 
																																																								
43 Ibid., 6.  
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which, according to them, amounts to “reinforc(ing) the binary thinking that is at the root 
of the state of affairs they are lamenting,”44 they develop a model unique to research-
creation’s conjunctive possibilities. In order to do this, they suggest four different 
subcategories that differ from each other in terms of how the articulation of research and 
creation is realized: 1) “Research-for-creation”; 2) “Research-from-creation”; 3) 
“Creative presentations of research”; and 4) “Creation-as-research.”  
They model this set of articulations after the concept of “family resemblance” 
which Wittgenstein developed in Philosophical Investigations. 45  For Wittgenstein, 
clusters of objects to which a word refers cannot be conjoined by “essential similarity” or 
“a universal significance,” instead, concepts, with their “blurred edges” traverse “a 
complicated network of multiple similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.”46 This is 
why he suggests “family resemblance” as a better allegory to grasp the meaning of a 
word, which traverses sets of relations that are constituted not only by “what is akin, but 
also what is different.”47 Modeled after “family resemblance,” Chapman-Sawchuk’s 
schema brings together different articulations between research and creation as a 
particular instance of family resemblance that defines the multimodal relationship 
between them. This is why subcategories are not mutually exclusive, “not easily 
separated,” and in fact are connected to each other at various points. However, I argue 
that these articulations presuppose an initial separation of research and creation. In other 
words, the coupling of research and creation is only possible when research and creation 
are positioned in an asymmetrical relation, in the sense that the traditional forms of 																																																								
44 Ibid., 12. 
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010,): 66. 
46 Ibid., 66.  
47  Owen B. Chapman, and Kim Sawchuk. “Research-Creation: Intervention, Analysis and ‘Family 
Resemblances.’” Canadian Journal of Communication 37, no. 1 (April 13, 2012): 13.  
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research lack creativity, and that creativity is an autonomous event that is not pursued by 
any type of research in and of itself. Reproducing and reiterating the binary logic that 
they criticize, their articulation is only possible by reinforcing the binary logic that 
distributes research and creation as exclusive activities.  
For instance, the first category, “Research-for-creation” defines the inquiries where 
the main outcome is the creative work, and the research is a preliminary study which 
“involves an initial gathering together of material, ideas, concepts, collaborators, 
technologies, et cetera, in order to begin.”48 With its sequential ordering of research and 
creation, this subcategory misleadingly suggests that the activities associated with 
research (such as gathering data, formulating ideas and concepts etc.) are exclusively 
objective in nature and do not require any creativity. However, in order to overcome 
obstacles at every stage of conducting scientific research, there is a constant need for 
new, imaginative, and creative methods, means, formulations and even problems. This 
subcategory, like the others as we will see, first isolates research and creation in order to 
articulate them. Therefore their existence is only possible via a dualistic logic, which 
distributes research and art as exclusive activities: research as objective, uncreative, non-
imaginative and art as ahistorical, self-generating and the sole site of creativity.  
In the second subcategory, “Research-from-creation,” the creative work itself is 
“used to generate information on user-responses to help build the project in question, as 
well as future initiatives.”49 Here, inverting the ordering of the first subcategory, they 
imply that the creative work constitutes a self-generating origin, whereas research data is 
																																																								
48 Ibid.,15. 
49 They write “Research is not only part of developing art projects that then stand on their own; rather, 
performances, experiences, interactive art works, et cetera can also be ways of generating research data that 
can then be used to understand different dynamics.” (Ibid., 16.) 
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subsequently produced on this already-given artwork. However, to be able to create 
artwork, there is obviously a need for an initial research to define the framework, means, 
problem etc. The third articulation between research and creation in their cluster of 
family resemblances is “Creative presentations of research” which defines the inquiries 
where the presentation of traditional academic research is realized “in a creative fashion.” 
Very similar to the first one, this subcategory is based on the erroneous notion that not 
every presentation employs creative means, and that there are means of presentation that 
are objective and neutral. It dismisses the alterations that can occur with any given 
presentation method. The aesthetic means that are employed in the presentation, this 
subcategory alludes, do not add anything to the content or to the research result; they 
amount simply to an aesthetic choice that does not alter the process. The last one, 
“Creation-as-research” seems to be a combination of the previous three, “where creation 
is required in order for research to emerge.”50 It is a creative process as research practice 
that can redefine “the very concepts of theory, creativity, and knowledge.”51 Instead of 
aligning them sequentially, as is the case of the previous three, it aims to accomplish “a 
production of theoretical knowledge not through, but as creation.” 52  According to 
Chapman and Sawchuk, in this subcategory, the methodology, research and theory are 
examined and redefined through the process of creation. I believe this subcategory is 
more comprehensive and does not commit the error of reproducing what they criticize. It 
does not place research and creation in sequential and binary order.  
However, this only serves to highlight the “irony at the very core of this article,” 
																																																								
50 Ibid., 19. 
51 Ibid., 21.  
52 Ibid., 19.  
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which they recognize.53 That is, these subcategories can only operate simultaneously, and 
in fact I argue that they can function only by outdoing and complementing each other at 
the same time. Furthermore, their method consists of two discursive operations that are 
oppositional and cancel each other: the separation of research and creation and the 
undoing of this separation through their articulation. I am not trying to state the obvious 
in the sense that research and creation can only be articulated if initial isolation is taken 
as a given. The problem is that the primary operation on which they establish the 
discursive fabric of their methodology as articulation of research and creation is the very 
separation of research and creation. In other words, they first isolate them in order to 
overcome the isolation.  
2.2.1 Sense Lab 
 
Developed by Brian Massumi and Erin Manning through their work at the 
Senselab at Concordia University, the second schema I will examine is framed primarily 
as an “immanent critique” within research-creation practices, which, according to them, 
bear the risk of developing “troubling alignments with the neoliberal economy.”54 
Explored through ten propositions in “Propositions for Thought in the Act” (in Thought 
																																																								
53 Recognizing this paradox within their text they conclude as follows: “We are also aware of an irony at 
the very core of this article, which has taken a traditional academic tone and style, to argue for the 
uniqueness of research-creation as a complex approach and intervention into the way knowledge is 
constructed and understood, and to interrogate the present and potential relations between creativity and 
scholarly practice. This is deliberate, at least in this instance. Finally, our ‘approach’ and construction of a 
set of inter-related categories is not meant to be definitive. It is intended to invite a playful consideration of 
the family resemblances between these different aspects of what is often condensed together into a 
hyphenated term, research-creation.” (Ibid., 22.)  
54 Their approach on the one hand attempts to develop a new model (metamodel as they call it) “for 
rethinking the very question of what is at stake in pedagogy, in practice, and in collective experimentation,” 
and on the other hand it is an attempt to develop a response to the neoliberal paradigm of the high-turnover, 
innovation-driven “knowledge economy.” Erin Manning and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages 
in the Ecology of Experience. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.) 
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in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience55), this “immanent critique” is a 
combination of two similar ontologies: the radical empiricism of William James, and 
Alfred North Whitehead’s procedural ontology that emerged as a critique of the idealist 
and dualist worldview of late modernity. Moreover, these two epistemological references 
not only frame the conceptual background of the relational, conjunctive,56 procedural, 
multimodal and open-ended structure of research-creation, they all are ultimately called 
upon to “explore new economies of relation” and “forces of life.”  
According to Manning and Massumi’s schema, the fundamental function of 
research-creation is to register and reproduce what William James calls “pure 
experience” as the immanent relationship of terms that is not subsumed under an external, 
teleological or original transcendental concept/discourse/program/aim. In fact, they state 
that they assume the very challenge of “radical empiricism” as the function of their 
schema.57 Radical empiricism, as explicated in The Meaning of Truth, for James, is a 
doctrine which postulates that the only things that can be part of a philosophical project 
are “things definable in terms drawn from experience.”58 In other words, James explains, 
“things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the 
material for philosophic debate.”59 By this postulate, he arrives at a statement of fact: “the 
relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of 																																																								
55  Erin Manning and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience. 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.) 
56 Erin Manning writes “The conjunction is at work, actively adjusting the always immanent coupling of 
research and creation, asking how the thinking in the act can be articulated, and what kind of analogous 
experience it can be coupled with, asking how a making is a thinking in its own right, asking what that 
thinking might be able to do.” (Erin Manning, “Ten Propositions for Research-Creation.” In Collaboration 
in Performance Practice: Premises, Workings and Failures. (New York: Springer, 2016): 137.  
57 Erin Manning writes “Let us be up to the challenge of radical empiricism as that which begins in the 
midst, in the mess of relations not yet organized into terms such as ‘subject’ and ‘object.’” (Ibid., 134.) 
58 William James, The Meaning of Truth. (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2013): 6. 
59 Ibid., 36.  
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direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.”60 
Life as an “immediate flux” consists of both things and also the relations between them, 
and relations, conjunctive or disjunctive, are “as real as the terms united by them.”61 
Finally, he develops a conclusion out of the postulate and states that “the directly 
apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, 
but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.”62 Similarly, 
rejecting the idea of “trans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual 
categories,”63 Manning-Massumi, for instance, in their fourth proposition (“Dwell in the 
transversal”), frame research-creation as a relational, experiential and open-ended process 
that cannot be defined according to a pre-constructed program. Instead it is a process that 
mobilizes the relational fields of terms to destabilize existing methods.  
The second figure that informs their model is Alfred North Whitehead and the 
procedural ontology which he proposed. His ontology is built on the critique of Hume’s 
empiricism in which the succession of events64 is not determined according to a causality 
principle. As in the famous example of the billiard ball,65 for Hume, there is no objective 
or rational principle that will provide us with a formula to connect a cause with a reason, 
but rather it is only human “habit” which connects these separated elements. However, 																																																								
60 Ibid., 136.  
61 William James. Essays in Radical Empiricism. (Massachusetts: Courier Corporation, 2003.): 107.  
62 William James. The Meaning of Truth. (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2013): 173.  
63 William James. Essays in Radical Empiricism. (Massachusetts: Courier Corporation, 2003.): 43. 
64 Hume writes: “All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can 
observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined but never connected.” (David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. (Simon & Brown, 2011.): 74.  
65 Hume writes “When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even 
suppose motion in the second ball should not by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact 
or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May 
not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from 
the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should 
we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our 
reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.” (Ibid., 19.)  
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Whitehead rejects the notion that events in themselves are ever merely “loose and 
separate,” or that the world can be reduced to “local matters of particular fact.” For him 
“there is nothing which ‘simply happens.’”66 There are no isolated data, because in every 
act of experience “the datum includes its own interconnections.” 67  Referring to 
Whitehead, Manning-Massumi emphasize the process which is subjected to constant 
change that emerges from the interconnectedness of events: “research-creation is less 
about an object than a mode of activity that is at its most interesting when it is 
constitutive of new processes.”68 For instance, they suggest in their fifth proposition [Be 
Speculatively Pragmatic (Enjoy the Process)] that the value which can be produced in 
research-creation is the process itself. 69 
Ultimately the procedural, experiential and relational epistemologies to which 
they refer to define research-creation are used to frame theoretical and artistic practices as 
a response to “the capitalist value production” and to its fundamental mechanism of a 
monetary system that creates a formal relation through exchange value. Subsuming 
everything under its quantitative logic of a monetary system, capitalism, for them, divides 
the flux of life into units that can be exchanged. It is a quantitative and formal economy 
that aims to “capture” the force of life. However, unlike the “capitalist logic of 
quantitative capturing,” research-creation can restore the informal and qualitative 
																																																								
66 Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect. Revised ed. edition. (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1985.): 38.  
67 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality. Corrected edition. (New York: Free Press, 1978.): 113. 
68 Erin Manning, “Ten Propositions for Research-Creation.” In Collaboration in Performance Practice: 
Premises, Workings and Failures. (New York: Springer, 2016): 134.  
69 They write “Research-creation: the value produced is the process itself, is its very qualitative autonomy.” 
(Ibid., 141.) 
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economy of the relational and procedural structure of life.70 With its emphasis on 
procedural, relational, multimodal,71  collective, pre-linguistic, affective and material 
expressions, research-creation diverges from the monetary economy that divides, 
captures and controls the perpetual and creative forces of life:  
An altereconomics of research-creation, understood as a practice of the event, is 
informal. It is unquantifiable. Its valuations directly concern qualities of life... Its 
process is autonomous in the sense that it is self-propagating. What propagates is 
an evolving form-of-life that partners thinking and making at the emergent level 
where they already come co-causally together. This is a polyrhythmic economy of 
germinal forms attuning – of forces of life finding new collective expression not 
for what it leaves behind but for its appetite to always begin anew.72  
 
Therefore what constitutes the fundamental motivation of their schema is to restore 
qualitative forms of life, to create new forms of knowledge and experience through 
conjunctions that research-creation is capable of generating. However, they recognize 
that there are no pre-given methodologies for “generating new forms of experience.” This 
is why, as they state,73 their research-creation schema is not even a method because, 
according to them, methods serve to discipline “the very question of what constitutes 
knowledge.”74 Instead it is an open-ended process that undoes the given methodologies. 
																																																								
70  They write “Research-creation as we propose to practice it is a polyrhythmic attuning of mutually 
composing autonomous activities that collectively resist definitive capitalist capture and affirm value in 
terms that cannot be quantified.” (Erin Manning and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages in the 
Ecology of Experience. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.): 123.) 
71 They also refer to Guattari and his metamodel which defines the multimodality of their research-creation 
conceptualization. Meta-model prepossesses the multiplicity of models without any hierarchical order. As a 
critique of the Lacanian structuralist and dualistic model, Guattari calls for a “metamodeling capable of 
taking into account the diversity of modeling systems” which creates new encounters that can undo the 
outcome projected by the existing models.  
72 Erin Manning, “Ten Propositions for Research-Creation.” In Collaboration in Performance Practice: 
Premises, Workings and Failures. (New York: Springer, 2016): 140.  
73 They write “Research-creation does not need new methods. What it needs are techniques that enable 
modes of valuing the process, techniques that enable the tuning to technicity of a practice.” Ibid., 138.  
74 Ibid., 134.  
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Rather than a method, they suggest developing what they call “technique” which is a 
singular set of constraints, which “has to be invented for each process.”75  
Similar to the Chapman-Sawchuk model, the discursive operation of restoring the 
unity of what has been isolated by the quantitative logic of capitalism is the ultimate 
function of research-creation. Historically and artificially divided, the flux of life can be 
restored by the conjunctions that research-creation can facilitate. However, it is not clear 
exactly how this will be realized and what the appropriate means for undertaking this 
project are, and this lack of clarity is the premise of research-creation. The very function 
of research-creation is to abolish itself and its mediation. They suggest developing what 
they call “enabling constraints.” Since their experience showed them that “unconstrained 
interaction rarely yields worthwhile effects,”76 they develop limitations that are positive 
in their dynamic effect, to avoid rendering their research-creation activities “anything 
goes.” Therefore their open-ended non-methodology presupposes enabling constraints, a 
double operation of opening and limiting. Once again, oppositional operations that cancel 
each other are employed to restore the immediate method capable of registering the 
perpetual flux of life.  
2.2.3 A/r/tography 
 
The third schema, called a/r/tography, was developed mainly at the University of 
British Columbia through the collaboration of several artists and researchers. This sparse 
literature is organized by Rita L. Irwin, Sylvia Wilson Kind and Stephanie Springgay in 
																																																								
75 Ibid., 136.  
76 Manning, Erin, and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience. 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.): 93.  
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their article “A/r/tography as Living Inquiry Through Art and Text.” 77  For them, 
A/r/tography is relational aesthetic inquiry “envisioned as embodied understandings and 
exchanges between art and text and between and among the roles of artist/researcher/ 
teacher and the viewer/reader.”78 As is made clear in their definition, it is also built on the 
conjunctive mechanism of research-creation which essentially serves to trouble the 
existing disciplinary structure of academia.  
In their schema, the epistemological model to which they refer is the Deleuzian 
concept of rhizome as a multiple and non-hierarchical mode of knowledge and 
representation. In the introduction to Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari use the 
analogy of rhizome to define on the one hand the very methodology that their book is 
based on, and on the other their political, epistemological and ontological project. 
Rhizome,79 Deleuze and Guattari state:  
“connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to 
traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and 
even nonsign states…  It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle 
(milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills… In contrast to centered 
(even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and pre-																																																								
77 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 897–912. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405280696. 
78 Ibid., 900.  
79 There are 6 principles that define rhizome book. “1 and 2. Principles of connection and heterogeneity: 
any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be.” (Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix 
Guattari. Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 2 edition. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota 
Press, 1987.)  It’s a heterogeneous whole in which all elements are connected to one another and where 
there is no fixed order or fixed point that can be subsumed under a single image. “3. Principle of 
multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "multiplicity," that it ceases 
to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world.” With this 
principle they characterize a multiplicity that is not defined according to a unity structured in the object or 
in the subject. “4. Principle of asignifying rupture: against the over-signifying breaks separating structures 
or cutting across a single structure.” By this principle they suggest that rhizome is never posited as fixed 
trans-temporal essence; it can be re-organized by the radical ruptures. “5 and 6. Principle of cartography 
and decalcomania: a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model.” As is clear in the 
definition, these are the final principles stating that rhizome is not defined according to original reason or a 
teleological model. (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
2 edition. (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1987.)) 
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established paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying 
system without a General and without an organizing memory or central 
automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states.”80 
 
With its multimodal, nonhierarchical and acentric structure, rhizome-book is 
contrasted to two different types of books, “tap-root book” and “fascicular-root book.” 
Positioning itself as an external and transcendental coherence, the taproot-book 
represents the world by imposing its internal unity on the world. Deleuze and Guattari 
say: “the tap-root book is organized around a single principle of coherence or meaning 
(often the intention, genius, or authority of the author) in order to represent the world or a 
privileged perspective on it.”81 The fascicular-root is the analogy for the books where the 
chaotic multiplicity of the world is represented through the unity of the book. In this case 
the world as multitude is a given but the very chaos in the world is represented by the 
book as having coherent unity. However, rhizome-book does justice to the chaos of the 
world without referring to any external coherence. It is a form of representation that is 
ultimately linked to their political program, which aims to trouble “transcendence,” and 
“hierarchical” and “despotic” models.  
Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome, Irwin, Kind, and Springgay suggest six 
renderings, instead of a criterion-based model. These six renderings (contiguity, living 
inquiry, openings, metaphor/metonymy, reverberations, and excess) in their rhizomatic 
and aesthetic interconnectedness, inform the multimodal, heterogeneous, open-ended 
nature of research-creation as “aesthetic inquiry.” For instance, the first rendering, 
contiguity, marks “the contiguous interaction” that constitutes the conjunctive nature of 																																																								
80  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 2 edition. 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1987.): 21.  
81Eugene W Holland, Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: A Reader’s Guide. (London: A&C 
Black, 2013.): 38.  
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research-creation, particularly between art and “graphy.” A/r/tography, first of all, is the 
doubling of “visual and textual wherein the two complement, extend, refute, and/or 
subvert one another.”82 With this doubling mechanism it “refuses absolutes; rather, it 
engages with a continual process of not-knowing, of searching for meaning that is 
difficult and in tension.”83 Second, it is a living inquiry: since the process of research-
creation cannot be separated from the experience of artist/researcher/teacher, a/r/tography 
pays special attention to “memory, identity, autobiography, reflection, meditation, story 
telling, interpretation, and/or representation, artists/researchers/teachers expose their 
living practices in evocative ways.”84 As “an embodied encounter constituted through 
visual and textual understandings and experiences rather than mere visual and textual 
representations,” it “lingers in the liminal spaces between a(artist) and r(researcher) and 
t(teacher).”85  
The third rendering is openings. Engaging with that which is between renders 
a/r/tography open and porous. It creates openings, which “leave room for encounters 
between artist/ researcher/teacher and reader/viewer entangling experience(s).”86 The 
fourth rendering is the doubling of metaphor and metonymy: taking metaphor and 
metonymy as techniques of doubling (between similarities and between whole and part), 
they emphasize “a displacement in the subject/object relation.”87 They argue, through the 
intertwined relationship of metaphor and metonymy, that “meaning un/does itself.” The 																																																								
82 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 900.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405280696. 
83 Ibid., 902.  
84 Ibid., 903.  
85 Ibid., 902.  
86 Ibid., 904. 
87 Ibid., 904. 
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fifth is a reverberation: A/r/tography is “an interplay between the new and the 
customary,”88 it unsettles traditional research practices by evocation of the new. And 
finally excess: A/r/tographer through writing reveals excess of affects such as “fears, 
inhibitions, desires, and pleasures.”89 
2.2.4 Epistemological Impasse as Political Function  
 
According to these three schemata, research-creation’s capacity to trouble the 
disciplinary, ideological, and historical boundaries that define academia and also 
hegemonic discourses stems from its heterogeneous structure. Its task is “simply” to 
implement/export/translate/mobilize its hybrid mechanisms to destabilize the binary 
logics of hegemony. Given in its hybrid form, its promise is to eliminate the mediation of 
hierarchical power models constructed by binary logic. There are three problematic 
presumptions that establish this argument.  
First, they presuppose an essentialist link between research-creation’s formal 
mechanism and the political or epistemological function of this formal mechanism. It is 
clear that the crisis that stems from the conjunction of concepts which are deemed to be 
oppositional and antonymous does not necessarily serve to upset hegemonic structures. In 
fact, at least historically, artistic alignments with contemporary power forms are not 
uncommon; each artistic discourse and artwork bears this risk, since there is no 
essentialist link between the form of art and the effect that it elicits. But more 
importantly, due to its very grounding premise -the impossibility of regulating its 																																																								
88 Ibid., 906. 
89 They say “to write from within and through the body is a writing of excess. Excess is a way to re-image 
ourselves into being; re-assembling the mundane of our experiences. Excess is the flesh of being, the space-
between interiority and exteriority, where touching touches and touches back in continual reverberations” 
(Ibid., 907.) 
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indeterminate nature by external criteria- research-creation annuls this possibility of 
being linked to any political program. As Schiller formulates, the freedom -independence 
from any external law- that defines the aesthetic domain and by extension research-
creation, does not lead to any specific result; it does not produce a definite kind of action, 
whether moral or immoral. What art in general, and research-creation in particular, give 
us, then, is not a political program but rather the freedom to produce a political action. 
However, art offers no inherent criteria to transform this political action into a critical or 
emancipatory one.  
Second, these schemata not only presuppose the initial historical, cultural or 
linguistic fragmentation of concepts between which they claim to restore unity, but also 
reproduce it in their attempt to destabilize it. As I noted earlier, to be able to realize the 
conjunctions of research and creation, theory and practice etc., research-creation first 
isolates them. It performs the very negation of its premise, which is to trouble binary 
oppositions of research and creation, and misleadingly suggests that the creative process 
is ahistorical, and does not involve any research practices, and that the research process is 
in itself is neutral, objective and does not involve any creative means and tools in the 
process of problem-framing, formulating an approach, etc. In a more radical sense, it 
bears the risk of reducing art to a rupture that only a genius is capable of, and reducing 
research to ahistorical objectivity determined by universal eternal laws.  
Finally, research-creation’s claim to restore “the natural relation inherent to life” 
between terms that are positioned in binary asymmetry is also problematic. Particularly 
evident in a/r/tography as “living inquiry” or the SenseLab schema, which is modeled 
after “forces of life,” this claim bears the risk of suggesting that the relations generated in 
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the research-creation project are natural. However, following the Deleuzian formula, I 
contend that every relation is external to the terms, and whether conjunctive, disjunctive 
or dialectical, each relation in itself is a product of historical and ideological context. The 
relations -binary or non-binary- that research-creation uses to explain the terms that it 
brings together also have to be explained. In other words, the claim of restoring the 
natural harmony of oppositional terms has to be examined through political and historical 
lenses. It is the condition of “emancipatory politics,” as Mark Fisher formulates, which 
“must always destroy the appearance of a ‘natural order’, must reveal what is presented 
as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency, just as it must make what was 
previously deemed to be impossible seem attainable.”90  
However, all of the three above-mentioned models recognize the irony of their 
respective conceptualizations pertaining to research-creation: the conjunction of these 
seemingly oppositional terms can be realized in an unlimited manner and cannot be 
subsumed under one schema. This is why, according to Manning-Massumi’s schema, 
research-creation is not even a method. It is, in their words, “against method, active in its 
refutation of pre-existing modes of existence.”91 In a/r/tography the very function of 
research-creation is “to resist to the formation of specific criteria. It is a research process 
that is fluid, uncertain, and temporal.”92 In Sawchuk-Chapman’s schema, research-
creation is not a fixed methodological approach,  “but each and every research-creation 
																																																								
90 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester: Zero Books, 2009.): 17.  
91 Erin Manning and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience. 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.): 138.  
92 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 900. 
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project also carries the possibility of acting as an intervention in its own right.”93 Thus, to 
accommodate the conceptual, aesthetic and historical frameworks unique to the specific 
art form in question, each art-based dissertation has to embrace the very identity crisis or 
conceptual impasse inherent to research-creation. Therefore in this doubling logic where 
its possibility is conditioned by its impossibility, it is postulated that the internal 
contradiction of research-creation as a hybrid methodology is what grounds its critical 
function against given knowledge production processes. I argue this doubling logic is not 
only contradictory but also problematic in its political and aesthetic presumptions in the 
sense that it postulates that the hybrid nature of research-creation in its essence functions 
as an anti-essentialist methodology. The idea that research-creation, due to its 
autonomous position from external criteria, inevitably performs critical and creative 
action against given knowledge production is not only essentialist but it also eliminates 
the possibility of any critique. This is why I argue that these schemata are trapped in a 
vicious circle of self-determination and self-evidence as a result of the ahistoricism that is 
found at the very heart of each schema. Therefore, the next section will work to map out 
the conceptual connections of research-creation with a particular aesthetic paradigm 
which, I argue, is crystalized in the philosophical conceptualization of cinema in the 20th 
century.   
2.3 Historicizing Research-Creation: Cinematic End of Metaphysics  
 
Similar to research-creation, cinema, particularly evident in its philosophical 
																																																								
93  Owen B. Chapman, and Kim Sawchuk. “Research-Creation: Intervention, Analysis and ‘Family 
Resemblances.’” Canadian Journal of Communication 37, no. 1 (April 13, 2012): 7. 
https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2012v37n1a2489. 
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conceptualization by Deleuze, Rancière and Badiou, is posited as an aesthetic-political 
means to challenge the binary oppositions on which the idealist or metaphysical 
framework of Modernity is based. For instance Deleuze, in the cinema courses he led in 
Vincennes, in order to highlight the anti-dualist nature of cinema, brings forward the 
question of whether there is any coincidence between the advent of cinema and the 
emergence of new philosophical undertakings — such as Bergsonism and 
Phenomenology — that set out to overcome the dualism of mind and body which grounds 
the metaphysical and idealist framework of western philosophy. For Deleuze, it is not a 
mere coincidence; in fact, cinema is the expression of a particular image that can be 
deployed to dismantle not only the binary distribution of body and mind but also image 
and matter, past and present, actual and virtual, real and imaginary. Similarly, for Badiou, 
cinema is anti-metaphysical, or more precisely “is the art of the end of metaphysics” 
which has been “defined in terms of the use of opposite categories, basically in terms of a 
dualism, of major oppositions: finite and infinite, substance and accident, soul and body, 
sensible and intelligible, and so on.” 94  Moreover, Badiou argues that cinema’s 
philosophical and political promise is to create “new syntheses” that bring together 
“terms that are foreign to each other.”95 And for Rancière, cinema is the fulfillment of an 
aesthetic paradigm that emerged in the 19th century which aims to disrupt the separation 
of image and text, the sensible and the intelligible. This aesthetic regime, in Rancière’s 
understanding, subverts the consensual distribution of roles and functions in philosophy 
of art where art has been subjugated under regulative rules.   
However, cinema is not unique in that sense: in fact it is part of a larger aesthetic 																																																								
94 Alain Badiou, Cinema. Reprint edition. (Cambridge: Polity, 2013.): 213, 211. 
95 Ibid., 202. 
	 52	
schema common to Deleuze, Badiou and Rancière which is characterized by the 
inversion of modernity’s subordination of art to philosophy. Inverting the hierarchical 
model of modernity, this set of philosophers, first of all, considers art as one of the many 
thought processes amongst which there is no hierarchical order. Secondly, the antithetical 
structure of art, which resulted in its dismissal in Modernity and ancient Greece, is the 
central philosophical means to redefine the given fabric of philosophical and political 
discourse. Thirdly, they defend the idea that art’s mission is neither to represent an 
external truth nor to construct a material experience as non-speculative experience, but 
rather to create crises within the dominant social, political and cultural context. Therefore 
cinema, due to its doubling mechanism, is essentially a heterogeneous rendering of truth 
and marks the end of the metaphysical and hierarchical structure of modernity.  
For instance, for Deleuze, particularly evident in the structure of crystal-image, 
cinema presents time’s fundamental operation, which is to split itself as the present and 
the past. Present, according to Deleuze, is no longer a homogeneous limit between past 
and future but a two-facade image like a crystal. This is why crystal-image creates what 
Deleuze calls “the zones of indiscernibility,”96 a heterogenic locus wherein multiple 
entities are subjected to a process of alterity either by converging physically in a real 
space or virtually in imaginary space and therefore the metaphysical and binary 
distributions of oppositions are cancelled. Rather than being mere confusion that emerges 
in the mind of spectators, crystal-image is an “objective illusion” that creates paradoxical 
situations and crises within the formal and metaphysical model of Truth. Similarly, in 
																																																								
96 Zone of indiscernibility amounts to a certain type of heterogenic reality wherein multiple entities are 
subjected to a process of alterity either by converging physically in a real space or virtually in imaginary 
space.  
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Badiou, cinema’s temporal structure is one of several mechanisms by which it can create 
situations which he calls “philosophical situations” where incompatible elements coexist. 
As “the relationship between terms that usually have no relationship with each other”97 
they compel us to find common measure between the oppositional elements that are 
foreign to each other. In a similar context, Rancière also argues that the modernism in 
cinema takes parataxis98 -the aesthetic technique of 19th century literature- as its model, 
which is based on the juxtaposing of oppositional terms.  
Similar to cinema’s capacity to create heterogeneous and paradoxical associations 
by montage and by its temporal structure, its regime of image also functions as a 
doubling of elements which are deemed to be oppositional. For instance, in Badiou’s 
understanding, cinematic imagery is at once “absolutely false” in its reality claim and 
“absolutely real” in its manifest falsity. In Badiou’s own words: “cinema simultaneously 
offers the possibility of a copy of reality and the entirely artificial dimension of this copy. 
With contemporary technologies, cinema is capable of producing the real artifice of the 
copy of a false copy of the real, or again, the false real copy of a false real.”99 In a similar 
vein, Rancière also points out cinema’s capacity to create double bindings in terms of its 
regime of image. For him, it is one of the operations that organize the relation between 
sayable/language/narrative/thought and visible/material/silent/unthought within sensibilia 
																																																								
97 Alain Badiou, Cinema. Reprint edition. (Cambridge: Polity, 2013.): 202.  
98 Parataxis -derived from a Greek word which means to place side by side- is a literary technique which 
juxtaposes phrases or clauses. In this respect, for Rancière, cinema, via sentence-image, undertakes 
"chaotic force of the great parataxis" (Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents. 1 edition. 
(Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2009.): 46.) by bringing together the "phrasal continuity" and the 
"imaging power of rupture" (Ibid., 46). Instead of organizing the terms in a harmonious way, cinema 
manufactures “effects of disturbance, while maintaining some semblance of meaningful connectivity or 
"measure" between the different elements” (Jean-Philippe Deranty, Jacques Ranciere: Key Concepts. 1 
edition. (Durham: Routledge, 2014.): 164.)  
99 Alain Badiou, Cinema. Reprint edition. (Cambridge: Polity, 2013.): 233.
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and the distribution of sensible100 which form the core of Rancière’s aesthetic and 
political conceptual framework. Rancière also claims that cinema is the realm of 
heterological structures; in this sense, cinematic imagery resides on the limits that design 
the very relation between these dichotomies with a unique type of image which is called 
sentence-image. Sentence-image is not simply bridging the sayable and visible; it is the 
undecidable positioning of continuity and fragmentation, articulation and inarticulateness, 
the dialectic and the symbolic, consensus and chaos, logos and pathos, lethargy and 
energy. It is an oscillation between two radical approaches: the first one is the modern 
idea of representational art which presupposes a supremacy of the narrative over non-
linguistic imagery, and the second is the modernist, purist idea that artworks are the 
manifestation of their material and technical properties. As for Deleuze, cinema does not 
provide representation of a movement that is external to it; rather, movement is nothing 
but the image itself. Following the Bergsonian schema,101 matter is identified with image 
and movement. This identification not only nullifies the distinction between movement 
and image but also dissolves the limits between the cinematic image and the real in the 
Deleuzian image regime.102 Cinematic imagery in this sense is not a representation of 
what is external to it but the expression of the change and difference of that which is 
immanent to it. 
																																																								
100 According to Rancière, politics and art are composed of the norms that condition the very sensory fabric 
of community that determine the perceptual forms of inclusion and exclusion.  
101 According to Deleuze, the advent of cinema coincided with a crisis in philosophy at the end of the 19th 
century. He points out in one of his cinema lectures that this crisis stems from the impossibility of retaining 
the modern idea of a fractured world which is based on a distribution of things in such a way that the 
images are located in the mind and movement in the body. In this sense there is parallelism between 
Bergson’s project, along with phenomenology, in terms of overcoming the binary positions (matter and 
image) and cinematic operations.   
102 Deleuze writes “What we see in the crystal is always the bursting forth of life, of time, in its dividing in 
two or differentiation.” (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image. Reprint edition. (London ; New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.): 91.) 
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Similar to research-creation, according to these three figures (Deleuze, Badiou and 
Rancière), cinema is first of all conceived as a hybrid art with its temporal structure, 
image regime and its relation to the other art genres. In fact, what constitutes cinematic 
expression is the hybridization or juxtaposing of that which is incompatible. Therefore it 
is postulated that with its hybrid structure, like research-creation, cinema is anti-
metaphysical and by extension anti-dualist and anti-essentialist. In other words, common 
to these three figures, cinema, with its temporal and image construction, is 
conceptualized as a hybrid art, which can be mobilized as a means to dismantle 
hierarchical models of dualism. However, the problem inherent to both the research-
creation schemata and the philosophical conceptualizations of cinema that I have 
analyzed is that they reinforce the essentialism that they aim to expostulate. They 
presuppose an essential link between the hybrid structure of cinema and research-creation 
and their critical, political and aesthetic function.  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Essentially connected to the 20th century aesthetic definition of cinema, research-
creation is therefore not autonomous from the historical context in which it emerged. 
Despite their attempts to challenge the historical distribution of research and creation, and 
by extension the diverse elements which are historically deemed to be oppositional, I 
argue that these schemata, in their autonomy claim from the historical context in which 
they became possible, carry the risk of becoming self-regulating. I argue that aesthetic 
activity can only be creative through critical engagement with what has historically been 
served to and emerged within hegemonic power structures. It is defined by the very crisis 
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that it causes within the given distribution of the material world, along with its concepts, 
events, and social positions, including those of race, gender and class. It must always 
trouble the appearance of a natural order. This is why, following Deleuze’s formulation, I 
argue that creativity, and by extension research-creation, is resistance. Creativity whose 
nature is not immediately apparent can only be understood as resistance/opposition 
against what is historically deemed to be true, natural and right. Certainly the idea of 
resistance that defines creativity cannot be reduced to historical resistance; in fact, one 
can argue that creativity resists the creator, and even creation itself. As Agamben notes, it 
is not “only as an opposition to an external threat” but also “the resistance must be 
internal to the act of creation.”103 
It is in this context that my dissertation seeks to develop a critique within the 
discursive fabric in which VR became possible as a technology. Unique to research-
creation as a hybrid methodology, it will be realized both visually and textually. It will 
engage in the double action of research-creation: it seeks to use formal techniques 
specific to VR in order to develop a critique that defines the artistic, technological and 
political tenets of VR. Therefore, in the following chapters, I will first historicize the 
discursive fabric in which VR is embedded. Second, I will analyze the politico-aesthetic 
coordinates of this discursive fabric in order to develop a conceptual critique. Thus the 
research that I aim to pursue seeks to answer the following questions: What are the 
ideological tenets and the formal strategies that define the contemporary aesthetics of 
VR? What are the techniques specific to VR that can challenge the conventions of VR? 
																																																								
103Giorgio Agamben, “Resistance in Art.” YouTube video, 43:12 posted by European Graduate School, 
2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=one7mE-8y9c. 
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3 Archaeology of Future Cinema 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since its inception, the speculations on cinema’s future, which are consubstantial to 
debates on its artistic value, have been polarized in the equivocality of the term end in its 
multiple resonances as ending, death, finitude, but also as purpose, telos, finality.104 For 
																																																								
104 Erin Obodiac, ‘Autoimmune Cinema’ (Spiral Film and Philosophy Conference, “Thinking Space” 
Toronto, ON, May 11, 2018.) 
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some, for instance for Louis Lumiere, “cinema is an invention without a future;”105 for 
others, it is in the future where cinema will unfold its artistic essence, as was stated in 
The Futurist Cinema manifesto, “…the immense artistic possibilities of the cinema still 
rest entirely in the future.”106 These two polarized camps have re-emerged every time 
new technological developments have been added (including sound, S3D, color, digital, 
computer and VR etc.) at numerous points throughout the history of cinema, where the 
subsequent transformations have been considered so radical that many were moved to 
declare that cinema had reached its end, and proclaimed it dead. For many other theorists, 
however, thanks to the proliferation of different platforms that incorporate moving image 
technology, cinema is more alive, more abundant, and more omnipresent than ever.107 
However, this chapter seeks to map a third approach, where two ostensibly antithetical 
meanings of end converge in a teleological program concerning the technological essence 
of cinema. According to this teleological program, these two possible future scenarios 
converge in a paradoxical outcome: the death of cinema as its essential promise, such that 
the very task of cinema is to abolish itself. It charges cinema with cancelling the 
ontological boundaries that separate it from its outside in favour of immediacy and 
transparency, or with expanding the image by multisensory and interactive strategies into 
its transparency to the extent that the image and its outside are transformed into 
variable/interchangeable realms.  
																																																								
105 James Naremore, An Invention without a Future: Essays on Cinema. First edition. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2014.) 
106	Scott MacKenzie, ed. Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology. First edition. 
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107 André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion. The End of Cinema?: A Medium in Crisis in the Digital Age. 
Translated by Timothy Barnard. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.) 
	 59	
With its emphasis on hyperbolic concepts such as transparency and immediacy, VR 
is purported to be the latest technology that fulfils this cinematic telos. It is purported to 
be not only the “future of cinema” at large but also of esports,108 advertising,109 
pornography, 110  education, 111  architecture/engineering/construction (AEC) 112  and 
design.113 Likewise it is proclaimed to be the ultimate medium that can eliminate the 
boundaries between different media technologies as well. For instance, according to 
Palmer Luckey, “the genius” behind the last wave of VR revolution is that “VR is the 
ultimate medium. It's not just its own thing, it can also hypothetically work to perfectly 
simulate every other medium.”114 This frenzy is not new; in fact, since its inception, both 
conceptually and technologically, VR has been posited as a model for cinema and image 
culture in general. It has been both an integral part of and the model for the techno-utopic 
program that seeks to construct an omnipotent image system that is self-regulating in the 
sense that it is autonomous not only from the mediation of artist, but also from the 
material, spatial, and by extension social and political determinations of reality. In this 
context, this chapter seeks to map out the aesthetic, technological and ideological tenets 
of the “future cinema” as a recurrent topic, which is purported to be fulfilled by VR.  
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Following Erkki Huhtamo’s media archaeology schema, built upon Michel 
Foucault’s and Friedrich Kittler’s discourse analysis, the first section of this chapter 
outlines the methodology used. As a recurrent topic, future cinema will serve as a means 
to analyze the complex and uneven trajectory of VR within the media landscape, 
particularly cinema and stereoscopic 3D, and the conceptual framework of several 
hyperbolic discourses such as transparency, invisibility, immediacy, disembodiment, and 
presence/telepresence that defines the discursive fabric in which VR is embedded. In the 
second section, I will outline the conceptual framework of the first future cinema model, 
which was considered to be stereoscopic 3D. Particularly evident in early film theory 
such as that of Hugo Münsterberg, Béla Balázs and Sergei Eisenstein, S3D would reveal 
the artistic essence of cinema, whose promise is to create an image where spectacle and 
spectator, image and reality will reach a state of indiscernibility. In this context S3D was 
posited to be the future of cinema due to its spatial capacity to blur the limit between 
screen and proscenium. However, S3D has a double position in the history of cinema: it 
was considered both to be the origin and the future of cinema. The following section will 
engage with Jonathan Crary’s and André Bazin’s analyses of S3D, which posited it to be 
the inaugural technology of the visual paradigm in the 19th century, culminating in the 
invention of cinema. The fourth section engages with a second instance of future cinema, 
which has been largely associated with VR. As a result of the advent of the computer, VR 
is purported to be the ultimate technology that can abolish the boundaries inherent to 
screen-based image technologies, and by extension eliminate difference in favour of 
social harmony.  
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3.2 Methodology: Topoi of Media  
 
This dissertation in general will follow the media archaeology outlined by Erkki 
Huhtamo in his article “From Kaleidoscomaniac to Cybernerd: Notes Toward an 
Archaeology of the Media”115 and his book “Illusions in Motion: Media Archaeology of 
the Moving Panorama and Related Spectacles.”116 Built in large part upon Michel 
Foucault’s117 and Friedrich Kittler’s118 discourse analysis, it primarily attends to the 
discursive fabric in which the artefact is embedded. Instead of tracing the deterministic 
and isolated history of media artefacts, it suggests mapping the network of discourses in 
which a particular technology is connected to other technologies simultaneously and 
diachronically. However what is unique to Huhtamo’s methodology is that it emphasizes 
the “recurring” discursive patterns that traverse different artefacts within the media 
landscape despite their technological, conceptual or functional differences. Rather than 
following “the chronological and positivistic ordering of things centered on the 
artifact”119 or engaging in an historical ordering of technoculture as a constant progress, 
proceeding from one technological breakthrough to another, it emphasizes cyclical 																																																								
115  Erkki Huhtamo, “From Kaleidoscomaniac to Cybernerd: Notes toward an Archaeology of the 
Media,” Leonardo 30, no. 3 (1997): 221-24. 
116  Erkki Huhtamo, Illusions in Motion: Media Archaeology of the Moving Panorama and Related 
Spectacles. 1st edition. (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013.) 
117 As indicated in “What Is Media Archaeology?” by Jussi Parikka, one of the main contributions that 
Foucault initiated with the archaeology of knowledge and culture was to develop a methodology for 
excavating conditions of existence. Stating that technological inventions are a result of historical contexts 
determined by concepts, ideas or ideological teloi, media archaeology attempts to define the background 
reasons why “a certain object, statement, discourse or, for instance in our case, media apparatus or use habit 
is able to be born and be picked up and sustain itself in a cultural situation.” (Jussi Parikka, What Is Media 
Archaeology? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.): 6.  
118 Kittler differs from Foucault in the sense that “such conditions of existence not only are discursive, but 
relate to media networks, as well as scientific discoveries. Kittler wanted to look at technical media in the 
way Foucault was reading archives of books and written documents. Of course, such archaeological 
questions are closely related to what Foucault later started to call ‘genealogy’” (Ibid., 6.)  
119 Huhtamo Erkki, “From Kaleidoscomaniac to Cybernerd: Notes toward an Archaeology of the 
Media,” Leonardo 30, no. 3 (1997): 221-24. 
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elements in the history of media. Media archaeology, for him, is “a way of studying 
recurring cyclical phenomena that (re)appear and disappear and reappear over and over 
again in media history, somehow seeming to transcend specific historical contexts.”120  
For Huhtamo, these cyclical phenomena are more than coincidences produced 
“indigenously by conglomerations of specific circumstances.”121 Instead, they all consist 
of certain commonplace elements or cultural motives.122 They can therefore be employed 
as a means of examining wider narratives that define the cultural sphere and can serve “as 
connectors to other cultural spheres; as commentaries and elaborations of media-cultural 
forms, themes, and fantasies; or as formulas deliberately used for profit or ideological 
indoctrination.”123 Different from a linear or chronologically conceived history of media, 
he suggests the symptomatic analysis of the ideological tenets of technological progress 
in the media environment through these recurrent topics:  
…first is the study of the cyclically recurring elements and motives underlying 
and guiding the development of media culture. Second is the “excavation” of the 
ways in which these discursive traditions and formulations have been “imprinted” 
on specific media machines and systems in different historical contexts, 
contributing to their identity in terms of socially and ideologically specific webs 
of signification. This kind of approach emphasizes cyclical rather than 
chronological development and recurrence rather than unique innovation.124 
 
Huhtamo defines such recurring, cyclical phenomena as topoi: “the formulas, 
ranging from stylistic to allegorical, serving as systematically organized conventions or 
constituting clichés.”125 However with their recurrent character, topoi are hyperbolic 
narratives “closer to the field characterized by Foucault somewhat contemptuously as the 																																																								
120 Ibid., 222. 
121 Ibid., 221. 
122 Huhtamo writes “They may serve to reveal the ideological and cultural patterns as much as realized 
artefacts.” Ibid., 221. 
123 Ibid., 221. 
124 Ibid., 221. 
125 Ibid., 223. 
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history of ideas."126 For Foucault, history of ideas is the study of those “age-old themes 
that are never crystallized in a rigorous and individual system, but which have formed the 
spontaneous philosophy of those who did not philosophize [...] The analysis of opinions 
rather than of knowledge, of errors rather than of truth, of types of mentality rather than 
of forms of thought."127 Recounting “the by-ways and margins of history,” they mainly 
diverge from the history of the sciences, and recite the history “of imperfect, ill-based 
knowledge” like “the history of alchemy rather than chemistry, of animal spirits or 
phrenology rather than physiology.”128  Parallel to the history of ideas, Huhtamo’s 
methodology suggests mapping sets of discourses, which are generally problematic in 
their technological, aesthetic and political presumptions and composed of literary 
formulas as well as pseudoscientific and paradoxical discourses, hyperbolic projections 
and imaginary solutions.  
For instance, he suggests that this method can be used to analyze the discursive link 
between television, virtual reality and telectroscope, a discursive device believed to have 
existed in the late 19th century. Telectroscope was a conceptual model of an electro-
optical device which aimed to increase the range of users’ visions. It was believed to be 
the early model (albeit discursive) for the telephone, television or videophone. For 
Huhtamo, the discursive pattern initiated by the telectroscope can be interpreted as a 
utopian projection of the “hopes raised by electricity and particularly by the telephone, 
and realized decades later in the form of television.”129 However, while television found 
																																																								
126 Ibid., 224. 
127 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language. Reprint edition. (New 
York, NY: Vintage, 1972.): 153. 
128 Ibid., 153.  
129 Erkki Huhtamo, “From Kaleidoscomaniac to Cybernerd: Notes toward an Archaeology of the Media.” 
Leonardo 30, no. 3 (1997): 221–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/1576453. 
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its dominant form in broadcasting, which was very different from the role offered by the 
telectroscope, this topos is reactivated in Jaron Lanier's utopian vision of VR more than a 
century later. For Huhtamo, Lanier’s model for VR “as the telephone, not as the 
television of the future”130 can thus be seen as another incarnation of this well-known 
topos of the 19th century.131  
Therefore, following Huhtamo’s media archaeology methodology, in this chapter I 
will map the artistic and political coordinates of future cinema as a discursive pattern in 
which VR is embedded. Transgressing the constraints of screen, incorporating the 
spectator’s bodily movement and enabling interaction with objects in its visual field, VR 
has been purported to have realized a technological telos that has haunted cinema from 
the beginning. Apparent in Eisenstein’s, Münsterberg’s and Balázs’ ideas on Stereoscopic 
3D, Bazin’s Total Cinema, Youngblood’s Expanded Cinema, and Heilig and 
Sutherland’s media utopias, this recurrent telos presupposes that cinema’s very promise is 
to realize a particular form of image where the limit that separates it from its outside will 
be cancelled to the extent that image and reality are transformed into 
variable/interchangeable realms. Moreover, according to this recurrent discourse, not 
only will future cinema realize this immediate relationship between the world and its 
image, but also social harmony will be restored by means of the immediacy purported to 
be inherent to the visual regime of possible cinema of the future. Embedded in the same 
discursive fabric, contemporary VR aesthetics also prioritize immediacy, transparency 
and empathy, and in general is considered to be a democratic site where the material, 																																																								
130 Ibid., 221.  
131 More interestingly, Huhtamo suggests a particular research project that is similar to what I am 
conducting in this dissertation: “the discursive formations which enveloped and molded the emergence of 
virtual reality technology around the turn of the 1980s and 1990s would provide an appropriate subject of 
study for the kind of an approach I have been trying to delineate.” (Ibid., 224.) 
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spatial, and by extension social and political determinations of reality are eliminated in 
favour of the immediate encounter.  
3.3 S3D: The Future That Never Happened 	
Even before technologically available,132 stereoscopic cinema, initially, emerged as 
a model for both the technological development of cinema and for the aesthetic 
conventions of the “flat” films in the early 20th century. For instance, the experiments 
involving flat, 133  as Ray Zone 134  indicates, were generally guided by the idea of 
reproducing the effects associated with stereoscopy: compositional elements such as 
moving objects rushing toward or away from the camera. Camera movements and depth 
of field were generally proclaimed to be attempts to incorporate “stereoscopic effects” 
into cinema in order to realize an illusion of depth. Beyond these aesthetic associations in 
terms of strategies to increase depth illusion in cinematic image, stereoscopy also was a 
technological model for cinema. As the common denominator for early film theory, along 
with sound and colour, it was the technological telos in which cinematic imagery was 
purported to unfold its artistic essence.  
																																																								
132 Zone writes “Shortly after the turn of the century, inventors started to work on stereoscopic attachments 
for existing cameras that could produce three-dimensional pictures. The use of alternating left- and right-
eye frames with a shutter in the viewing device became a commonplace idea after the turn of the century.” 
Ray Zone, Stereoscopic Cinema and the Origins of 3-D Film, 1838-1952. (Lexington, Ky: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 2007.): 87.  
133 Particularly evident in Actuality Films and Phantom Rides, the experiments were generally on the 
movements within the image either through the movement of the object or through camera movements on 
the z-axis.  For detailed discussions about early film conventions see Ray Zone, Stereoscopic Cinema and 
the Origins of 3-D Film, 1838-1952. (Lexington, Ky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.): 
134 Zone gives a very detailed of history of S3D’s influence on early film theory. For instance, movement of 
the camera itself was increasingly characterized as "stereoscopic effects." Furthermore, any attempt to 
increase the depth information in cinema was associated with 'stereoscopic effects' and they were 
concerned with how a sense of depth and three-dimensionality might be achieved in the cinematographic 
image. (Ibid., 77) 
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3.3.1 Münsterberg: The Triumph Of The Mind Over The Material 	
Münsterberg argued that by adding stereoscopy, cinema could fulfill its artistic 
promise, which is to reproduce the subjective vision of the viewer. Inspired by Kantian 
subjective idealism, 135  cinema, for Münsterberg, finds its artistic possibilities by 
overcoming objective reality and by materializing the inner/subjective reality of the 
spectator. For instance, our attention is objectified by the mediation of close-up, or our 
memory with flashback, etc. However, not only does cinema reproduce the mental 
processes of the viewer, it also presupposes the spectator’s mental mechanism to create 
the impression of continuity and of depth in the very image itself. 136  Therefore 
subjectivity of the spectator, or the subjective vision, a post-Kantian notion that is both a 
product and constituent of modernity, has a double function in the cinematic process. 
Cinema, on the one hand, is the triumph of the mind over the objective world through its 
capacity to materialize the subjectivity of the spectator, and on the other hand is only 
possible through participation of the spectator’s mental processes. The subject is the 
condition of cinematic image and cinematic image is the extension of subjectivity.  
However, in Münsterberg’s view one particular shortcoming of cinema had to be 
overcome: cinema has to incorporate “the complete appearance of depth” of the subject. 
Even though it is capable of creating depth impression through monocular depth cues 																																																								
135 Münsterberg is generally located within the school of neo-Kantism that emerged at the beginning of the 
20th century and Gestalt theory. As Dudley Andrew writes: “Following Kant, Münsterberg employs an 
entirely different kind of analysis when he turns from psychology to aesthetics. Psychology is part of a 
scientific mode of thought. It tries to explain aspects of what Kant called the phenomenal realm, the realm 
of sense experience where things are linked in time, space, and causality.” (J. D. Andrew, The Major Film 
Theories: An Introduction. (London ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.): 105.) 
136 For instance, it is the spectator who furnishes frames –which are flat and immobile in their selves- depth 
and movement by his or her mental processes: “…we furnish to them more than we receive, we create the 
depth and the continuity through our mental mechanism.”	 (Münsterberg, Hugo. Hugo Munsterberg on 
Film: The Photoplay: A Psychological Study and Other Writings. Edited by Allan Langdale. 1 edition. 
(New York: Routledge, 2001.): 30.  
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(such as relative size, occlusion and intrinsic movement in frame etc.), it lacked the 
impression of depth as complete as the subjective vision of the spectator. Here 
Münsterberg prescribes the convergence of film and stereoscopy technologies in order to 
obtain “plasticity” of human depth impression and says: “It may be said offhand that even 
the complete appearance of depth such as the stereoscope offers would be in no way 
contradictory to the idea of moving pictures. Then the photoplay would give the same 
plastic impression which the real stage offers. All that would be needed is this.”137 Thus 
stereoscopic 3D is the model to realize the very promise or the essence of cinema: to 
materialize the inner mental mechanism and corporeal conditions of the subject, hence 
the triumph of the mind over the material and objective world through the aesthetic 
means of reproducing the subjective vision. Bringing together objectivity and 
subjectivity, S3D is the technology that will unfold the artistic essence of cinema.  
3.3.2 Béla Balázs: Aesthetic Unity 	
The same teleological approach can be found in Béla Balázs’ work as well. S3D is 
described in a remote paragraph, in his book entitled Theory Of The Film (Character And 
Growth Of A New Art)138 as being more “filmic” in comparison with two-dimensional 
film: “We must also remember that the stereoscopic film which produces the illusion that 
the figures on the screen are three-dimensional and protrude into the audience, will break 
up even more that traditional closed composition of the picture which was from the birth 
of the film a specific trait of the new art. In this respect the stereoscopic film will be even 
																																																								
137 Ibid., 66.  
138 Béla Balázs, Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art. (New York: Dover Publications, 
1970.)  
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more 'filmic' than the two-dimensional film.”139 In fact S3D will widen even further the 
aesthetic rupture in art history that cinema gives rise to. For him the aesthetic of cinema, 
which identifies and couples the loci of the spectator and of the filmic universe through 
perspective,140 inner movement of the film, etc.141 deviates from the European art 
tradition,142 which presupposes “that there is an external and internal distance and 
dualism between spectator and work of art.”143 Therefore, due to its spatial structure, 
where screen space and proscenium become indiscernible, stereoscopy, for him, would 
enable a more filmic experience. Thus, parallel to Münsterberg, S3D is the future of 
cinema, since the very telos of cinema is to annihilate the limit between oppositional 
terms such visible and invisible, text and image, etc.  
3.3.3 Eisenstein: Annihilation of Class Society  
 
The third instance where stereoscopic 3D is posited as the future cinema in a more 
enthusiastic and utopic manner is Eisenstein, who says, “To doubt that tomorrow belongs 
to stereocinema is just as naïve as it is to doubt about the very coming of tomorrow!”144 
Eisenstein maintains that S3D can re-establish “the original unity” of spectator and 
spectacle that was dismantled during the history of theatre by the advent of stage 
																																																								
139 Ibid., 244.  
140 Film fuses two “physiognomies -one is that of the object, its very own, which is quite independent of the 
spectator- and another physiognomy, determined by the viewpoint of the spectator and the perspective of 
the picture.”  (Ibid., 91.) 
141 Balázs argues, “In the cinema the camera carries the spectator into the film picture itself. We are seeing 
everything from the inside as it were and are surrounded by the characters of the film. The camera carries 
my eye into the picture itself.” (Ibid., 48.) 
142 Balázs describes this tradition in these words: “The work of art is separated from the surrounding 
empiric world not only by the frame of the picture, the pedestal of the statue, the footlights of the stage.” 
(Ibid., 49.) 
143 Ibid., 49.  
144 Sergei Eisenstein, “On Stereocinema.” in 3D CINEMA AND BEYOND. (Public. Toronto; Bristol; 
Chicago: Intellect Ltd, 2014.): 20.  
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organizations such as rampe145 etc. Inherently, for him, this spatial organization resulted 
in a type of egoism based on the artificial disintegration of the natural unity of reality-
fiction, actor-participant etc. However, he argues that the history of spectacle reveals the 
telos in its unfolding which is to “bridge the gap.” Therefore S3D –with its capacity to re-
unite oppositional terms- can overcome this chasm by blurring the screen’s limits. 
Moreover, S3D, through its spatial organization, is the telos of the spectacle insofar as 
history proceeds to reach a certain synthesis146 where the origin of spectacle lost long ago 
is resuscitated. Thus, naturally, S3D, as a microcosm of the universal history which 
proceeds towards a certain state of synthesis of oppositional terms (in a Hegelian way), 
will bring together not only spectator and spectacle, fiction and reality or image and 
world, but also by extension it is the ideal image technology that will render it possible to 
abolish the limits between the oppressor and the oppressed, in order to restore the 
classless society as an original state:  
Above we have outlined a few general ideas that seem to support our assertions 
about the “viability” of stereoscopic cinema, which we have shown to be––strictly 
on account of its unique technical properties––an aesthetic reflection of one of the 
deepest and most powerful drives of humanity, in its transition toward the 
annihilation of class society and its transformation into a classless society… No 
wonder then that the bourgeois West has responded with either indifference or 
hostile irony to the stereoproblem in cinema, a problem to which the research-
and-development genius of the Land of the Soviets, along with its government 
and the leaders of its film industry have devoted so much attention.147 
 
																																																								
145 For Eisenstein, rampe is the result of a long history of “the tendency toward the separation between 
stage and audience.” (Ibid., 30.)  
146 This synthesis is the unique possibility of S3D film for Eisenstein. He argues: “If we were to put this 
question to a Taoist philosopher of ancient China, he would surely tell us that the very essence of the two 
universal principles—the positive and the negative, which, in their union and interpenetration, drive and 
sustain the whole system of universal phenomena— may be glimpsed most vividly in the unique character 
of stereocinema.” (Ibid., 26.)  
147 Ibid., 55.  
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Although more utopic in its political and artistic assumptions, Eisenstein’s model is 
defined by the same formal operation as Münsterberg’s and Balázs’: eliminating the limit 
that separates oppositional terms. Like subjectivity-objectivity in Münsterberg and text-
image in Balázs, cancelling the unnatural limit between spectator and spectacle, and by 
extension the classes to restore the original unity of society is linked to the formal 
possibilities of stereoscopy. However, this utopian future of a classless society and of 
S3D has never come to pass. Instead, S3D became the principal gimmicky strategy148 of 
Hollywood to increase theatrical income. Yet despite the constant failure of teleological 
discourses around S3D, the idea that it is the future cinema has continued to re-emerge 
periodically throughout the last century.  
																																																								
148 This failure in itself merits another comprehensive study but far exceeds the scope of this dissertation. 
Mainly determined by the Hollywood boom strategy (Mitchell, 2004; Elsaesser, 2011 and 2013), the 
history of S3D cinema can be subdivided into three periods during which theatrical income was decreased 
by the advent of different platforms or technologies that sent the movie-going experience into a dramatic 
financial crisis. The first one coincides with the advent of television, the second one with the advent of 
videotapes and the third with the rise of piracy. It is general consensus (Johnston, 2013; Klinger, 2012; 
Higgins, 2012, Sara Ross, 2012; Miriam Ross, 2012) that the way in which Hollywood engages with 
stereoscopy depends on the pop-up effect of negative parallax, which is based on the violation of screen 
limits of classical 2D cinema in the form of intrusion: sometimes an abyssal or an extraterrestrial monster, 
an animal, or a bandit that comes from beyond the horizon which separates not only some spatial categories 
such as here and there, ocean and land, space and earth, but also some social categories such as human and 
animal, culture and nature, innocence and guilt. Encompassing more than fifty films released between 1952 
and 1955, the first wave was initiated by Bwana Devil (1952), and included films such as House of Wax 
(1953), It Came from Outer Space (1953), Robot Monster (1953) and Creature from the Black Lagoon 
(1954). Not only did these films narrativize the entities beyond, they also re-determined the conventions of 
motion picture frame of the time (Academy aperture). Designed to recoup the large budgets involved in 
their production, the films of the second S3D boom –of which Comin' at Ya! (1983), Friday the 13th Part 
III (1982), Jaws 3-D (1983) and Amityville 3-D (1983) are exemplary ones - were usually produced as 
blockbusters in tested genres (action, horror, sci-fi, film-noir, etc.) However, by the third wave, particularly 
within the works of Wim Wenders (Pina, 2011), Peter Greenaway (3x3D, 2013), Jean-Luc Godard 
(Goodbye to Language, 2014) and James Cameron (Avatar, 2009), a different usage of S3D emerges: (1) to 
translate the stage arts experience to cinematic experience, such as concerts, dance, and theater 
performances or (2) to narrativize several themes related to corporeality, affectivity and movement in the 
form of pornography, dance, and flying travel films. Moreover the “hypo-stereo” and “hyper-stereo” are 
used more than the previous periods. These effects, along with changing the depth volume in the stereo 
image, also enable the spectator to experience the visuality of a body which has either greater or smaller 
interaxial distance than the human one.  
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3.4 S3D: The Origin of Cinema  
 
What is even more striking about S3D is that it has a double position in the history 
of film theory: not only is it promoted as the future cinema, it has also been considered to 
be the origin of cinema. Several film and media theorists, such as Bazin (2104), Sadoul 
(1946) and Crary (1988), emphasize the conceptual, historical and possibly even 
ontological link between cinema and S3D. They share the view of S3D as the most 
important of the devices –among the proto-cinematic devices such as thaumatrope, 
phenakistoscope and zoetrope- which emerged as the result of a new visual paradigm in 
the 19th century that culminated in the invention of cinema. 149 I believe the two 
approaches (positing S3D as the future and as the origin of cinema respectively) are 
complementary in regard to the conceptual framework upon which future cinema, as a 
discourse, has been built. Therefore, in this section, I will outline the conceptual 
framework of two approaches that position stereoscopic 3D as the origin of cinema.  
3.4.1 Body as interface  
 
The first approach that I will engage with is Jonathan Crary’s historical recounting 
of 19th century image culture, in which he positions S3D as the most significant visual 
																																																								
149 As Crary observes, stereoscopy was one of the first optical devices that was designed by modeling 
human perception within the research on optics that focused on the comprehensive articulation of 
subjective vision: the study of afterimages, of persistence of vision, peripheral and binocular vision which 
initiated the invention of a series of apparatus - stereoscope, the kaleidoscope, the phenakistiscope, and 
even the diorama- where the spectator becomes a constituent element of the device by its very corporeal 
capacities. This paradigm, under the influence of the epistemological linage of the 19th century -Kant’s 
subjective idealism, Goethe’s color theory, Newton’s optic, undertake to map out the visual experience in 
which “the body itself produces phenomena that have no external correlate.” Crary, Jonathan. Techniques 
of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century. (Cambridge, Mass. u.a.: The MIT Press, 
1992.) 71.  
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form.150 What makes S3D important for him is not the abundance of stereograms that 
dominated the second half of the 19th century, 151  but rather the scientific and 
technological context in which S3D is embedded, which is linked to the larger paradigm 
that traverses the cultural, political and visual culture of the last two centuries. In fact, for 
him, the history of S3D in the 19th century, which fluctuated between being abundant and 
redundant, is a case study which provides insight into the visual paradigm of a particular 
form of power.  
Crary, in his book Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 
Nineteenth Century (1990), attempts to map an epistemological shift in vision science 
that initiated the proliferation of optical devices beginning in the 1820s (not only cinema 
and S3D but also several proto-cinematic devices) and how they are linked to the 
philosophical paradigm of modernity that positions the subject as the condition of 
knowledge. He characterizes this turn as the “passage from geometrical optics of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to physiological optics, which dominated both 
scientific and philosophical discussion of vision in the nineteenth century.”152 Particular 
evident in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s153 colour theory, this shift constitutes a turning 
towards the subjective and corporeal conditions of vision rather than studying the 
																																																								
150 Crary writes “The most significant form of visual imagery in the nineteenth century, with the exception 
of photography, was the stereoscope.” (Ibid., 96.)  
151 It is estimated that between 1870 and 1910 “tens of millions of stereographic cards were sold annually 
and hundreds of millions were in circulation.” Leon Gurevitch, “The Birth of a Stereoscopic Nation: 
Hollywood, Digital Empire and the Cybernetic Attraction.” Animation 7, no. 3 (November 1, 2012): 239–
58. https://doi.org/10.1177/1746847712456255. 
152 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century. (Cambridge, 
Mass. u.a.: The MIT Press, 1992.): 71.  
153 Goethe writes “Let the observer look steadfastly on a small colored object and let it be taken away after 
a time while his eyes remain unmoved; the spectrum of another color will then be visible on the white plane 
. . . it arises from an image which now belongs to the eye.” (Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, Theory of 
Colours. Translated by Charles Lock Eastlake. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015.): 21.)  
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objective conditions154 of a rectilinear propagation of light rays. The invention of 
stereoscopy and cinema is thus the result of this paradigm shift, where corporeal 
mechanisms of vision such as retinal afterimages, peripheral vision, binocular vision, and 
thresholds of attention became the dominant subject of vision studies.  
Built on the Foucauldian155 observation that the body becomes a field of research in 
modernity, Crary argues that the paradigm shift in optics is the extension of an 
epistemological rupture initiated by Kant and carried on by Schopenhauer. This rupture 
resulted in a move towards studying how the subject and its corporeal conditions 
determine knowledge. For instance, for Kant, knowledge isn’t merely determined by an 
external cause, rather, it is synthesized by the subject through a priori forms; that is to 
say, the image of an object is only possible through the synthesis realized by a priori 
forms (time and space) and categories given in the subject.156 However, in Schopenhauer, 
who “seeks to rectify Kant”, this shift, Crary argues, tends to study the physiological 
basis of perception by shaping the Kantian transcendental subject in flesh and bones. For 
instance, Schopenhauer says, “A philosophy like the Kantian, that ignores entirely [the 
physiological] point of view, is one-sided and therefore inadequate. It leaves an immense 
gulf between our philosophical and physiological knowledge, with which we can never 
																																																								
154 Crary writes “Dominant theories of vision, whether those of Alberti, Kepler, or Newton, all described in 
their own fashion how a beam of isolated light rays traversed an optical system, with each ray taking the 
shortest possible route to reach its destination.” (Jonathan Crary, “Techniques of the Observer.” October 45 
(1988): 8. ) 
155 Foucault writes “There are those that operate within the space of the body, and –by studying perception, 
sensorial mechanisms, neuro-motor diagrams, and the articulation common to things and to the organism– 
function as a sort of transcendental aesthetic; these led to the discovery that knowledge has anatomo-
physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within the structures of the body, that it may have a 
privileged place within it.” (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. (New York: Routledge, 2005.): 347.)  
156Kant writes “We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of 
appearance; … as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 
1999.): 168.)  
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be satisfied.”157 Different from late 19th and 20th century philosophy (Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, and even Maurice Merleau-Ponty) where the body was 
conceptualized as an indeterminate mediation with its affective structure to defy the 
rationalist control mechanisms inherent to power, for Crary, the 19th century paradigm is 
linked to a paradigm shift in power formation, where subjects were studied in order to 
determine quantifiable norms and parameters. In a Foucauldian sense, the emergence of 
stereoscopy and film technologies is the result of the quantifying of human perception, 
attributing it to a mechanic, rationalized structure in order to simultaneously allow new 
forms of control and standardization of vision.  
However, even though stereoscopy became the dominant form of visual culture in 
the 19th century as an extension of the control mechanism of power, Crary states that it 
was defeated by photography,158 and cinema by extension. The reason behind this 
ostensible disappearance,159 for him, is that S3D “was insufficiently phantasmagoric”160 
																																																								
157Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation. (Massachusetts: Courier Corporation, 
2012.): 273.  
158 The first stereoscopic apparatus, which was invented by Wheatstone, used hand drawings (Gurevitch 
2012, Brown, 2012; Crary 1988; Sandifer, 2011). Almost simultaneously, Sir David Brewster developed 
the first portable 3D viewing device using photographic images. This lenticular stereoscope, using 
photographs instead of drawings, provided a template for all later stereoviews that became popular in the 
Victorian era and for the Viewmaster of the 1960s (Gurevitch and Ross, 2012). 
159 There are several new studies that show how S3D came into existence in different technologies such as 
View Master after the ostensible obliteration that Crary claims occurred. For instance, in 
“STEREOSCOPIC MEDIA Scholarship Beyond Booms and Busts” by Leon Gurevitch  and Miriam Ross, 
they study how S3D was again popularized by View Master.  In his book 3D: History, Theory and 
Aesthetics of the Transplane Image, Jens Schröter argues that, unlike a history concatenating the mediums 
sequentially, S3D in particular, and media history in general, follows a history that is oriented “more 
spatially and topologically where several media are related synchronically to each other in a systematic 
relationship or exist and develop diachronically within a specific constellation.” (Jens Schröter, 3D: 
History, Theory and Aesthetics of the Transplane Image. Revised edition. (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014.) 
160 Mobilized mainly by Adorno and Benjamin, phantasmagoric effect is used to mark a shift in visual 
paradigm and in the ways in which power operates: “the occultation of production by means of the outward 
appearance of the product.” Criticizing Wagner’s aesthetic program (Gesamtkunstwerk), Adorno asserts 
that this image form “can lay claim to the status of being. Its perfection is at the same time the perfection of 
the illusion that the work of art is a reality sui generis that constitutes itself in the realm of the absolute 
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in the sense that it fell short of concealing the means of production since it “was 
dependent on a physical engagement with the apparatus which became increasingly 
inconvenient and unacceptable, but more importantly, the abstract and synthetic nature of 
the stereoscopic image could never be fully effaced.” 161 However, though S3D has never 
fully become the future form of cinema, it has never disappeared, and came to exist in 
different media forms throughout the last two centuries. Despite his inaccurate account of 
the historical trajectory of S3D, I believe Crary’s statement is still relevant to 
understanding the paradigm that I define as future cinema. In fact it is the first moment of 
future cinema and by extension of VR aesthetics: it constructs its immediacy and 
autonomy claim through an immediate interface organized according to the subjective 
and bodily conditions of the viewer. Phantasmagorical in its strategies to construct the 
illusion of immediate and unlimited imagery, in this paradigm, the objective limitations 
of the image are concealed beyond the subjective limitations of the viewer to the extent 
that the only limitations left in the visual field become the ones inherent to the viewer’s 
vision. Moreover it deploys the ways in which the function of the viewer is doubled both 
as the subject and object, or the viewer and the maker at once.  
3.4.2 Bazin: Total Cinema 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
without having to renounce its claim to image the world.” (W. Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner. 
(London: Verso, 2005.) 
161 Supposedly S3D was capable of replacing the spatial limitations of screen inherent to cinematic imagery 
in favour of a greater perceptual realism. However, S3D does not annihilate the limitations of screen; 
stereoscopic imagery is still conditioned by several constraints such the boundary of the screen and the 
relative positioning of spectator and image (Zone, 2007). As Zone indicates, stereoscopic imagery requires 
a certain distance and angle between screen and spectator to be able to merge the stereo images. 
Furthermore, while it is true that transgression of the limit is possible in the case of the limit that separates 
the screen and proscenium, the vertical and horizontal limit of the S3D screen is still “defined by the 
relative position” of each stereo image.    
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In Myth of Total Cinema, Bazin also maintains that S3D is the earliest image 
technology that initiated the paradigm in which cinema was invented. In fact, for Bazin, 
both cinema and stereoscopy are the result of an ideal that traverses image technologies 
starting in the 19th century. This ideal, which Bazin calls the Total Cinema, precedes and 
determines not only the invention of cinema but also image culture in general in the 19th 
century. However, what is unique about total cinema is that it is a teleological program or 
ideal that charges image culture with a utopic objective to represent the world in an 
immediate way. Both the origin and the telos at once, Total Cinema is thus the early 
reiteration of the teleological paradigm that this chapter seeks to map out. It is the myth 
where two ostensibly antithetical concepts, realism and idealism, converge in a 
teleological program concerning the technological essence of image culture. For instance, 
while in The Ontology of the Photographic Image, Bazin states that cinema is objectivity 
in time due to its photographic nature which has “the power to lay bare the realities,”162 
in Myth of Total Cinema,163 he identifies another vocation of cinema, which lies in its 
relation to idealism: “The cinema is an idealistic phenomenon.”164 Difficult to discern at 
first glance, the connection between the two vocations may seem irrelevant or incidental; 
however, it is crucial to understanding the epistemological paradigm that traverses 
Bazin’s corpus and also the recurrent topic of future cinema.  
Before embarking on Total Cinema and its technological coordinates in 
contemporary image culture, I will briefly outline his methodology which I believe 
mirrors the methodology I employ in this chapter in particular and in this dissertation in 																																																								
162 André Bazin and Hugh Gray. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” Film Quarterly 13, no. 4 
(1960): 8. https://doi.org/10.2307/1210183. 
163 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew 
and Francois Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition. (University of California Press, 2004.) 
164 Ibid., 234.   
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general. Particularly in Myth of Total Cinema, Bazin, instead of recounting the 
technological chronology of the process that culminated in the invention of cinema, 
attempts to excavate the discursive context that enabled the invention of cinema. Parallel 
to the discourse analysis that has been modeled after Foucault and Kittler in media 
archaeology, Bazin analyzes the discursive fabric that defines the condition of 
existence165 of the artefact rather than “the account of the cinema that was drawn merely 
from the technical inventions that made it possible.”166 Similar to Foucault’s emphasis on 
excavating “the conditions of existence” through the analysis of discourses and Kittler’s 
focus on media networks, Bazin’s method bear a striking similarity to media archaeology 
approach which operates through, as Jussi Parikka frames, “digging the background 
reasons why a certain object, statement, discourse or, for instance in our case, media 
apparatus or use habit is able to be born and be picked up and sustain itself in a cultural 
situation.”167 This is why, for Bazin, the idea precedes the invention and hence is superior 
to the technical means used to achieve it. For instance, total cinema already existed as an 
idea before the invention of cinema: “There are numberless writings, all of them more or 
less wildly enthusiastic, in which inventors conjure up nothing less than a total cinema 
that is to provide that complete illusion of life which is still a long way away.” 168 
It is in this context, as Tom Gunning suggests, from Sadoul’s chronology of the 
invention of cinema, that Bazin, in Myth of Total Cinema, abstracts and formulates the 																																																								
165 Foucault writes “The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in a quite different way; we must grasp 
the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its 
limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other 
forms of statement it excludes.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on 
Language. (Reprint edition. New York, NY: Vintage, 1972.): 28. 
166 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew 
and Francois Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition. (University of California Press, 2004):  234.  
167 Jussi Parikka, What Is Media Archaeology? (John Wiley & Sons, 2013.): 6.  
168 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew 
and Francois Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition. (University of California Press, 2004):  235. 
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idea which he considers to be the transcendental conditions that define the origin and 
technological progress of cinema. As Gunning states, he finds “less a description of 
scientific and technological progress than evidence of an obsessive fascination with 
achieving a complex and “total” mimesis of the world.”169 Aiming at “recreating the 
world in its image” this idea or ideal, which Bazin calls Total Cinema, is the guiding 
myth “inspiring the invention of cinema, [it] is the accomplishment of that which 
dominated in a more or less vague fashion all the techniques of the mechanical 
reproduction of reality in the nineteenth century, from photography to the phonograph, 
namely an integral realism, a recreation of the world in its own image, an image 
unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.”170 
This is why for Bazin, as an embodiment of the idea, cinema, for him, is “an idealistic 
phenomenon” and only consequently technical. In its invention, development and future, 
cinema is coloured or marked by this idea. Therefore both the origin and the future of 
cinema, Total Cinema is an idea that inverts deterministic causality between future and 
present. For instance, for Bazin the history of cinema is a progressive trajectory toward 
an ultimate goal, but this goal is the reversal of the historical order of causality where the 
“telos itself becomes the origin.” Bazin brings his essay’s rhetoric of reversal to a climax 
as he charts film’s technological development not simply as a linear progression, but as 
actually circling back to fulfill the original ideal: “Every new development added to the 
																																																								
169 Tom Gunning, “The World in its Own Image: The Myth of Total Cinema.” In Opening Bazin: Postwar 
Film Theory and Its Aftermath. Eds. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011.): 121. 
170 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew 
and Francois Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition. (University of California Press, 2004):  235.  
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cinema must, paradoxically, take it nearer and nearer to its origins. In short, cinema has 
not yet been invented!”171 
The very ideal that defines the emergence of cinema essentially, in fact, aims to 
represent the world shorn of the mediation of artist: “an image unburdened by the 
freedom of interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.”172 Therefore, as 
Gunning suggests, Total Cinema, as the original idea, aims to be more than merely an 
artistic means to express a subjective view of the world; it is an immediate image of the 
world: “The myth of cinema’s origin does not primarily concern artistic expression, as 
the theorists of cinema in the ‘20s (articulating the achievements of that decade’s 
filmmakers) would claim. Rather, at the point of its invention cinema pursued not only 
the possibility of a complete mimetic presentation of the world but also the creation of an 
image beyond the manipulations and interpretations of artists, not a particular artist’s 
image of the world, but the ‘world in its own image’.”173 In this context cinema finds its 
realist vocation: it aims to create an image that can stand for reality as a whole. In fact, 
cancelling the artistic mediation that essentially functions through limiting the image in 
time and space is identified with the cancellation of the limitation at large in order to 
create an unlimited image system that can imitate the very unlimited character of reality.  
The connection between the realist and idealist vocation of cinema is more visible 
in The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,174 where Bazin states that the montage 
cannot fulfill the realist vocation of cinema as much as the depth of field. Since montage 																																																								
171 Ibid., 236. 
172 Ibid., 236.  
173 Tom Gunning, “The World in its Own Image: The Myth of Total Cinema.” In: Opening Bazin: Postwar 
Film Theory and Its Aftermath. Eds. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin. (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2011): 123.  
174 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew 
and Francois Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition. (University of California Press, 2004)  235. 
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functions to organize movement in a rational and fragmented ordering, it eliminates the 
“ambiguity” inherent to reality as a “perpetual flux”175 which defies any limitation. 
However, in cinematic montage, the world is represented in a fragmented temporal 
structure by disrupting the unity inherent to things and men.176 This is why montage, as a 
way of fragmenting the world in time, is less realistic for Bazin. Cinema can nonetheless 
fulfill its essence by eliminating montage and its fragmenting representation of reality 
and deploying depth of field as a spatial organization that can conglomerate events, 
beings and humans in the totality of image. Therefore, the ultimate operation that defines 
realism in cinema is to eliminate fragmentation or construct unlimited image in it is 
temporality. Moreover, along with temporal configuration of movement in a limitless 
manner, as Thomas Elsaesser underlines, Total Cinema is “a kind of self-abolition of 
cinema in the dialectic between “spectacle” and “event”, whose overcoming—rightly or 
wrongly—he associates with De Sica’s film: “No more actors, no more story, no more 
sets, which is to say that in the perfect aesthetic illusion of reality, there is no more 
cinema.”177 Pushed to the extreme, the aesthetic and technological operations that define 
Bazanian realism pertaining to cinema and Total Cinema converge in the idea of 
abolishing the limits that condition the cinematic image in its temporal and spatial 
organization.178 In short, the realist vocation of cinema can be subsumed under the 
operation of cancelling any mediation in order to create “an immediate mediation.”  
																																																								
175 Clearly inspired by Bergsonian ontology, the grounding gesture of reality, for Bazin, due to the 
objective mechanism inherent to time, is ambiguity. 
176 In short, montage by its very nature rules out ambiguity of expression. 
177 André Bazin, “Bicycle Thief.” In What Is Cinema?: Volume II, edited by Dudley Andrew and Francois 
Truffaut, translated by Hugh Gray, 1 edition., 47–60. (University of California Press, 2004.) 60.  
178 However, unlike Bergson, who considers cinema to be an illusion, Bazin sees a possibility to reintroduce 
ambiguity through depth of field: “depth of focus reintroduced ambiguity into the structure of the image if 
not of necessity—Wyler's films are never ambiguous—at least as a possibility.” (André Bazin, What Is 
Cinema? Volume I. (University of California Press, 2005.): 36.)  
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However in his text The World in Its Own Image: The Myth of Total Cinema, Tom 
Gunning points out that Total Cinema, as a discursive operation of cancelling the limit 
specific to the ways in which representation is produced, does not aim at a “crowning 
synthesis” as a Hegelian telos. He asserts that it is not an image without a limitation but 
an image “bounded by a horizon” which is in constant expansion: “total cinema offers 
more than a complex process of duplication. Bazin calls this something more: “the world 
in its own image.” I read this phrase as equivalent to the phenomenological concept (used 
by both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger) of the worldhood of the world. The worldhood of 
the world forms the ultimate referent of the myth of total cinema. Thus total cinema does 
not posit a Hegelian universal totality but rather the phenomenological image of the 
world as bounded by a horizon, and it is in the nature of a horizon to be expanded.”179 
Introducing horizon, Gunning emphasizes the utopic aspect of total cinema; however, he 
also gestures towards what I call the main operation of future cinema “…Bazin’s total 
cinema strives to achieve ‘the world in its own image’. This unique image seeks precisely 
to overcome the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and even between 
materialism and idealism.”180  
Complementary in their conceptualizing of cinema, both approaches which posit 
S3D as the future of cinema and as the origin of cinema reveal the discursive fabric that 
has traversed image technology starting from modernity to the contemporary media 
landscape in which VR emerged. There are two fundamental operations that define future 
cinema: first, eliminating the boundaries that condition image to the extent that the 
																																																								
179 Tom Gunning,“The World in its Own Image: The Myth of Total Cinema.” In: Opening Bazin: Postwar 
Film Theory and Its Aftermath. Eds. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin. (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2011): 125.  
180 Ibid., 125.  
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elements distributed in binary oppositions such as spectator and spectacle, image and 
reality, subjective and objective are unified. Second, it aims to integrate subject as an 
interface to the image construction to the extent that the boundaries are determined by the 
subjective limitations defined by the viewer’s body.  
3.5 Second Instant of Future Cinema: VR and Technological 
Utopianism 	
With the advent of the computer, future cinema models developed in the 1960s 
shifted towards a more utopian trope in their political and aesthetic presumptions. They 
are marked by the hyperbolic beliefs and hopes that arose following the emergence of the 
computer as a meta-media that could incorporate and assimilate different media platforms 
in favour of universalism/globalism.181 Moreover, different from the stereoscopic models 
that sought to overcome the spatial limitations of the screen, the future cinema models of 
the 1960s and 1970s focused mainly on interactivity and multisensory strategies. Unlike 
the previous model that posited stereoscopic 3D as the future cinema which would fulfill 
the artistic essence of cinema, these models were primarily linked to a political program 
in which social harmony or universal peace could be restored by translating the harmony 
inherent to the formal structure of future cinema. The question was more about how 
cinema in the future could realize, with the help of the computer, a new reality that could 
function as an alternative to the present one: a reality that would transgress the 
																																																								
181 Similar to utopic discourses that previous technological inventions such as the railroad, steam, 
electricity, telephone, airplane, nuclear power etc. enabled, the political promises that emerged by the 
advent the computer as Langdon Winner emphasizes “The basic conceit is always the same… new 
technology will bring universal wealth, enhanced freedom, revitalized politics, satisfying community, and 
personal fulfillment.” (Langdon Winner, “Technology today: utopia or dystopia?” Social Research 64.3 
(1997): 989- 1017) 
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differences between image and reality, image and matter, spectator and spectacle, and 
hence transgress social differences.  
More importantly, these techno-utopic models of the ‘60s most often emerged from 
the research related to VR. They generally converged in the idealization of VR as a future 
cinema model. In this section I will look at four figures who have been widely 
acknowledged to be the fathers of VR. The first figure is Ivan Sutherland, a scientist and 
inventor of the first headmounted VR display. For him, future cinema, which he calls 
Ultimate Display, can change the ways in which we define reality by eliminating the 
differences between image and matter. For Morton Heilig, a former cinematographer, the 
future cinema is a multisensory device that can respond to technological developments in 
science to restore universal peace. Jaron Lanier, artist and researcher, who coined VR, 
also maintains that VR can restore the sense of being part of a community by its 
unlimited imagery in which social differences are cancelled. Finally, for Myron Krueger, 
computer artist, technological developments in terms of interactivity can be used to create 
a new aesthetic paradigm where technology can generate new philosophy based on 
“contingency” in order to invert the epistemological paradigm of given narrative 
structures.  
3.5.1 Sutherland: Ultimate Display  
 
As a researcher and one of the early figures who shaped the conceptual framework 
in which VR was invented, Ivan Sutherland focused mainly on enhancing the interaction 
between human and computer. Working on interactive and immersive systems beyond 
the technologies of the day, such as keyboard, light pen, and joystick, he completed the 
first prototype of a headmounted display in 1970 at the University of Utah, and named it 
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ironically “Sword of Damocles” because of its gigantic structure that threatened to 
decapitate the user. He was also the creator of one of the most influential computer 
programs in computational visual media called Sketchpad which allowed users to 
visualize and control program functions. His contributions became the foundation for 
computer graphics, computer operating system interfaces, and software applications that 
are used widely in modern technology, and he introduced concepts such as 3-D computer 
modeling, visual simulations and computer-aided design.  
In 1965 Sutherland presented a research paper entitled “Ultimate Display” in which 
he proposed three main points related to the novelties that a computer could generate. 
First of all, as an extension of the ‘60s utopic environment, he argued that the computer 
can be used to change the ways in which we conceptualize reality beyond empirical 
science. He suggests that the mathematically organized visual world of computers can 
enable a modeling of phenomena that are beyond the reach of empirical science. This 
particular visual regime, a computer display, for him, is “a looking glass into a 
mathematical wonderland”182 where the concepts that are not realizable in the physical 
world can be modeled. For instance, such a display will be able to visualize “the forces 
on charged particles, forces in non-uniform fields, the effects of nonprojective geometric 
transformations, and high-inertia, low friction motion.”183 Therefore ultimate display is 
an aesthetic means to go beyond the limits of empirical science:  
There is no reason why the objects displayed by a computer have to follow the 
ordinary rules of physical reality with which we are familiar. The kinesthetic 
display might be used to simulate the motions of a negative mass. The user of one 
of today's visual displays can easily make solid objects transparent - he can "see 
through matter!" Concepts which never before had any visual representation can 
be shown, for example the "constraints" in Sketchpad. By working with such 																																																								
182 Ivan E. Sutherland, “The Ultimate Display.” In Proceedings of the IFIP Congress, 506–508, 1965. 
183 Ibid., 506. 
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displays of mathematical phenomena we can learn to know them as well as we 
know our own natural world. Such knowledge is the major promise of computer 
displays.184 
 
Furthermore, for him the computer will lead to less textual interaction by involving 
multiple senses: “If the task of the display is to serve as a looking-glass into the 
mathematical wonderland constructed in computer memory, it should serve as many 
senses as possible.”185 Finally, with its conspicuous similarity to future cinema as 
discursive machine, Ultimate Display will enable a new visual regime which, more 
importantly, will reshape the distribution of the material world as well:  
The ultimate display would, of course, be a room within which the computer can 
control the existence of matter. A chair displayed in such a room would be good 
enough to sit in. Handcuffs displayed in such a room would be confining, and a 
bullet displayed in such a room would be fatal. With appropriate programming 
such a display could literally be the Wonderland into which Alice walked.186 
 
Thus ultimate display, as the first model for VR, attempts to alter the ways in which 
empirical science conceptualizes reality, and more importantly it is ultimately modeled in 
such a way that it will abolish the limit between image and matter.  
3.5.2 Morton Heilig: The Cinema of the Future 
 
In the case of the second figure, Morton Heilig, this connection between VR and 
future cinema as a discursive model is much more obvious. Parallel to Sutherland, Heilig 
also conducted his research on VR in search of possible future models for cinema. 
Originally a Hollywood cinematographer, Heilig was the first person to attempt to create 
what we now call virtual reality. He attempted to design “a reality machine,” as an 																																																								
184 Ibid., 507. 
185 Ibid., 508.  
186 Ibid., 508.  
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extension of cinema, that might succeed in stimulating the entire sensory spectrum of 
human perception. However, unable to find support in Hollywood for this utopic 
invention, Heilig moved to Mexico City in 1954, where he elaborated on the 
multidisciplinary concepts found in his essay, “The Cinema of the Future.”187 As a result 
of this text, which I will look at shortly, two different technologies came into existence: 
the first was the “Telesphere Mask,” which was an early version of head-mounted 
displays, and the second was the “Sensorama” which immersed viewers in multisensory 
excursions through the streets of Brooklyn. The Sensorama was able to display 
stereoscopic 3-D images in a wide-angle view, provide body tilting, supply stereo sound, 
and also had tracks for wind and aromas to be triggered during the film.  
Reductive in his analyses of how human perception and action work, in The 
Cinema of the Future, he undertakes to develop, first of all, a taxonomy of the cultural 
sphere in which he defines three modalities which cover the whole of human activity: art, 
science and industry. For him, art, which is “slow” to respond to the developments in 
science and industry, needs a mathematical and scientific methodology. As articulated in 
his text, the very task of future cinema, which is the ultimate art, is to control the 
multisensory stimulation of the audience with the illusion and sensation of absolute 
immersion. In order to do so, future cinema has to model itself after consciousness, which 
is in turn a “composite of all the sense impressions conveyed to the brain by the sensory 
part of the nervous system.”188 Therefore future cinema is not simply occulting reality 
																																																								
187 Heilig Morton, “The Cinema of the Future.” In Multimedia: From Wagner to Virtual Reality, Expanded 
edition. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002.) 
188 Heilig writes “And this is because, as yet, art has evolved no clear-cut methodology to make it as 
efficient as science and industry in creating its product. Art is now struggling feverishly to achieve this, and 
only in the light of this struggle and the laws it seeks to establish will we be able to understand the 
innovations that prompted this article.” (Ibid., 242.) 
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with fully immersive imagery but has to respond to the subjective conditions of viewers’ 
visual capacities and hence their consciousness.  
Furthermore, he also distinguished between two forms of art: pure arts and 
combined arts. The history of art, for him, is a constant progress from pure arts to 
combined arts. Accelerated by cinema,189 which can combine sound and light, this new 
dominant paradigm of art can serve to control the distribution of senses in accordance 
with human perception: “the laws of art, like those of science and industry, lie hidden in 
the subconscious of man. But this was not possible till the advent of machine into the 
domain of art which has been realized by cinema.”190 With the help of the mechanistic 
nature of cinema, this new art form can create an immersive and multisensory image 
where “each basic sense will dominate the scene in roughly the same proportion we 
found them to have in man. That is, sight, 70%; sound, 20%; smell, 5%; touch, 4%; and 
taste, 1%.”191 Similar to Münsterberg’s schema, where the viewer and its subjective 
conditions become the reference point, the very task of future cinema, for Heilig, is to 
generate an image “devoted to the revelation of the laws of his psyche and the 
invention of better means.”192  
3.5.3 Jaron Lanier: Restoring the Social  
 
The third and most unique figure in the history of VR is Jaron Lanier. With his 
research company, VPL Research, which stands for Virtual Programming Languages, he 																																																								
189 “It is the addition of sound that represents the really great “revolution” in the history of cinema. For with 
addition of sound, cinema stepped irrevocably out of the domain of the “pure arts” into the camp of the 
“combined arts”.” (Ibid., 245.)  
190 Morton Leonard Heilig,. “EL Cine Del Futuro: The Cinema of the Future.” Presence: Teleoperators and 
Virtual Environments 1, no. 3 (January 1, 1992): 279–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/pres.1992.1.3.279. 
191 Ibid., 245. 
192 Ibid., 245. 
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invented early forms of the devices that have been the model for the VR aesthetic such as 
The Data Glove - a device which uses a glove as a form of input, the EyePhone -a head-
mounted display unit which is used to visually immerse its user into a virtual 
environment, and the Data Suit - a full-body outfit with sensors for measuring the 
movement of arms, legs, and trunk. Furthermore, he is the one who coined the term 
virtual reality, and most importantly, his approach to VR aesthetics became the root of 
the contemporary conventions of VR as an “empathy machine.” For him, VR as 
technology can restore the lost sense of being part of a shared experience as a society. As 
a platform of communication that eliminates the constraints of the material world, social 
identities, and above all the limitation inherent to linguistic structures, VR is “the 
ultimate gadget” for generating post-symbolic communication.  
In an interview, he explains why he preferred virtual reality when he coined the 
term instead of using artificial or synthetic reality. For him, virtual is much more 
convenient, since it underlines this new technology’s capacity of overcoming the material 
constraints of reality as an electronic representation.193 This liberation from constraints 
extends to a more hyperbolic definition of VR: “it’s a reality in which anything can be 
possible, provided it's part of the external world. It's a world without limitation, a world 
as unlimited as dreams.”194 Therefore the very essence of VR is that it abolishes the 
																																																								
193 Lanier writes ““Virtual” means something that exists only as an electronic representation, which has no 
other concrete existence. It's as if it were there even if it isn’t.” Will. Kurt, “An Interview with Jaron 
Lanier.” Serials Review 33, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 190–95.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serrev.2007.05.009. 
194 Ibid., 119. 
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limit 195  as differentiating technology 196  and as a result of that, it generates a 
neutral/democratic platform where social differences are also eliminated:  
Virtual Reality is the ultimate lack of class or race distinctions or any other form 
of pretense since all form is variable. When people's personalities meet, freed of 
all pretense of that kind in the virtual plane, I think that will be an extraordinary 
tool for increasing communication and empathy. In that sense it might have a 
good effect on politics.197   
 
This set of arguments, based on the unboundedness of VR, for him, culminates in 
the ultimate function of VR, which is to go beyond language structures and create a new 
language that is post-symbolic.198 This is why, for him, “VR’s deep mission… was to 
find a new type of language, or really a new dimension of communication that would 
transcend language as we know it.”199 Therefore since there are no linguistic, material 
and social limits, it is the ultimate gadget to realize a shared sense of community. It will 
restore “the mystical altered sense of reality that is so important in basically every other 
civilization and culture prior to big patriarchal power.”200 Here he argues that, shorn of 
mediations, it can enable random relations, improvisation, unpredictable encounters that 
can be used to invert hegemonic communication structures. For instance, as an ultimate 
model for 20th century art, VR is “a fusion of the three great arts of the twentieth century: 																																																								
195 Lanier writes “In the virtual world there is absolutely no difference between a thousand-dollar bill and a 
one-dollar bill; they are simply two different graphic designs and they are both as plentiful as you can make 
them.” (Ibid., 120.) 
196 Lanier writes “Well, physical reality is tragic in that it's mandatory. Virtual Reality is multiple channel. 
People can choose and switch which Virtual Reality plane they're on. They can also simply take off their 
clothing if they want to get out of it.” (Ibid., 121.) 
197 Lanier writes “It has a tendency to bring up empathy and reduce violence, although there's certainly no 
panacea ultimately.” (Ibid., 123.) 
198 Lanier writes “Now, Virtual Reality is just the opposite. First of all, it's a network like the telephone 
where there's no central point of origin of information. But, much more importantly, since nothing is made 
of physical matter, since it's all just made of computer information; no one has any advantage over anyone 
else in their ability to create any particular thing within it.” (Ibid., 124.)  
199 Ibid., 124. 
200 Lanier writes “It's the ultimate gadget. It's the culmination of gadgetry in many ways. I think that it will 
bring back into western experience something that has been lost. Why that is so is a big topic.It will bring 
back a sense of the shared mystical altered sense of reality that is so important in basically every other 
civilization and culture prior to big patriarchal power.” (Ibid., 124.) 
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cinema, programming, and jazz.”201 Jazz in this context is that which corresponds to the 
improvisational possibilities of VR. Moreover he states that VR is an image system 
where pure consciousness can be experienced: “VR lets you feel your consciousness in 
its pure form. There you are, the fixed point in a system where everything else can 
change.”202 With social, political and linguistic identities stripped away, the viewer 
becomes the invariable term of image, which is the series of variable visual 
organizations, and will experience self-awareness in its purest form. This is why VR, for 
Lanier, is the extension of the telephone, rather than of cinema or television, which found 
their ultimate function in reducing empathy because broadcasting them creates a sense of 
a world “in which [viewers] can't act or have responsibility or meet each other.”203 
Therefore, not only is VR the ideal device to enable post-symbolic and democratic 
language due to its unlimited imagery, but, according to Lanier, it can also mobilize users 
within its interactive visual regime. This paradigm, with which I will engage in the fourth 
chapter, has informed the contemporary conventions of VR and 360 video documentary 
aesthetic.  
3.5.4 Myron Krueger: Response is the Medium! 
 
The last of the fathers of VR is Myron Krueger, an American computer artist who 
developed early interactive environments which became the model for the immersive and 
interactive strategies of VR. These works have been very influential in computer science 
in terms of interactivity and have been considered to be the precursor of virtual reality. 
																																																								
201 Ibid., 125. 
202 Ibid., 126. 
203 Lanier writes “They cease to function as a responsible or social person during the time that they're 
simply perceiving media.” (Ibid., 126.) 
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As an artist, Krueger produced early interactive closed image systems that he called 
responsive environments such GLOWFLOW, METAPLAY, MAZE and 
PSYCHICPACE, and most importantly VIDEOPLACE. Different from headmounted VR 
displays, these works are organized in a way such that users experience an immersive and 
interactive image that is projected onto the walls of the room they are in. In his text 
Responsive Environments, beyond the aesthetical outcomes of interactive art, he focuses 
on how technology can be mobilized for new means of thought process. For him, the 
purpose of technology is not only to solve problems but also to create “concepts and 
philosophy.”204 In this text, he outlines the paradigm that defines the ways in which the 
human-technology interaction can alter and enhance art along with education, 
communication and psychotherapy. 
Comprised of sensing, display and control, his environments are aesthetical means 
to express the relationship between action and response, and for him the “beauty of the 
visual and aural response is secondary.”205 Embodied in his famous formula, “response is 
the medium!”206 his approach attends to the ways in which the artist intervenes between 
the participant's action and the results perceived. The very space of expression, for him, is 
the interval between input and output which is arbitrary and variable. Therefore his 
responsive environments do not seek to simulate the physical world but to “define 
arbitrary, abstract and otherwise impossible relationships between action and result.”207 
Hyperbolically based on the idea that interactive art was different from non-interactive art 																																																								
204 Krueger writes “The design of such intimate technology is an aesthetic issue as much as an engineering 
one.” Myron W. Krueger,  “Responsive Environments.” In Proceedings of the June 13-16, 1977, National 
Computer Conference, 423–433. AFIPS’77. New York, NY, USA: ACM, (1977.) 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1499402.1499476. 
205 Ibid., 15. 
206 Ibid., 14. 
207 Ibid., 16. 
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in an absolute manner which overdetermines the relationship between the artwork and 
viewer, his responsive environments can create contingencies that cannot be subsumed 
under the established form of art and knowledge procedures. The very task of interactive 
art is to create an open image system that is not determined by narrative structures.  
Therefore, the virtual environments, for Krueger, can eliminate the overdetermining 
narrative structures which presuppose the binary distribution of spectator and spectacle. 
His model presupposes a certain idea of a freedom in its immediacy claim, where 
users/viewers are posited as both the maker and the viewer of the virtual environment. In 
other words, it aims to dismantle the limit that distributes the viewer and maker in binary 
opposition as is the case in non-interactive image technologies.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Where these hyperbolic future cinema schemata converge is in the idea that the 
essence of cinema is to abolish its mediation to the extent that it represents the world in 
an immediate manner. Cinema is charged with the task of eliminating its objective 
boundaries in order to construct an image autonomous not only from the mediation of 
artist, but also from the material, spatial, and by extension social and political 
determinations of reality. In other words, concomitant to the purported absence of spatial 
limitation, as is hyperbolically claimed to be inherent to the visual regime of S3D and 
VR, in the future, cinema will realize its founding telos in which the viewer is presumed 
to be emancipated from the mediations of an artist whose fundamental operation is to 
limit the image in time and space. Furthermore, as the result of this putative unbounded 
image system, it is assumed that future cinema will reconstruct reality in its unlimited 
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character. More importantly, this unlimited character of future cinema models is linked to 
a techno-utopic political program where differences in race, class, gender, language etc. 
are cancelled in favour of a democratic encounter. Ultimately, the schemata that I have 
analyzed aim to restore a supposed lost unity: for Münsterberg it’s the unity between 
subject and object in order to establish the subject’s control over the object; for Balázs 
it’s the aesthetic unity disrupted by western art; for Eisenstein it is the harmony between 
spectator and spectacle, and by extension the emergence of a classless society; for 
Sutherland it’s the unity of matter and image; for Heilig harmony between the senses; for 
Lanier it is social harmony; and for Krueger action and reaction.  
Paradoxical and hyperbolic in its conceptualization, utopic in its political project, 
future cinema and by extension VR therefore aims at an aesthetic paradigm that 
prioritizes immediacy. It’s paradoxical in the sense that the very concept of immediacy 
connotes its negation. The ultimate function of that future cinema, as a recurrent topos 
whose teleological program has haunted cinema and VR from the outset, presupposes a 
continuous progression of eliminating the boundaries between not only image and reality, 
but also the senses, between different media and hence between subjects in the political 
sphere. Diverse in their technological presumptions (cancelling the ontological 
boundaries that separate the cinematic image from its outside, or expanding the image via 
polysensory strategies into its transparency, to the extent that the image and its outside 
are transformed into variable/interchangeable realms), these projections ultimately 
converge in a utopian and also paradoxical model: a cinema without limitation, or, more 
radically, a cinema without an outside. It aims to create a visual regime where the viewer 
and image, at once, become autonomous not only from the mediation of artist but also the 
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difference that conditions image. More importantly, it is posited as necessary progress 
since it is the very essence of cinema: it aims to restore the natural mediation between 
oppositional terms, a mediation that is pure, natural, neutral and therefore a historical 
necessity. However, following the Deleuzian formula, I contend that every relation is 
external to the terms, and whether conjunctive, disjunctive or dialectical, each relation in 
itself is a product of historical and ideological context. Therefore the very claim of 
immediacy is the product of a particular political program, which has to be examined as 
well. The following chapter will thus critically engage with conventional VR aesthetics 
which is promoted as “an empathy machine,” along with the question of immediacy in a 
larger context, and provide a detailed analysis of its political and ideological tenets.  
4 Contemporary VR Aesthetics VR: Immediacy, 
Disembodiment, and Immateriality  
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter endeavours to examine the political coordinates of contemporary VR 
aesthetics. Built upon the hyperbolic presumption that VR enables a non-mediated 
experience where the immersant can interact or identify with different subjectivities from 
all walks of life, contemporary VR aesthetics is in large part characterized by the concept 
of empathy. It is believed that with its higher perceptual realism relative to cinematic 
image and its absolute control over representation which is structured as digital 
information, VR enables not only a technological utopia where the ontological difference 
between image and reality is suspended, but also a democratic site where social, class, 
gender and racial difference can be eliminated in favour of a utopic political and aesthetic 
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program. However, I contend that this program is based on several technological 
presumptions that are problematic.  
First of all, the supposed non-mediated experience that makes up VR imagery is not 
defined by technological features inherent to VR itself but rather is inferred from the 
relative higher perceptive realism it offers in comparison with cinema. From this relative 
position, this view takes a considerable leap of faith to the conclusion that VR can stand 
in for what it represents. Second, as digitally structured information, the virtual image is 
defined as an unbounded image that is freed not only from the spatial constraints of 
cinema but also from material and temporal determinations inherent to reality. Third, this 
high perceptive realism extends beyond the ontological distinction between image and 
technology: it is presupposed that the virtual representation of a subject and virtual avatar 
with which the user identifies can exhaust and transcend the complex network of socio-
political determination in which a subject is embedded. Complementary to this 
hyperbolic argument in regard to virtual representation, it is also presupposed that 
immersion in virtual space is capable of stripping away from immersants their bodily 
determinations, and by implication their socio-political background. Finally, based on 
these technological, aesthetic and political presumptions, VR is posited as a utopic site 
that can facilitate the construction of a democratic and neutral platform where the 
boundaries that define material, spatial, gender, racial and class difference can be 
abolished and replaced with a harmonious alternative reality.  
In the second part of this chapter, after examining the formal tenets of empathy 
discourse, I will historicize it within early architectural and pictorial immersive media 
and cybernetics. Since I have already analyzed in detail the relation between cinema and 
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VR in the previous chapter, this one will springboard from an analysis of early pictorial 
and architectural immersive image organizations to cybernetics. My intention is to show 
that empathy discourse is not only false in its technological presumptions, but also 
problematic in its techno-utopic political program. It is, I argue, the result of a techno-
utopic paradigm that began in modernity, which aims to develop a neutral interface to 
transform the world that subjects inhabit into immaterial visual information in order to 
control it.  
4.2 Contemporary VR Aesthetics: “VR is the Ultimate Empathy 
Machine” 
4.2.1 Documenting Empathy  
 
In a TED Talk208 in 2015, explaining their motivation for using VR for the award-
winning 360-degree documentary, Clouds over Sidra,209 a panorama of the Zaatari 
Refugee Camp in Jordan which has provided shelter to 130,000 Syrian refugees, 
filmmaker Chris Milk makes a claim which would induce polarized reactions: “VR is the 
ultimate empathy machine.” 210  Both highly criticized and praised by many VR 
filmmakers and academics, the empathy discourse governs Clouds over Sidra not only in 
its formal and immersive strategies, but also its content. In fact, I argue, besides its salient 
motivation to stimulate affective engagement with the harsh conditions of refugees, it can 																																																								
208 Chris Milk, “How Virtual Reality Can Create the Ultimate Empathy Machine.” YouTube video, 10:26 
Posted by “TED”  April 22, 2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iXHil1TPxvA. 
209 Gabo Arora and Barry Pousman. Clouds Over Sidra, 2015. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt4396650/. 
210 Defining VR as the ultimate empathy machine which can be used for awareness-raising for firsthand 
experiences from different walks of life, Milk in fact reiterates the techno-utopic discourse pertaining to 
immersive and interactive technologies. For instance he argues that “[Virtual reality] connects humans to 
other humans in a profound way I’ve never before seen in any other form of media, and it can change 
people’s perception of each other.” Reiterating the techno-utopic discursive fabric that connects VR with 
cinema and cybernetics, Milk argues “That is why I think virtual reality has the potential to actually change 
the world.” (Ibid.)  
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serve as an allegory for an emblematic illustration of the empathy claim in its content as 
well.  For instance, to increase immediacy effect, the documentary follows a narrative 
through both the eyes and the voiceover of a resident of the camp: Sidra, a “charming 12-
year-old girl” who guides the viewer through the mundane and immediate daily life in 
“her temporary home” while she is “eating, sleeping, learning and playing in the vast 
desert city of tents.” However, instead of using subtitles for translating Sidra’s voiceover, 
creators of the film opted for a questionable strategy: they dubbed her voice. It is clear 
that this choice of dubbing aims at enhancing immersion for an English speaking 
audience, but it is done at the expense of adding another layer of mediation to Sidra’s 
narrative. What is more striking about the choice of dubbing is that the voiceover, with 
seemingly perfect, though simplified, English, has an accent, probably a Syrian-Arabic 
one. While silencing Sidra’s voice, or at best concealing it as background noise, the 
voiceover imitates an accent, presumably her accent, in order to increase the immediacy 
effect. I believe this choice serves as a very emblematic illustration of empathy discourse: 
the voiceover with accent is used to increase the effect of the illusion of non-mediation at 
the expense of immediacy.  
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Image 3. Screenshots from Clouds Over Sidra, Gabo Arora and Barry Pousman. 2015.  
The other striking point in Clouds over Sidra is the parallelism between the 
description of the camp and the utopic discourses around VR and cyberspace. The 
UNHCR camp, as described by Sidra, seems to achieve the replication of her own home 
back in Syria: even the clouds that cover the sky of the camp come from Syria. In fact, in 
some respects, her new life in the camp seems to outstrip the one she had in Syria. For 
instance, the camp is more developed in terms of technological accessibility: there is an 
internet café where residents have access to computers. It’s also more advanced in terms 
of social structure: the girls can have access to a soccer field, which is almost impossible 
in Syria, a non-secular country wracked by war. Her description reaches a more utopic 
level when she utters, while kids run around in the background footage,  “Sometimes I 
think, we [kids] are the one in charge.” Her description of the camp, almost like a utopia 
governed by children, represents a conspicuous parallelism to the techno-utopic 
discourses inherent to VR as an alternative reality that can not only represent “the old 
world” in its entirety but also can outstrip it by eliminating the flaws that transformed it 
into an uninhabitable site.  
In this respect, Clouds over Sidra points towards a conceptual framework of the 
empathy discourse both in its content and its formal presumptions. However, instead of 
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undertaking a more extended analysis of documentaries in terms of their content, since 
this would far exceed the purpose of this chapter, my intention is to analyze the formal 
conventions of the empathy discourse. To briefly explain, overcoming the limitations of 
previous images systems, specifically those of cinema, such as editing and framing, VR, 
for the proponents of this discourse, is the ultimate technology to create a non-mediated 
relationship between image and reality, seer and seen. It’s believed that, equipped with 
the power to select where and when to look, and to interact with the virtual object, VR 
“immersants” occupy a particular position where the visual field is fully accessible to 
them. The visual field within this immediate relationship between virtual image and 
spectator is determined by nothing other than the subjective choices of the viewer who 
will, in turn, be stripped of social, cultural, political and gender determinations by 
“entering” a hermetically closed-off image space. Not only will the active viewer 
condition the visual field as an interface, it will thereby overcome the passivity that the 
cinematic image imposes on itself. As a result, emancipated from the constraints of both 
the objective world and those inherent to cinema, and its own subjective socio-political 
positioning, this omnipotent, omnivoyant and therefore omniscient viewer will enter an 
ethical site through this immediate imagery where it can exercise its power towards an 
altruistic and humanitarian activity. Through the perceptual freedom and realism of VR, 
then, the mobilized spectator is intended to develop not only an understanding of 
different perceptual realities but also empathy with different people from all walks of life 
- for instance, with Syrian refugees, inmates in solitary confinement, people in war zones, 
or with differing sexual identities and performances etc.  
4.2.2 Virtual Experiments in Empathy 
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For detailed analysis of the formal tenets of the empathy discourse, I will scrutinize 
the works of Jeremy Bailenson in his lab, the Virtual Human Interaction Lab at Stanford 
University, where he has been working on different virtual scenarios to measure and 
create empathy between different subjectivities since 2003. The experiments involve 
different scenarios where VR can serve to create an immediate exchange between 
subjectivities which differ in terms of gender, race, age etc. For instance, the one on 
ageism is structured in a way such that two different groups of young adults interact with 
or, as Bailenson frames it, “wear” a virtual avatar. While the first group interacts with an 
avatar that resembles them in gender and in age, the second group’s avatars are older than 
the users. After their interaction with the avatar, subjects were asked to perform a 
memory exercise. Bailenson states that “the subjects who wore the elderly avatar used 
more positive words to describe the elderly in general, compared to those who wore a 
younger avatar.”211 Another experiment was developed to induce empathy for animals, 
specifically with cows in a slaughterhouse. In the “cow simulator,” college students 
experienced “a day in the life of a cow, drank from a virtual trough, ate virtual hay, and 
finally were prodded to a truck headed for the virtual slaughterhouse.” 212  Again 
Bailenson states that compared to other subjects who just watched the cows walk around 
and get shocked, those who “became a cow gained more empathy for the plight of 
cattle.”213 
In his subsequent book, Experience on Demand, Bailenson elucidates the 
conceptual background and formal approach of these experiments, which, for him lead to 
																																																								
211 Jeremy Bailenson, Experience on Demand: What Virtual Reality Is, How It Works, and What It Can Do. 
1 edition. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018.): 171.  
212 Ibid., 204.  
213 Ibid., 204.  
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changes in perceptions of self and others. First of all, similar to the grounding approach 
to VR in general, the reason he cites for specifically choosing VR, as I discussed in the 
first chapter, is an extension of a recurrent discourse claiming that it’s the ultimate image 
technology that can overcome the shortcomings of cinema, which fails to realize its 
grounding promise of immediacy. Presenting striking similarity with McLuhan’s formula 
that “the content of a new medium is always older medium,” what makes virtual image 
an immediate representation is inferred from its relatively higher perceptual realism in 
comparison to cinema. He argues that, with the advent of virtual image systems, “the gap 
between ‘real’ experience and mediated experience is about to get a whole lot smaller,” 
and VR “allows us to instantaneously conjure experiences at the click of a button.”214 
Unlike cinema, which is defined by “the two-dimensional flatness of the image, the 
framing of shots, the unnatural camera movements, the cuts and other editing tricks, and 
perhaps most importantly, the unusual perspectives created by the camera placement,”215 
VR, with its interactive and immersive capacities, provides a more immediate image. 
Therefore it can go beyond the mere representational regime that is inherent to cinema 
and can be used for “sharing the experiences of others, to deepening our understanding of 
lives outside our own.”216 This formula reiterates the typical leap of faith: based on the 
difference in degree of perceptual realism between cinema and VR, he shortcuts to the 
idea that the immediate representation of reality (ultimate promise of cinema) is achieved 
by VR. However, I contend that, despite the relative enhancement offered by its reality 
effect, VR does not provide an immediate image, and it is hyperbole to argue that its 
relatively higher perceptual realism compared to cinema makes VR as real as reality 																																																								
214 Ibid., 16.  
215 Ibid., 90.  
216 Ibid., 152.  
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itself. Despite this enclosable gap between image and reality, this argument takes a leap 
of faith, and it rules out numerous mediations that condition the production and the 
experience inherent to virtual image. 
 For instance, based on the idea that the virtual immersive image is not conditioned 
or limited by a single camera perspective, as is the case in cinema, Bailenson jumps to the 
conclusion that VR is an unbounded image system, and by extension that there is no 
selection in its production. However, both in VR and 360-degree videos, image is 
produced by mediation based on selection. Particularly evident in 360-degree videos, 
multiple cameras are used to register reality in a fragmented way. Synchronically but 
separately recorded “flat” images are then brought together in the process called 
stitching. In most cases, the stitching lines are visible; the achievement of seamless stitch 
is only possible for limited ideal cases. Moreover, these reassembled images construct an 
immersive image viewed from one central point where the camera is located. Occupying 
this transcendental locus of the camera, viewers, however, cannot navigate in the 
immersive image and the only freedom they have is to change perspective by circular 
head movements that are inscribed on this specific point. More importantly, interaction 
with the virtual objects and subjects is almost impossible. As for VR images produced 
digitally by using 3D modeling interfaces, even though spatial organization and 
interactivity with the virtual objects and the effect of immersion are more realistic, they 
lack the photorealism of 360-degree videos. Moreover, despite the fact that the effect of 
perceptual realism is achieved visually, the lack of tactility, or the presence of different 
mediations such as headsets, controller etc. to increase tactility are a constant reminder of 
the mediation inherent to the virtual experience. In fact, the very obvious limitations of 
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VR headsets in terms of the field of view, framerate, screen refresh rate, resolution, pixel 
fill density, and persistence are an ongoing challenge for higher perceptual realism. My 
intention here is not to state the obvious, but to underline the leap of logic involved in 
constructing the hyperbolic arguments around VR. For instance, this considerable leap 
results in the technologically problematic claim that, in immersive and interactive virtual 
images,  
…there are no interfaces, no gadgets, no pixels. One second you are strapping on 
an HMD and the next you are somewhere else. That sensation of “being there,” 
wherever the program you are running takes you, is what researchers call 
psychological presence, and it is the fundamental characteristic of VR. When it 
happens, your motor and perceptual systems interact with the virtual world in a 
manner similar to how they do in the physical world.217  
 
As matter of fact, for Bailenson, VR is not even a medium since it’s an experience that is 
not mediated, “not as a media experience, but as an actual experience.”218 He reiterates 
the contradictory formula that “VR technology is designed to make itself disappear.”219  
Following this technologically hyperbolic presumption of immediacy, he claims 
that virtual avatars can also allow one to experience or inhabit different bodily 
formations. Virtually constructed avatars can exhaust what they stand in for and allow 
viewers “to take ownership of bodies that are not their own.”220 They facilitate alignment 
with the perspective of different subjectivities. Referring to Adam Galinsky’s work at 																																																								
217 Ibid., 41.  
218 However this is only true for the ideal cases, Bailenson writes: “When VR is done right, all the 
cumbersome equipment—the goggles, the controller, the cables—vanishes. The user becomes engulfed in a 
virtual environment that simultaneously engages multiple senses, in ways similar to how we are 
accustomed to experience things in our daily “real” lives. This is distinctly different from other media 
experiences, which only capture fragmented aspects of what our senses can detect. For instance, the sounds 
you hear in good VR don’t come from a speaker rooted in one place. Instead, they are spatialized, and they 
get louder or softer depending on the direction you are facing (or if you are in a tracked environment, how 
close you move to the source of the sounds). When you look at something in VR, it is not framed by the 
dimensions of a monitor, or television set, or movie screen. Instead, you see the virtual world as you see the 
real one. When you look to the left or right, the virtual world is still there.” (Ibid., 88.)  
219 Ibid., 89.  
220 Ibid., 169.  
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Columbia Business School, suggesting that “perspective-taking causes empathy,” 
Bailenson again jumps hastily to the claim that VR can be used as an empathy-inducing 
platform. However, as Deborah Levitt reminds us, virtual alignment with the subjective 
vision with which we are intended to empathize does not equal seeing through their eyes, 
since “perception is inextricably bound to forms of embodied experience that are absent 
and/or untranslatable; this includes smell, taste, touch (though “haptics” can include some 
of these multisensorial experiences), and individual habits of kinesthesia and 
proprioception. But perhaps most importantly, this definition disavows individual 
histories and frames of reference as they co-constitute our perception of a world.” 221 I 
contend that VR, isolating the subject in a virtual avatar, detaching it from the invisible 
elements in its subject formation, as Erick Ramirez argues, following Thomas Nagel, at 
best reveals the ways in which this subject appears for the other to have these 
experiences. What is created is not the actual experience of being that or this subject but 
the reproduction of an external gaze, which in turn cannot be isolated from the network of 
socio-political power relations in which it is embedded. This has in fact proven to be the 
case in one of the virtual experiments that Bailenson developed where white participants 
“wore” black avatars: the results rebut the expected outcome. Instead of creating 
empathy, as Bailenson states, “wearing a black avatar primed more racial stereotypes” 
and “reinforced stereotypes and made them more salient.”222  
Finally, linked to the immersive aspect of VR which is hyperbolically framed as “a 
																																																								
221 Deborah Levitt, “Five Theses on Virtual Reality and Sociality.” Public Seminar (blog). Accessed April 
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hermetically closed-off image space”223 that isolates the viewer perceptually from the 
space that she or he inhabits and by extension from the complex network of social, class, 
race and gender etc., the immediacy claim presupposes that VR is capable of abolishing 
the very mediation of the viewer. It isolates users from their own reality within the virtual 
environment that “simultaneously engages multiple senses, in ways similar to how we are 
accustomed to experience things in our daily “real” lives.” Therefore the “immersant,” 
when entering the virtual space, leaves behind what defines its subjectivity as a socio-
political construct. However, as Erick Ramirez suggests, “perception is something we 
actively do, not something we passively experience.” 224  Our subjective positions, 
expectations, along with other background processes, such as race, gender, class etc. 
serves as a determining factor for “how we understand the things that we see, hear, feel 
and think, and these processes vary from person to person. They are powerful enough to 
affect even seemingly nonconscious empathic processes (such as mirror-neuron 
activation).”225 Similarly Robert Yang states: “VR can't actually offer any embodiment, 
transparency, or immediacy to anyone. At best, VR can only offer the illusion of 
empathy.”226 Problematic in its technological presumptions, I argue that VR is not the 
technological breakthrough which has enabled the empathy/immediacy discourse, but is 
itself the result of an ongoing ideological and technological paradigm that seeks to 
develop a universal, all-encompassing and omniscient interface that can enable control of 
matter, the world, and nature and therefore the subjectivities that inhabit them.  																																																								
223 Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004.): 5.  
224 Eric Ramirez, “Can Virtual Reality Make Us More Empathetic?” December 2, 2018. 
https://theweek.com/articles/804958/virtual-reality-make-more-empathetic. 
225 Ibid.  
226 Robert Yang, “‘If You Walk in Someone Else’s Shoes, Then You’ve Taken Their Shoes’: Empathy 
Machines as Appropriation Machines.” Accessed April 15, 2019. 
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4.3 Immersion in the Classical Era 
 
Maintaining that installing an observer in a hermetically closed-off image space 
“did not make its first appearance with the technical invention of computer-aided virtual 
realities,” 227  in his book Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion, Oliver Grau 
investigates early examples of immersion strategies starting from the classical period. For 
him, the large-scale architectural illusions such as Villa dei Misteri in Pompeii, the 
garden frescoes in the Villa Livia, the Gothic fresco room, the Chambre du Cerf, and 
Renaissance illusion spaces, such as the Sala delle Prospettive are early examples of 
contemporary immersive technologies not only in their formal strategies but also in their 
aesthetic and political function. Concealing their means of production and detaching the 
observer from reality with formal strategies such as keeping the medium beneath the 
perceptive threshold of the observer, extending the image beyond the limits of the 
observer’s sightline, and covering the visual space entirely, Grau argues that immersive 
image systems, in general, aim to eliminate the critical and aesthetic distance between the 
image and observer in order to maximize the intensity of the message or content being 
conveyed.  
Based on this conceptual and historical continuity, he subsumes immersion 
strategies under two different categories: 1-) large-scale spaces of illusion that fully 
integrate the human body, such as rooms with 360 frescoes, the panorama, IMAX 
cinemas, or the CAVEs and 2-) apparatuses that are positioned immediately in front of 																																																								
227 These immersive technologies are “Ranging from Wagner’s idea of a Gesamtkunstwerk to Monet’s 
water lilies panorama, Prampolini’s plans for a Futurist Poly-dimensional Scenospace, Eisenstein’s theories 
of multisensory Sterokino, Youngblood’s Expanded Cinema, Heilig and Sutherland’s media utopias, to the 
hype of the California Dream and beyond.” (Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004.): 5.) 
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the eyes such as stereoscopes, Sensorama, or head-mounted displays like VR. While the 
former are spatial or architectural organizations into which the observer enters with its 
full body, the latter deploys apparatuses that the spectator puts on in order to cover its 
sight. In both cases the aim is not only to create “a hermetically closed-off image 
system”228 but also to occult reality or detach the spectator perceptually or spatially from 
reality. What is technologically different in computer-based virtual reality as compared to 
the architectural and spatial endeavours employing poly-sensory illusions can be 
characterized by three principal motives. First, VR attempts to create illusion in 
dimensions, color, proportions, plasticity, and lighting of images; second, it incorporates 
the element of movement in image itself; and third, it creates “interaction with dynamic, 
continually recalculated images, which target increasingly more of the senses.” 229 
However, despite these differences, the ultimate aim for both immersive strategies is to 
blur the boundaries between image and its outside in order to transform them “into 
variable realms.” He states:  
As a general rule, one can say that the principle of immersion is used to withdraw 
the apparatus of the medium of illusion from the perception of the observers to 
maximize the intensity of the message being transported. The medium becomes 
invisible.230 
 
For instance, the Great Frieze in the Villa dei Misteri at Pompeii, created ca. 60 
B.C., which simulates a Dionysian ritual, is designed according to the same aesthetic 
purpose: covering the visual space in order to detach the observer from reality. The 
events depicted on the walls and the very spatial organization of the hermetically closed 
chamber aims to create “the ecstatic state” similar in intention to the ritual. It is intended 																																																								
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to function in the same way intoxicants and other trance-inducing techniques (such as 
dance and music) are used to remove inhibitions and social constraints of the individuals. 
The immersion here aims at bringing gods and humans together on the same pictorial 
level by emotionally arousing the observer to ecstatic participation, and realizing the 
psychological fusion of observer and image in the cult. Grau writes that the chamber 
functions as “a gateway, which allows the gods to enter the space of the real, and, in the 
other direction, transports their mortal assistants into the picture.”231 Stripping away the 
viewer from the real world to intensify the ecstatic participation, it seeks to stimulate an 
illusion of transcendence.  
 
 
 
Image 4. The Great Frieze in the Villa dei Misteri at Pompeii, created ca. 60 B.C. 
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The other immersion strategy he examines is the panorama war paintings; 
particularly The Battle of Sedan by Anton von Werner (1883) where the Sedan war is 
depicted in a way such that the observer is “left entirely alone and powerless in their 
confrontation with the suggestive force of this enveloping, potential totality of the 
image.”232 Like the majority of battle panoramas, The Battle of Sedan, Grau argues, is 
aimed at releasing the observer from inner distance and conscious attitude. Canceling the 
aesthetic distance between the image and the observer, it abolishes the democratic 
participation of the observer, immures and subjugates it formally to the content of the 
image in order  “to ‘educate’ through a powerful model—not of democratic thinking, but 
of unquestioning obedience.”233  
 
 
 
Image 5. The Battle of Sedan by Anton von Werner, 1883. 
Therefore, Grau argues, what governs these two architectural and pictorial 
immersive organizations, like any new media in general, is the intent to subjugate to the 
logic of image and by extension to enhance the power of the powerful. In fact, from 
classical antiquity to the revolution of digital images, he reads each new development in 
media culture, particularly in immersive media, as the aesthetic attempt at “maintaining 																																																								
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power and control or maximizing profits.”234 And each new image medium, as a rule, is 
“the defense of existing hegemony under changing social conditions, the marketability of 
products.”235 This is why VR, for him, and its image culture cannot be considered as an 
isolated phenomenon; in fact, VR is primarily the result of “the new alliance of art and 
technology in the economy and military technology.”236 Initiated by military research 
projects, 237  VR primarily emerged as a means to extend the power of American 
interventionism. The conspicuous parallelism between the cross-border operations of the 
USA exercising power beyond state boundaries and the technophile conceptualization of 
VR as a means to cross boundaries is very striking; however, exploring it in detail far 
exceeds the scope of this research.  
Ultimately, for Grau, the aesthetic regime that VR enables can be linked to a 
political and technological paradigm which aims to reach “a symbiosis of human being 
and computer image, where contact is effected via a polysensory interface that ultimately 
is not perceived by the human user and fades from consciousness.”238 Abolishing 
boundaries, this paradigm seeks to develop immersive and interactive image systems 
where “the artwork and technical apparatus, the message and medium of perception, 
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converge into an inseparable whole.”239 However, referring to Arnheim’s notion of the 
role of selective perception as a means of exercising intelligence, he criticizes this 
paradigm, in which the ultimate function of immersive strategies is to abolish aesthetic 
distance and the conscious participation of the observer. Abolishing this ontological 
difference between image and reality, actual and virtual, immersive media in large part, 
for him, is an undemocratic spatial organization in which the observer, unable to exercise 
a selective viewing act “in a total image, since everything is image”240 goes through an 
experience that erodes the inner distance between image and viewer. The perfected 
illusion, he states, perceptually deceives the viewer and compels it “to act or feel 
according to the scene or logic of the images.”241 Referring to Foucault, he argues that, 
the disciplinary surveillance model of Panopticon is reversed in the Sedan panorama and 
in the Great Frieze: the observer, for him, becomes the object of political control. 
Building on this critique, the ultimate task of artistic and critical engagement with VR, 
for him, is to dismantle the unconscious participation of the observer into illusion and 
“rediscover the criterion of self-reflection, the awareness of inner distance and 
perception.”242  
 
4.4 Computation and Cybernetics 
4.4.1 Cybernetic Totalism and Hyperreality 
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This section will map out three streams of historical research that align VR with 
computation and cybernetics. The first one is developed by Melanie Chan in her book, 
Virtual Reality: Representations in Contemporary Media, where she studies the ways in 
which VR is connected to the political and economic agenda of hegemonic discourses in 
the context of computation and cyberculture. For her, VR is an integral part of a 
paradigm shift “towards knowledge-based economies.” 243  Particularly evident in 
Sutherland’s conceptualization of VR as an immediate interface between the world and 
its image, these discourses, which she calls “cybernetic totalism” following Lanier’s 
conceptualization, aim to reorganize the material world in its totality as mathematically 
constructed visual information. This technological totalitarianism ultimately aims to 
abolish the difference between image and the world in order to transcend “the limitations 
of the physical realm.”244 For her, technology appears to offer the possibility of escaping 
from earthly problems by immersing us into a virtual world in which time, space and 
embodiment are no longer constraining. Aligning VR historically with different 
mechanical forms of computation, she argues that the technological discourse that 
constitutes cybernetic totalism ultimately originates in Cartesian dualism, which seeks to 
transcend the deceptive bodily inputs of human sensations. In fact, she suggests that the 
Roman Catholic background of Cartesian dualism wherein the soul and mind are thought 
to be eternal and logical has been re-contextualized within the discourses around 
cyberspace and virtual reality. Within the techno-utopic climate of the 1960s, for Chan, 
“transcendence from embodiment is no longer regarded as a metaphysical or religious 
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concern; instead, it is often represented as something which can be achieved through 
technology.”245  
Moreover, drawing upon Baudrillard’s critique of late capitalism characterized by 
an abolishing of the distinction between reality and representation in favour of 
consumerism, she argues that the cyber totalism that defines contemporary VR aesthetics 
enforces what Baudrillard defines as hyperreality. Different from early systems of sign 
structured by “the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real,” 246 
hyperreality, or simulation for Baudrillard, marks a radical turn in late capitalism. 
Enabled by the pervasiveness of new image technologies, the consumerism of late 
capitalism enforces a perpetual exchange of signs detached from material or external 
references through the simulations of reality that replace the real, producing an over-
encompassing simulacrum completely disconnected from reality. Utopian in its 
technological presumptions, this radical shift aims to dismantle any referential conditions 
that define the image externally.247  
However, Baudrillard’s critique is problematic in the sense that he seems to put 
forth hyperbolic claims that an unbounded image system has already been realized and 
even perfected. For instance, in Art and Artefact, Baudrillard states that the teleological 
program that has defined VR from the outset has been fulfilled: “The image cannot 
imagine the real any longer, because it has become the real. It can no longer transcend 																																																								
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reality, transfigure it, nor dream it, because it has become its own virtual reality.”248 
However, Chan contends the existence of Baudrillard’s critique points to its very failure. 
If his argument that “simulacra has annexed reality in its entirety” is valid, there would be 
no critique of it.249 Similarly, N. Katherine Hayles argues, in In Response to Jean 
Baudrillard, 250  that hyperreality, with its internal paradox, is a fictional 
conceptualization: it is as utopic as what it criticizes. In fact, the discourses around 
hyperreality and Baudrillard’s critique of it converge in disavowing the ontological 
difference between image and reality that is defined by boundary. “Every existing 
simulation” Hayles contends, “has boundaries that distinguish it from the surrounding 
environment. Virtual reality environments are limited by the length of the cables 
attaching the body apparatus to the computer.  Only when these boundaries do not exist, 
or cease to signify that one has left the simulation and entered reality, does the 
dreamscape that Baudrillard evokes shimmer into existence.”251 This is a grounding 
difference marked by border or threshold that conditions the image and it can not be 
erased “for they exist whether we recognize them or not; it [hyperreality] only erases 
them from our consciousness.”252  
For Chan, this gap that discredits the hyperbolic arguments of cybernetic totalism 
around VR and the hyperreality of Baudrillard is the corporal conditions of viewer. She 
opposes the hyperbolic claims of disembodiment in VR and the idea of technological 
transcendence from the physical body via immersion in virtual image since it is based on 																																																								
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a misleading dichotomy of mind versus body. Referring to Hansen’s phenomenological 
critique, she contends that the perception and the mind cannot be separated from the 
body, which comes into play when we experience the world around us. Therefore, for 
her, the persistence of body in regard to image serves as the guarantee of impossibility of 
hyperreality and virtual totalism.  
4.4.2 Boundary Discussions  
 
A second instance of historical research that engages with the discursive fabric of 
contemporary VR conventions in relation to cybernetics is N. Katherine Hayles’s work, 
as found in her article “Boundary Disputes: Homeostasis, Reflexivity, and the 
Foundations of Cybernetics”253 where she unpacks contemporary VR conventions within 
historical developments in cybernetics. For her, the research in cybernetics on 
information, feedback loops, human-machine interfaces, and circular causality paved the 
way for “the terminology and conceptual framework that made virtual reality a 
possibility.” 254  In fact, three hyperbolic discourses that define the contemporary 
conventions of VR can be traced back to three successive and interwoven periods within 
cybernetics, from the immediate post-World War II period to the 1990s. For instance, the 
idea that VR is “the technological means to displace materiality”255 originates in the 
quantitative approach developed in the foundational stage of cybernetics between 1945 
and 1960, in which human and machine were equated as information processors. An 
extension of this first approach, the second recurrent discourse in which VR is posited as 
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an image system into which users enter by leaving their bodies behind comes from the 
subsequent period in cybernetics, where the body is defined as a techno-bioapparutus or 
prosthesis to human sensorium. Finally, the techno-futuristic discourse that traverses the 
contemporary cultural environment, beginning in the 1990s, where the ontological 
distance between human and machine is presumed to be abolished and it is posited that 
we are now in a post-human era is, for her, instantiated by VR in the third wave of 
cybernetics. VR is an integral part of posthumanist or trans-humanist discourses in regard 
to the correlation of human and machine.  
Even though all three periods converge in focusing on how humans and machines 
are to be reconstituted through the common technological “denominators of feedback 
loops and signal transmission,” 256  the first one, according to Hayles, has a more 
conservative approach in its purpose. Based on a quantitative approach, in this period, 
information is structured “as a mathematical function, without reference to its meaning to 
a receiver”257 and detached from “the context in which it is received and understood.”258 
Considered to be unscientific and unquantifiable, the subjective inputs in the system are 
eliminated in favour of an “efficient transmission of messages through communication 
channels.”259 Moreover, what conceptually links human and machine as information 
processors in this quantitative formation is that they both are defined as systems that seek 
to reinstate the conditions that they are given as natural position. Coupling both human 
and machine as organizations that tend toward homeostasis “where they are functioning 
correctly,” this paradigm privileges “constancy over change, predictability over 
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complexity, equilibrium over evolution.”260 In fact, for Hayles, this approach is the result 
of the historical context in which it emerged, and “reflected the desire for a ‘return to 
normalcy’ after the maelstrom of World War II.”261  
There are two technological devices that instantiate this conceptual framework 
where information processors are modeled to find an inverse function to reinstate an 
equilibrium state. The first one, developed by Claude Shannon, is the electronic rat, a 
maze-solving machine. In this early example of a machine learning device, a rat was 
designed to search through the corridors of a maze until it reaches a target. The machine 
is structured in such a way that it could remember previous search patterns and identify 
the choices that allowed it to advance towards the target. The presuppositions embodied 
in the electronic rat are the idea that both humans and cybernetic machines are “goal-
seeking mechanisms learning through corrective feedback to reach a stable state.”262 The 
second model was Homeostat, developed by W. Ross Ashby, a device that sought to 
reinstate its initial state when it was affected by an input changing its configuration. 
Unlike the electronic rat, in Homeostat, the state of equilibrium is the original state of the 
machine, and it was designed to search for the configuration of variables that would 
return it to its initial condition.  
However, the second period tends toward another conceptual approach unlike the 
essentialist tendencies of the first one. Characterized by Humberto 
Maturana’s phenomenological approach, as a result of his work on visual processing in 
frogs’ cortex, it differs from the first approach in incorporating the observer with its 
corporeal organization into the system. Maturana, in his research on frogs’ visual 																																																								
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systems, observes how the frog’s visual cortex responds to stimuli in ways “dictated 
almost entirely by the internal organization of the its sensory receptors and central 
nervous system.”263 As a result of this observation, he develops a phenomenological 
approach, which is revolutionary for Hayles, in which perception is framed as “already 
encoded by the perceptual apparatus of the observer.”264 In this circular epistemology, the 
observer and the environment constitute the system, and the system unites them as its 
components.  
As a result, unlike the first period in which organisms are defined according to an 
essential state where they function correctly, the second period frames the organism not 
only as self-organizing procedures (coded in the mutual interaction between observer and 
environment), but also as autopoietic or self-making. This is why, for Hayles, the second 
approach privileged change over constancy, evolution over equilibrium, complexity over 
predictability, instead of the closed circle of corrective feedback of the first period. 
Similar to the first approach, the second period is also a technological response to the 
historical context in which it emerged: it seeks to develop a conceptual framework that 
“points toward to the open horizon of an unpredictable and increasingly complex 
postmodern world.”265  
These two periods constitute two recurrent and interwoven discourses on VR: first, 
VR as an image system that can displace materiality within information space, and by 
extension the second “as a disembodied realm of information that humans enter by 
leaving their bodies behind.”266 The first one is grounded in Claude Shannon’s approach 
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of conceptualizing information “as a pattern distinct from the physical markers that 
embody it.”267 It is particularly evident in Sutherland’s conceptualization of VR as 
mathematical organization that can control the existence of matter. The second period of 
cybernetics, characterized by Maturana’s phenomenological approach, is grounded in the 
idea that VR can replace the bodily organization of the observer, as a result of the 
conceptualization of body as prosthesis that can be reproduced in a virtual environment.  
However, similar to Chan’s argument, Hayles contends that “the VR body-suit is a 
wrinkle in the fabric of human life, hardly to be mistaken as an alternative form of 
embodiment.”268 In fact, the perceptual coupling that VR provides as prosthesis to the 
“natural” sensorium employs “interfaces between the retina and the stereovision helmet, 
between the helmet and the computer through data transmission cables, between the 
incoming data and the CTR display via computer algorithms, and between the algorithms 
and silicon chips through the magnetic polarities recorded on the chips” and therefore it is 
still far from realizing the immediate sensorium of embodied perception of any organism. 
Moreover, she contends that “the self-sufficiency of a virtual world of information is 
deeply problematic, for this illusion, like everything that exists, has its basis in the very 
materiality it would deny.”269Hayles writes: 
In fact, of course, we are never disembodied. Simulated worlds can exist for us 
only because we can perceive them through the techno-bioapparatus of our body 
spliced into the cybernetic circuit. The reading of cyberspace as a disembodied 
realm is a skeuomorph that harks back to the first wave of cybernetics, which in 
turn is a reading of information that reinscribes into cybernetics a very old and 
traditional distinction between form and matter. These residues, echoing in a 
chain of allusion and reinscription that stretches back to Plato’s cave, testify to the 
importance of excavating the sedimented history of artefacts and concepts, for 
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they allow us to understand how the inertial weight of tradition continues to exert 
gravitational pull on the present.270 
 
Finally, in the third period, the emphasis shifted to emergence and immersion and 
fostered “the idea of a virtual world of information that coexists with and interpenetrates 
the material world of objects.”271 VR is posited as a technical means to overcome 
material constraints to elicit self-sufficient and self-organizing information space. She 
claims that the larger narrative inscribed in the final period beginning in the 1990s 
displays a techno-utopic character in regard to the relation between human and machines. 
It assumes that the ontological gap between human and machine is now abolished in 
favour of posthumanism. Dichotomous positioning of machine and human is cancelled in 
favour of a technological utopia where “humans will contribute to the partnership pattern 
recognition, language capability, and understanding ambiguities; machines will 
contribute rapid calculation, massive memory storage, and rapid data retrieval.”272   
4.4.3 Metaphysics of Virtual Reality 
 
Finally, the last moment that I will address is the one that Michael Heim developed 
in his book Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, where he unpacks historical discourses that 
culminated in techno-utopic VR discourses, tracing the technological “progression from 
digital to virtual reality.”273 He argues that hypertext marks a fundamental shift in cultural 
logic that culminated in VR. With the intention of transforming knowledge and matter 
into information through abstraction, the guiding logic in this process originates in 																																																								
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Leibnizian metaphysics, which seeks to fabricate a universal and omniscient technology 
that can accommodate conflicting human thoughts. For him, the technological 
developments that made VR and cyberspace possible were initiated by the digitalization 
of print culture. With the advent of word processors in the late 1970s, transforming print 
culture into immaterial information, the computer incited the techno-utopic illusion of 
total text. For Heim, epitomized by hypertext as an aggregate of multiple texts, and also 
of images, videos etc., this ontological shift “breaks with the linear sequence of ordered 
thought demanded by the printed word.”274 Therefore freed from the material and 
temporal constraints of print culture, hypertext enabled a nodal, nonlinear, free-
associative structure and thus favoured the illusion of total information which can 
incorporate that which is deemed to be incompatible in the linear ordering of print 
culture. It is in this context that hypertext, as a “total text”, is an early iteration of the 
technological paradigm wherein cyberspace, and by extension VR, are posited as a means 
to represent the universe in its totality.  
For Heim, this technological paradigm originates in Leibniz’s “logic, metaphysics, 
and notion of representational symbols” 275  which seeks to develop a universal 
computation system that can “encompass all the combinations and permutations of 
human thought.” 276  Particularly evident in his “calculus ratiocinator,” a universal 
computation system that “would compile all human cultures, bringing human languages 
into a single shared database,”277 his encyclopaedic project represents epistemological 
parallelism with the techno-utopic discursive fabric in which VR and cybernetics is 
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embedded. For instance, in order to construct this all-encompassing system, Leibniz first 
seeks to develop a universal medium, which can address every problem and in which 
conflicting ideas could thus coexist and interrelate. It employs a universal language, in 
the form of pasigraphy or ideographic language, which he calls characteristica 
universalis, ultimately operating through an interface that “translates all human notions 
and disagreements into the same set of symbols.”278 Structured similarly to the digital 
information process, Heim argues, Leibniz’s characteristica universalis operates through 
a binary logic, as “an artificial language remote from the words, letters, and utterances of 
everyday discourse.” 279  More importantly, similar to the defining paradigm in 
cyberspace, it aims to transform the means of statement into “the terms of a logical 
calculus, a system for proving argumentative patterns valid or invalid, or at least for 
connecting them in a homogeneous matrix.”280 However, for knowledge to become 
manipulable and transmissible as information, it must first be reduced to homogenized 
units. By a double operation, dividing knowledge into units and then bringing them 
together in different combinations, Leibniz aims “to mechanize the production of new 
ideas.” 281  Therefore with its neutral interface, devoid of material and subjective 
determinations, characteristica universalis will, for him, enable us to emulate divine 
knowledge, which has “no temporal unfolding, no linear steps, no delays.”282 In other 
words, the omniscient God's knowledge serves as a model for calculus ratiocinator, and 
by extension, Heim argues, for “the virtual world constituted by bits of information.”283 
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The parallelism between his conceptualization of VR and cyberspace and Leibniz’s 
project is more conspicuous in his “monadology.” Monads for Leibniz are the non-
extensive, non-divisible simple substances that potentially or virtually represent within 
themselves the entire universe in concentrated form. It is a microcosm which contains the 
macrocosm. Similar to VR, they are posited as an immediate, unbounded image system 
that can represent in itself the entirety of the world; for monads there is no externality. 
This is why, according to Heim, the conceptual framework that defines VR and 
cyberspace as an unbounded image system devoid of material constraints originates in 
this all-encompassing and omniscient “calculus ratiocinator.” Connected to this 
paradigm, he argues that there are seven divergent concepts currently guiding the VR 
research aesthetic: Simulation, Artificiality, Immersion, Telepresence, Full-Body 
Immersion (interactive environments in which the user moves without encumbering gear) 
and Networked Communications. For him, they all converge in developing a 
technological means that is similar to Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator in their techno-
political purposes, which amount to the conquest of nature by abstracting it from material 
determinations. In fact, for him, VR has been represented as the Holy Grail, which is a 
symbol of the quest for a better world, and Heim writes: “Conquering nature meant 
regulating the earth as a harmonious system. It meant balancing nature so that all life-
forms could thrive together in harmony.”284  
However, Heim contends, the artificial harmony that VR can develop offers the 
possibility of surveillance. Similar to Leibniz’s metaphysics, where all the finite monadic 
units are harmonized by the Central System Monad, virtual harmony, for him, is only 																																																								
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possible with the Central System Operator (sysop) which in turn operates as a 
transcendental figure that has absolute control of all members of the network. He writes:  
“The infinite CSM holds the key for monitoring, censoring, or rerouting any piece of 
information or any phenomenal presence on the network.” Furthermore, he also contends 
that the grounding principle of duplicating reality as digital information to create 
harmony results in pacifying: “This very realism may turn into irrealism, in which virtual 
worlds are indistinguishable from real worlds, virtual reality becomes bland and 
mundane, and users undergo predominantly passive experiences akin to drug-induced 
hallucinations.”285 Therefore he suggests that the potential of VR as a technological and 
artistic means lies in its capacity to express difference from and within reality. He states, 
“A virtual world needs to be not-quite-real or it will lessen the pull on imagination. 
Something-less-than-real evokes our power of imaging and visualization.” 286  
4.5 Conclusion 	
The postulation that interacting with a social issue or different subjectivity in a non-
mediated environment is a sufficient condition for political mobilization is problematic in 
the sense that it presupposes an essentialist link between immediacy and political or 
ethical action. However, VR is not unique in this sense; as Rancière points out, it is 
inherent to contemporary political art in general. In his analyses of the modernist 
theatrical programs of Bertolt Brecht and Antonin Artaud, Rancière outlines the 
paradoxical premises of this rhetoric:  
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According to the Brechtian paradigm, theatrical mediation makes them conscious 
of the social situation that gives rise to it and desirous of acting in order to 
transform it. According to Artaud’s logic, it makes them abandon their position as 
spectators: rather than being placed in front of a spectacle, they are surrounded by 
the performance, drawn into the circle of action that restores their collective 
energy. In both cases, theatre is presented as a mediation striving for its own 
abolition.287  
 
Through this abolition of mediation, theatre is intended to transform the passive 
spectator into an active participator not only in the play itself but also in the struggle 
over the political issues that the play represents. However, for Rancière, these formulas 
are based on the binary distribution of concepts such as seeing and action, truth and 
passivity. Rancière writes:  
It is these principles that should be re-examined today. Or rather, it is the network 
of presuppositions, the set of equivalences and oppositions, that underpin their 
possibility: equivalences between theatrical audience and community, gaze and 
passivity, exteriority and separation, mediation and simulacrum; oppositions 
between the collective and the individual, the image and living reality, activity 
and passivity, self-ownership and alienation.”288 
 
Echoing Rancière, I argue that the main problem of empathy discourse stems from 
its claim to cancel the ontological split between real and imaginary in order to restore the 
natural unity between them, and by extension harmony in society as result of empathetic 
understanding between different social-political categories. Moreover, the 
empathy/immediacy discourse, as I discussed in the first chapter and in this one, is the 
result of an ongoing techno-utopic paradigm that seeks to develop a universal, all-
encompassing and omniscient interface that can enable us to control matter, the world, 
and nature and therefore the subjectivities that inhabit them. This paradigm in large part 
aims at immediate interface where the world and its representation, image and reality, 																																																								
287 Jacques Rancière. The Emancipated Spectator. Reprint edition. (London: Verso, 2011): 8.  
288 Ibid., 37.  
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spectator and spectacle become variable realms. Its fundamental operation can be boiled 
down to eliminating the ontological, social and epistemological boundaries that serve as 
discursive technology to construct difference. Inferred from the spatial structure of VR as 
limitless image, which is in turn hyperbolic presumption, this model simply aims to 
translate the unbounded formal structure inherent VR to a political program. Based on 
these historical analyses, this dissertation will perform a visual and conceptual critique to 
challenge the immediacy, empathy and harmony claims that have defined VR 
conventions. Instead of developing an immediate image where the immersant is equipped 
with omnipotence in unbounded image, it will seek to reflect upon the possibility of 
boundaries and disharmony within VR.  
 
 
5 Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy: Archaeology of 
Freedom in Virtual Reality  
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will function to map the conceptual connection between the 
methodology and theoretical context in which my artistic practice in VR will be realized. 
What defines each component of this dissertation (methodology, theory and practice) is 
the question of autonomy. Consisting of three complementary sections, this chapter will 
first outline the methodological framework that defines my artistic experiment in VR. 
Based on the critique of three research-creation schemata, which I argue are trapped in 
the false dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy in art, I contend that artistic practices 
in general and media in particular are never absolutely autonomous; rather, they 
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communicate and embody the discursive fabrics in which they became possible. 
Following the analysis of four aesthetic discourses on artistic autonomy (Kant, Schiller, 
Adorno, and Cavell) that go beyond this false dichotomy, I maintain that the autonomy of 
art can only be posited when its heteronomous nature is constructed as a limit to 
transgress. Art in general and any medium in particular are both autonomous and 
heteronomous with respect to the discursive fabric that defines their aesthetic, 
technological and political coordinates. They are heteronomous in the sense that each 
medium communicates, materializes and embodies the very epistemological paradigm in 
which it becomes possible as a technology, and also autonomous in the sense that they 
cannot be reduced to the essentialist definitions of the epistemological and aesthetic 
paradigm in which they emerged. However, my aim is not simply to recognize the 
simultaneity or indiscernibility of the autonomy and heteronomy of art or of a given 
medium but to radicalize the tension between these dynamically related elements inherent 
to the material organization of the medium, in the sense that the autonomous character of 
a medium as technological and material organization will be mobilized against the 
historical paradigm which culminated in its invention as both technology and artistic 
means.  
The second section, following this methodological framework, will set out to frame 
the question of autonomy that is purported to be inherent to VR spectatorship and it will 
historicize the formal strategies of contemporary VR conventions. Generally convergent 
in idealizing VR as an immediate and unlimited image system the immediacy and, by 
extension, autonomy claim of conventional VR aesthetics, I argue, require the visual and 
corporeal limitations of the viewer as a condition. For instance, in terms of immersion, 
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concealing the means of production beyond the peripheral vision of viewer, the 
phantasmagoric effect of unbounded image system that defines VR as shorn of spatial 
and material limitations, is only possible by the very bodily limitation of the viewer. It 
assigns to the finitude of human vision a dual role as both the condition and the means to 
transgress these limitations. With respect to interactivity, VR doubles the function of the 
viewer both as the subject and object, or the viewer and the maker at once. In its 
technological configuration both as an immersive and interactive medium, VR 
communicates this peculiar idea of freedom where it is the viewer’s finitude in its visual 
and corporeal configuration that allows it to experience this freedom. I argue that 
contemporary VR conventions embody an episteme that first emerged in the 19th century 
which operates through the double function of the subject through its limitations. Similar 
to Foucault’s critiques of modernity, this purported freedom of the immediate imagery of 
VR presupposes a double function of viewer as both the subject and the object of the 
image. As the extension of a particular idea of subjectivity that emerged in modernity, the 
visual regime claimed to be inherent to VR, with its freedom and autonomy claims, I 
argue, communicates a double logic where viewer is both “enslaved sovereign” and 
“observed spectator” as Foucault formulates. The hyperbolic claims of autonomy both 
from the mediation of artist and from reality gesture towards an aesthetic program where 
the viewer is trapped in an illusion of self-regulating omnipotent political power. Finally, 
following Han’s critique of freedom, I argue that this political power deemed to be 
inherent to VR and particularly to 360-degrees documentaries, which aim to induce 
empathy, reinforces the contradictory political subjectivity that regresses into its own 
isolated and hermetic omnipotence.  
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The last section will provide an overview of formal techniques that I develop in my 
VR experience as a response to my conceptual analysis of the conventions. My intention 
is not to use VR as a medium to communicate a specific social, cultural, subjective or 
geographical event, subjectivity/character etc.; on the contrary, it is to engage with the 
very medium itself through both a theoretical critique and artistic experiments. However, 
mobilizing the very medium itself against the dominant paradigm that rendered it 
technologically possible, parallel to the critique that I have developed in the first two 
sections of this chapter, I will address the ways in which the question of the autonomy of 
the viewer purported to be inherent to VR will be subverted in the immersive and 
interactive experience I will develop. The questions that I will pursue are the following: 
What is the origin of the technological and aesthetic paradigm that VR communicates? 
What would be the limit case of which VR is capable that can drag its conventions into 
crisis?  
5.2 Autonomy of Art in Research-Creation 
 
“The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and 
neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or 
canvas is already so covered with pre-existing, preestablished 
clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, 
even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos 
that brings us the vision.” —Gilles Deleuze289 
 
Research-creation, according to the three schemata which I analyzed in the first 
chapter, is posited as ambiguous or at times paradoxical research practice due to its 
hybrid structure which juxtaposes incompatible and oppositional elements such as art and 																																																								
289 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. What Is Philosophy? (New York: Verso, 1994.): 204.  
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science, theory and practice etc. In fact, due to the indefinite character of the relationship 
between those elements that it brings together, research-creation is deemed to be 
conceptually impossible to subsume under a universalist and essentialist formula: in other 
words, it is always autonomous from any external discursive regulations. This is why, 
according to Manning-Massumi’s schema, research-creation is not even a method. It is, 
in their words, “against method, active in its refutation of pre-existing modes of 
existence.”290 In a/r/tography the very function of research-creation is “to resist to the 
formation of specific criteria. It is a research process that is fluid, uncertain, and 
temporal.” 291  For Sawchuk-Chapman’s schema, research-creation is not a fixed 
methodological approach “but each and every research-creation project also carries the 
possibility of acting as an intervention in its own right.”292 However, this very autonomy 
from universalizing and essentialist external discourses due to its hybridity in turn is what 
conditions the very function of research-creation. To accommodate the elusive and 
excessive character of aesthetic creativity, which is by definition anti-essentialist and 
beyond the existing discourses, models, formulas, concepts and means, research-creation 
has to be posited as autonomous. However these schemata, as Rancière points out, echo 
the same paradox of the claims about artistic autonomy: “Conversely, all the new, 
aesthetic definitions of art that affirm its autonomy in one way or another say the same 
thing, affirm the same paradox: that art is henceforth recognizable by its lack of any 
distinguishing characteristics — by its indistinction. Its products perceptibly manifest a 																																																								
290 Erin Manning and Brian Massumi. Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience. 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2014.): 138.  
291 Stephanie Springgay, Rita L. Irwin, and Sylvia Wilson Kind. “A/r/Tography as Living Inquiry Through 
Art and Text.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 898. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405280696. 
292  Owen B. Chapman and Kim Sawchuk. “Research-Creation: Intervention, Analysis and ‘Family 
Resemblances.’” Canadian Journal of Communication 37, no. 1 (April 13, 2012): 13. 
https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2012v37n1a2489. 
	 131	
quality of a thing that is made that is identical with the not made, a known thing identical 
to the unknown, a willed thing identical with the unwilled. In short, the specificity of art, 
finally nameable as such, is its identity with non-art.”293 
Therefore, in this doubling logic where its possibility is conditioned by its 
impossibility, it is postulated that the internal contradiction of research-creation as a 
hybrid methodology is what grounds its critical function against given knowledge 
production processes. This formula, I argue, bears the risk of postulating that the 
autonomy of research-creation from any external formula automatically functions as an 
antagonistic and critical method. To put it a different way, these schemata risk falling into 
an automatism or essentialism in the sense that each research-creation project has to 
simply translate or radicalize the internal impasse of research-creation into practice in 
order to challenge the hierarchical knowledge model of academia. The means of 
challenging the universalizing, determinist, objectivist and binary logic of academia is a 
priori given in its very hybrid essence, which is automatically or essentially beyond 
binary logic. However, to replace the essentialism of academia that they aim to 
expostulate, they seem to postulate another one: the essentialist link between the 
autonomy of research-creation and the critical or creative function given in its hybridity. 
In fact, identifying its “anti-essentialist essence” with its critical function, this automatic 
antagonism and creativity supposed to be inherent to research-creation is possible only 
insofar as research and art are posited as oppositional not only historically but also 
essentially. This is why I maintain that they reinforce and presuppose the very dualism 
and binary distribution of creativity and research that they aim to trouble. Moreover, the 																																																								
293 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity, 2009.): 66.  
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idea that the autonomy of research-creation inevitably performs critical and creative 
action on given knowledge production processes is not only essentialist but it also 
eliminates the possibility of any critique. In that sense it bears the risk of negating its 
original critical intentions: it reduces the institution or the act of critique to a unilateral 
protocol.  
I argue that research-creation and artistic practices are both autonomous and 
heteronomous in the sense that each creative process is determined by the historical, 
technological, material, social and cultural context that renders it possible and 
autonomous in the sense that it cannot be reduced to these conditions. Thus, in order to 
overcome the circular logic, I suggest that the autonomy of art and, by extension, of 
research-creation can only function when its heteronomous nature is posited as a limit to 
transgress. Going beyond the false dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy which are 
both dynamically related elements, aesthetic creation must engage critically with the 
historical and material context that precondition the artistic practice and the medium in 
question. In this context, the next section will address different aesthetic discourses that 
go beyond the false dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy in order to delineate the 
methodological framework that this dissertation employs.  
5.2.1 Historicizing Autonomy: Kant, Schiller, Adorno and Cavell 
 
Art does not exist in itself; it is an outcome of a 
complex set of relationships between what one is allowed to 
say, to perceive, and to understand. Events and objects only 
exist within the fabric of discourse, and are perceived as art, 
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or a revolution in art, only within this fabric. —Jacques 
Rancière 294 
 
The question of artistic autonomy, and by extension the peculiar relation between 
art and the discourses on art, whether speculation on the artist’s political or aesthetic 
strategy, critical analysis, research by academics or historians, or speculation by 
philosophers, is an ongoing challenge and follows a conflicted trajectory in aesthetic 
theory. As Day argues, generally trapped in the false dichotomy of “autonomy” and 
“heteronomy,”295 there are many conflicting functions and usages of the term.296 While in 
some cases it connotes an absolute independence from any external discursive program, 
and prioritization of singular art works in their material and technological particularities, 
as is evident in the modernist paradigm Greenberg frames,297 for others artistic autonomy 
is the withdrawal from the logic of market, utility, the regulation of institutions, political 
																																																								
294 Jacques Rancière, “The Politics of Art: An Interview with Jacques Rancière.” Versobooks.com. 
Accessed June 24, 2019. https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2320-the-politics-of-art-an-interview-with-
jacques-ranciere. 
295 The infamous platonic ostracism against art is the earliest attempt to determine art’s nature in 
accordance with that which is external to it. For Plato “all art is mimesis” in fact it is the imitation of an 
imitation, a third degree mimesis. For instance in Book X of Republic, Plato compares the three different 
creative act of God, craftsman and painter. While God is the creator of Idea of the particular object, for 
instance a bed, the craftsman’s role is the materializing of this Idea, as a particular object in nature and 
artist imitates this particular object that craftsman has created. Therefore the way a painter produces an 
image of an object into visibility is farther from the Idea of the object than the way the carpenter produces 
it. This is why the mimetic act of artistic production finds its possibility in that which is external to itself: 
the second degree of imitation of craftsman. It’s preconditioned by both poesies of God and technê of the 
craftsman. This very heteronomy of art which makes it deceptive in its configuration of Idea results in the 
infamous ostracism of Plato against art: “the artist knows nothing worth mentioning about the subjects he 
represents, and that art is a form of play, not to be taken seriously.” Similarly deviated from the ostracism 
that Plato directed towards art, late modernity has revisited the position of art in relation to truth. The 
aesthetic schema in Hegel undertook to assimilate art into an idealist and transcendental philosophical 
framework. In this schema art is no longer considered a deception as it is framed in Plato; however, it does 
not possess the same qualities as philosophy in terms of its relation to truth. Due to its hybrid nature where 
antonymous concepts and events coexist, art has to be regulated by the universal, objective and rational 
means of philosophy. Art, with its paradoxical nature, presents a certain antagonism within the systematic 
universe of thought. This is why Hegel assigns to philosophy the task of re-organizing the aesthetic 
experience to solve the paradoxes it elicits. 
296  Gail Day, “The Fear of Heteronomy.” Third Text 23, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 393–406. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09528820903007677. 
297 For Greenberg, artistic modernism meant that art develops by making and challenging its own rules, 
reflexively, according to its own inner logic and “learning processes.” 
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functions, artistic motivations of the author, conventions of traditions, styles and genres 
etc. However, in most cases the notion of the autonomy of art has always been framed 
within its dynamic relation to the idea of heteronomy. This section will analyze four 
instances of aesthetics which go beyond this false dichotomy.   
In general the debates around the autonomy of art are thought to have been initiated 
by Kant’s idea that fine arts are fabricated according to a purpose which in turn has to be 
purposeless. For Kant, both fine arts and aesthetic judgments are autonomous from an 
interest or desire connected to a utilitarian or pragmatist conceptualization. Due to their 
paradoxical nature, which brings together what is considered to be contradictory, such as 
universal and subjective, fine arts are founded neither on a concept, in the sense that there 
is no universal and a priori regulation of their indeterminate character, nor on a telos in 
the sense that there is no external pursuit for utilitarian purposes.298 However, for Kant, 
without any regulation, art is not possible. To solve this problem, Kant introduces genius 
which supplies a rule that is applicable to single instances of artistic practice: 
“Consequently fine art cannot of its own self excogitate the rule according to which it is 
to effectuate its product. But since, for all that, a product can never be called art unless 
there is a preceding rule, it follows that nature in the individual (and by virtue of the 
harmony of his faculties) must give the rule to art, i.e., fine art is only possible as a 
product of genius.”299 Therefore defined by the rules created by the genius who “is a 
																																																								
298 Rancière frames the autonomy of art in Kant as follows:  “It is disconnected with respect to the law of 
understanding, which subordinates, sensory perception to its own categories, and also with respect to the 
law of desire, which subordinates our affections to the search for a good. The form apprehended by 
aesthetic judgement is neither that of an object of knowledge nor that of an object of desire… The beautiful 
is that which resists both conceptual determination and the lure of consumable goods.” (Jacques Rancière, 
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.): 173.) 
299 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment. (Cosimo, Inc., 2007): 137.  
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talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given,”300 fine arts are 
autonomous from the regulations of understanding and also from utilitarian telos and they 
are heteronomous to rules that are given by the talent of genius. However, as Rancière 
points out, “the genius cannot know the law under which he or she operates,”301 thus to 
acknowledge the dual character of art as both autonomous and heteronomous, the 
Kantian model mystifies and reduces the artistic procedure by linking it to the autonomy 
of the individuality of genius. 
Inspired by Kant,302 Schiller furthers this dynamic relationship by locating it in the 
very essence of artistic creativity instead of in mystified genius. Maintaining that art is 
both autonomous and heteronomous at once, the schema that Schiller develops suggests 
that art’s political importance stems from its capacity to achieve harmony by restoring the 
unity of human nature, which is essentially divided into oppositional impulses: the sense 
impulse and the form impulse.303 Fundamentally grounding, limiting and operating only 
																																																								
300	Ibid., 189.   
301 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.): 174.  
302 In fact this is mostly inspired by Kantian moral autonomy. For Kant the moral autonomy that each 
subject is given functions as the freedom to delimit itself. It consists in the double sense of freedom as 
independent from any external/empirical determinations and as the capacity to impose its own law. Kant’s 
notion of moral autonomy of the will thus involves, as Andrews Reath has written, “not only a capacity for 
choice that is motivationally independent, but a lawgiving capacity that is independent of determination by 
external influence and is guided by its own internal principle–in other words, by a principle that is 
constitutive of lawgiving” (Reath 2006). Therefore rational agents can act autonomously by imposing 
“upon themselves –to legislate for themselves– the moral law.” In this context moral act is both free and 
determined; Kant uses the concept heautonomy which means that subject legislates its own activity as 
autonomous subject. 
303 Citing several dichotomies that define the dualistic human nature, such as person-condition, physical-
rational etc., Schiller specifies two fundamental impulses that define the human condition. The first of these 
impulses is the “sense impulse” and the second “the form impulse.” While the first one “proceeds from the 
physical existence of Man,” and furnishes particulars and singular cases to human Mind, and requires 
variation, the form impulse proceeds “from Man’s rational nature,” the universal laws and necessity, and 
requires no variation. While one brings what is necessary within us to reality, the other subjugates what is 
real outside us to the law of necessity. Fundamentally grounding, limiting and realizable only through each 
other, these impulses orient humanity in oppositional directions. Protecting the sensuous aspect of 
humanity against the tyranny of reason, and rationality against the transgressive nature of sense, Schiller 
explains, both impulses “are equally earnest in their demands” while “the sense impulse relates in its 
cognition to the actuality, the latter to the necessity, of things; while in its action the first is directed 
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through each other, these impulses, both heteronomous and autonomous at the same time, 
orient humanity in oppositional directions. While the sense impulse “proceeds from the 
physical existence of Man,”304 furnishes particular and singular cases to the human Mind, 
and requires variation, the form impulse proceeds “from Man’s rational nature,” the 
universal laws and necessity, and requires no variation. Harmony between these impulses 
is only possible through a third impulse which he calls “play impulse.” Combining both 
impulses that constrain the human mind either through laws of Nature (sense) or through 
laws of Reason (form), the play impulse “will compel the mind at once morally and 
physically; it will therefore, since it annuls all mere chance, annul all compulsion also, 
and set man free both physically and morally”305 (emphasis added). Therefore, harmony 
has to be established in a way that is neither indeterminable nor determinate, and both 
indeterminable and determinate at the same time. As Beiser states, the term “play”306 has 
a crucial role here, since it alludes to the paradoxical fact that play is neither necessary 
nor arbitrary: “not necessary, because we do not play from need but do it for its own 
sake; not arbitrary, because our actions still conform to rules.”307 This is the context in 
																																																																																																																																																																					
towards the maintenance of life, the second towards the preservation of dignity—both, that is to say, 
towards truth and perfection.” (Ibid., 78.) 
304 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Edited by Alexander Schmidt. Translated by 
Keith Tribe. (London: Penguin Classics, 2016.): 118.  
305 Ibid., 74.  
306 Giving form to the material world, the play impulse, for him, generates what he calls “living shapes” 
which, he argues, “serve to denote all aesthetic qualities of phenomena and in a word—what we call Beauty 
in the widest sense of the term.” (Ibid., 76.) Thus the very interaction of two opposing impulses in the play 
impulse is the origin of Beauty, “whose highest ideal is therefore to be sought in the most perfect possible 
union and equilibrium of reality and form.” (Ibid., 78.) Beauty is the oscillation between the opposites, a 
middle state between the contradictory elements. 
307 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.): 
141.  
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which Schiller states his famous formula: “Man plays only when he is in the full sense of 
the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing.”308  
Therefore the task of culture is twofold for him: unification has to be realized while 
preserving the differences between conflicting impulses. Schiller, as Frederick Beiser 
demonstrates in the following syllogistic form, reaches the conclusion that beauty 
consists of freedom: “1-beauty consists in wholeness, the full realization of the sense and 
form drives, 2- wholeness, the full realization of the sense and form drives, consists in 
freedom, 3- therefore Beauty consists in freedom.”309 What constitutes the freedom in 
beauty is not simply the autonomy of art as a “mere chance” which does not have any 
objective determination, or the heteronomy of art as “absolute necessity” which has no 
variation. It is autonomous and heteronomous at the same time, as the concept of play 
alludes.310 It is only through determination that indetermination can function. Beauty is 
dualistic and holistic at the same time. It does not mandate any aim, program or interest; 
however, it is not absolutely contingent, either. Conditioned and unconditioned, it can 
accommodate difference and necessity. With its hybrid structure, art in itself is inclusive; 
it is the condition for a more inclusive society.  
Similarly, Adorno also maintains that art is both independent and dependent to the 
external social and historical conditions in which it emerged: “Art is autonomous and it is 																																																								
308 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Edited by Alexander Schmidt. Translated by 
Keith Tribe. (London: Penguin Classics, 2016.): 80.  
309 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.): 
92. 
310 Through this determinable and indeterminate unity of oppositions, Beiser formulates the inclusive 
character of freedom in Beauty as following: “the aesthetic condition does not lead to any specific result; it 
does not produce a definite kind of action, whether moral or immoral….What beauty gives us, then, is not a 
moral or intellectual result—a good action or a true proposition—but the freedom to produce a good action 
or a true proposition….Just as those are right who say that beauty is fruitless, because it leads to no specific 
result, so those are correct who say that beauty is fruitful, because it can lead to any specific result. Insofar 
as beauty does not favor any specific function of humanity exclusively, it is favorable to all of them.” 
(Ibid., 155.) 
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not; without what is heterogeneous to it, its autonomy eludes it.”311 For him, the historical 
developments in art have freed it from the heteronomous models, which deployed it in 
the service of religious and ritualistic function in early artistic practices, or the modern 
discourses such as socialist realism that subsumes art under an external political program. 
However, the radical rupture that emerged in late modernity, which presupposes the 
autonomy of art, he argues, resulted in subjugating it to the logic of market or more 
precisely to commodity fetishism. Adorno argues that these two polarized camps are 
based on the false dichotomization of heteronomy and autonomy: 
Today the nomenclature of formalism and socialist realism is used, with great 
consequence, to distinguish between the autonomous and the social essence of art. 
This nomenclature is employed by the administered world to exploit for its own 
purposes the objective dialectic that inheres in the double character of each and 
every artwork: These two aspects are severed from each other and used to divide 
the sheep from the goats. This dichotomization is false because it presents the two 
dynamically related elements as simple alternatives.312 
 
The final model that informs my approach is the one developed by Stanley Cavell, 
who posits artistic creativity as a dialectical act that oscillates between freedom and 
constraints. In his book The World Viewed, he frames artistic creation as not “to produce 
another instance of an art but a new medium within it.”313 However, what Cavell attempts 
to do is in no way to undertake the modernist programs like Greenberg’s prioritization of 
medium specificity, which is defined by the material and technological determinations 
inherent to the medium itself. As Rodowick points out, in Cavell, a medium “combines 
multiple elements or components that can be material, instrumental, and/or formal.”314 
Cavell terms these elements that preconditions each art automatisms – such as forms, 																																																								
311 Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1998.): 8.  
312 Ibid., 346.  
313 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, Enlarged Edition. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979.): 103.  
314 David Norman Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film. (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2009.): 41.  
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conventions, or genres that arise creatively out of the existing materials and material 
conditions of given art practices, which are both historical and ontological. However, 
automatisms have a double position in art: the creation of a medium is the creation of 
automatisms. Therefore the Cavellian model posits automatisms as both the condition and 
the result of artistic creativity. In fact, as Rodowick writes, automatisms “in turn serve as 
potential materials or forms for future practices…What constitutes these elements is 
unknowable prior to the creative acts of artists and the analytical observations of critics—
this is why they are considered potentialities or virtualities expressed in the history of a 
medium and its uses.”315 Therefore Cavellian automatism does not simply suggest 
prioritizing the material conditions or historical conventions of a medium; on the 
contrary, the ultimate task of the artist is to create a new medium by responding to these 
historical and ontological conditions and limitations. Artistic creation, as Lisa Trahair 
points out, is “an exploration of the dialectic of freedom and constraint, while the 
investigation of automatism makes art self-conscious, autopoietic, and autonomous.”316 
Therefore the autonomy of art, as Cavell framed it, is based on a concentric action of 
affirming, negating and recreating the preconditions of the medium itself in both its 
historically and materially determined conditions.  
Following these models, I argue the autonomy of art in its conceptualization 
(Schiller), in social function (Adorno) and in its material and historical conditions 
(Cavell) can only be posited when its heteronomous nature is given as a limit to 
transgress or as Adorno suggests “without what is heterogeneous to it, its autonomy 
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eludes it.”317 In this context, art in general and any medium in particular are both 
autonomous and heteronomous, pertaining to the discursive fabric that defines its artistic, 
technological and political coordinates within the contemporary cultural environment. 
Specifically in the case of a medium, it is heteronomous in the sense that each medium 
communicates, materializes and embodies the very epistemological paradigm in which it 
becomes possible as a technology and also autonomous in the sense that it cannot be 
reduced to the essentialist definitions of the epistemological paradigm in which it 
emerged. Therefore art in general and media in particular are neither independent from 
the historical context that defines their conditions nor a site of absolute freedom. They 
operate through the historical and material constraints that they both affirm and negate at 
the same time. Each artwork has to develop a singular relationship with the pre-existing 
discourses that define its clichés and conventions. However, my aim is not simply to 
recognize the simultaneity or indiscernibility of the autonomy and heteronomy of art or 
of medium but to radicalize the tension between them. I will mobilize its autonomous 
character given in its technological and material organization against the historical 
discursive pattern, which engendered it as both technology and artistic medium. In order 
to do so, in this chapter I will conduct archaeological research on the origin of the formal 
conventions of VR. Deploying the medium itself into its limit case, I aim to reveal its 
supposed inner logic and its political and aesthetic affiliations.  
I have contended that the formalist presupposition that links the political function 
of research-creation to its inner structure is trapped in the false dichotomy of autonomy 
and heteronomy, similar to aesthetic debates that began in the 19th century where the 
“narratives of autonomy and heteronomy” are posed as mutually exclusive. However, 																																																								
317 Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1998.): 8.  
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following Schiller, Adorno and Cavell, I argued that artistic practices emerge in the 
reciprocal interlocking of autonomy and heteronomy. Artistic practices are never 
autonomous; they are always predetermined with the “pre-existing, preestablished 
clichés” which are results of the constraints that are defined both by the material and 
technological organization of the given medium and the historical paradigm in which the 
very medium itself became technologically possible.318 As Lütticken suggests, autonomy 
is not a fact that the artist can possess; on the contrary, it “is an exceptional occurrence in 
the realm of established, factual relations – including art and its institutions.”319 In fact, 
aesthetic practices emerge within the dynamic and interlocked relation between 
heteronomy and autonomy. More radically, I argue, again following Lütticken, that 
artistic practice becomes properly aesthetic practice when it problematizes the limits of 
art and of artistic autonomy. The task is to push the artistic practice to its limit where the 
very question of autonomy is sensibly problematized:   
If the aesthetic problematizes the relationship of autonomy and heteronomy, then 
this means that an act can be termed aesthetic insofar as it lets autonomy appear 
sensibly as a problem – in a world where subjectivities and objectifications are 
profoundly entangled, where different agencies coexist and collide.320  
 
Therefore my method amounts to inverting the very discursive operation that 
deploys the false dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy to explain what the artistic 
practice is. In other words, the false dichotomy that is used to explain the artistic 
practices themselves are what my artistic practices, in turn, set out to grapple with. In a 
more radical sense, what defines artistic practices in general is their problematizing of the 																																																								
318	Furthermore not only the autonomy claim is hyperbolic, in the sense that the claim to be independent 
from historical and formal constraints that defines the conditions of both emergence of individual artworks 
and the medium in question, and from the institutional and political affiliations of artist is impossible, but 
also, as Lütticken suggests, it can “lead straight into heteronomy logic of market.” (Lütticken, Sven. 
“Autonomy as Aesthetic Practice.” Theory, Culture & Society 31, no. 7–8 (December 1, 2014): 3) 
319 Ibid., 3.  
320 Ibid., 11. 
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very distribution of concepts such as freedom and constraint, or autonomy and 
heteronomy. In order to make the question of autonomy emerge as a problem, I argue that 
it has to engage both with the historical conventions and the technological determination 
of the medium in question. It is for this reason that, after engaging with VR conventions 
in a historical fashion, I attempted to engage with the technological structure of VR as 
well. Therefore the next approach that informs my artistic practices is the Cavellian idea 
of creating medium. For him, as noted previously, in the process of artistic creation, what 
constitutes the artist’s practice is to invent a new medium. However, invention as he 
defines it is not to create a new medium from scratch but to redistribute the association 
and disassociation that defines the artistic program as a discourse and also as technology. 
As Diarmuid Costello states in his text entitled “Automat, Automatic, Automatism: 
Rosalind Krauss and Stanley Cavell on Photography and the Photographically Dependent 
Arts” where he analyzed the Cavellian program, it is “to seek out new ways of securing 
value within their medium, that is, new ways of using its resources and thereby 
extending-by-transforming the tradition they inherit.”321 It’s the reconfiguration of what 
is given in the medium both technologically and conceptually in order for a new medium 
to “emerge through a process of gradual accretion, revision, translation, and cross-
fertilization.” 
My intention is to push the immediacy claim to its limits to create a crisis in its 
conventions in such a way that the question of autonomy becomes visible as a problem. 
In order to do that, following the Cavellian formula, I reconfigured the very technological 
structure of the VR headset. To re-examine the associations and disassociations of the 																																																								321 	Diarmuid Costello, “Automat, Automatic, Automatism: Rosalind Krauss and Stanley Cavell on 
Photography and the Photographically Dependent Arts.” Critical Inquiry Vol.38 (2012): 819–54. 	
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concepts of autonomy and heteronomy that define contemporary VR conventions along 
with immediacy and mediation, passivity and activity, visible and invisible etc., my VR 
experience formally deploys immersive and interactive techniques that aim to 
problematize the concept of boundary. It sets out to make the boundaries of the very 
viewer appear as a problem in the very construction of the immersive and interactive 
aspects of the VR experience that I have developed. There are two different boundaries 
that I problematize: the visual boundaries of the viewer and the boundaries between the 
actual and virtual environment. While the former has been deployed as an aesthetic 
means of unfolding the narrative structure and interactivity, the latter is deployed to push 
to the extreme the discursive fabric of unlimited image where real and actual becomes 
indiscernible. 
 
5.3 Unbounded Image  
 
...In that Empire, the Art of Cartography 
attained such Perfection that the map of a single 
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the 
map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In 
time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer 
satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a 
Map of the Empire whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with 
it. The following Generations, who were not so 
fond of the Study of Cartography as their 
Forebears had been, saw that that vast map was 
Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, 
that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun 
and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, 
there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by 
Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no 
other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography. —
Suarez Miranda, Viajes de varones prudentes, 
Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lerida, 1658 
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As Hayles stated, virtual reality “did not spring, like Athena from the forehead of 
Zeus, full-blown from the mind of William Gibson;”322 on the contrary, it has been both 
an integral part and model of an ongoing paradigm that has traversed the media landscape 
from the 19th century onwards. This paradigm, pushed to the extreme, can be defined as 
the totality of the technological and aesthetic attempts at creating an image system that 
can replace reality in its entirety by cancelling the ontological boundaries that separate 
the image from its outside, occulting reality/the world via hermetically closed imagery 
systems, or expanding image via polysensory strategies into its transparency, to the extent 
that image and its outside are transformed into variable/interchangeable realms. 
Traversing and haunting the landscape of image technologies, starting from magical and 
religious use of the image to Renaissance perspective to cinema, Imax and S3D, to 
Sensorama etc., this paradigm, I argue, aims at developing not only an immediate 
interface that can represent reality in its entirety but also a transcendental image that can 
ultimately outstrip the material, social, spatial and even ontological conditions inherent to 
reality. As a teleological paradigm, in its state of freedom from the spatial, material and 
even ontological determinations of previous image technologies and reality at once, it 
aims to increase the power of the viewer over reality/nature/world through increasing her 
or his power on and in the image itself. However, I contend that this paradigm is both 
paradoxical in its discursive structure, and hyperbolic and problematic in its political 
presumptions.  
For instance, as a discourse, there lies an epistemological paradox in its very 
foundation, since the mediation that is aimed for connotes its own negation or functions 																																																								
322  Hayles, N. Katherine. “Boundary Disputes: Homeostasis, Reflexivity, and the Foundations of 
Cybernetics.” Configurations 2, no. 3 (September 1, 1994): 441–67. https://doi.org/10.1353/con.1994.0038. 
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as its own negation. The claim of immediacy that grounds the purported power and 
freedom in immersive and interactive image technologies, as Hegel points out with 
reference to immediacy as a concept, is “a one-sided determination” since its very 
conceptualizing “does not contain it alone, but also the determination to mediate itself 
with itself, and thereby the mediation being at the same time the abrogation of 
mediation.” 323  In fact, trapped in its circularity, this paradox is what defines the 
fundamental discursive operation in different media technologies haunted by this 
paradigm: coupling the elements that essentially negate and cancel each other. For 
instance, as is evident in the Bazinian concept Total Cinema, this paradigm is both the 
origin and the telos of image technologies starting from the 19th century, where cinema, 
with its fundamental promise to represent the world in its entirety, is a model. In fact, 
future cinema as a teleological discourse, as I discussed in the first chapter, not only 
couples origin and future, it has also oscillated within the equivocality of the term end in 
its multiple resonances: ending, death, finitude, but also as purpose, telos, finality. It 
charges cinema with the task of abolishing itself. Thus the discursive operation that 
defines this paradigm is to cancel the difference between the elements that it brings 
together: it seeks to cancel, blur or eliminate the limits that mark material, technological, 
cultural, historical and social differences, among others. For instance, as I discussed in 
the first and third chapters, in early immersive technologies such as the Great Frieze in 
the Villa dei Misteri at Pompeii or the panorama war paintings, as Grau argues, the 
ultimate aim of the immersion is the coupling of “the artwork and technical apparatus, the 
																																																								
323 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, as cited in Bolter, J. David, and Richard A. Grusin. “Remediation.” 
Configurations 4, no. 3 (September 1, 1996): 311–58. https://doi.org/10.1353/con.1996.0018. 
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message and medium of perception”324  which converge into an inseparable whole. 
Similarly, stereoscopic 3D325 is also shaped by the same paradoxical operation in the 
sense that it is charged with cancelling the boundaries that separate reality and image, and 
by extension spectator and spectacle, subject and object etc. Likewise, this paradigm as it 
re-emerged in cybernetics, which I have analyzed in its connection to the discursive 
pattern that defines VR, seeks to develop a mediation that can function as the immediate 
interface between human and machine.   
Therefore I argue that what the VR conventions are organized to communicate is 
this fundamental operation of the coupling of that which is deemed to be oppositional. 
Particularly evident in empathy discourse, VR generally is employed to create an 
immediate platform or interface where that which and those who are deemed to be 
incompatible coexist: it is presupposed to be an immediate and democratic encounter 
between those from distant and diverse walks of life, differing in age, sex, gender, race, 
class etc. There are two fundamental and complementary technological operations in VR 
that embody this discourse as coupling what is essentially incompatible: immersion and 
interactivity. I argue that each of these, as part of this hyperbolic paradigm, attempts to 
develop an illusion of freedom and autonomy, and by extension the power given to the 
viewer, by assigning a dual role to the position of the viewer.  
																																																								
324 Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004.) 
325 For instance, in the case of Münsterberg, due to both the photorealism of cinematic image as mechanic 
representation of reality and cinematic possibilities to reorganize the mechanical reproduction in time 
through editing according to the subjective conditions, cinema serves to double subject and object. In this 
cinematic organization, for Münsterberg, doubling serves to establish the triumph of the mind over the 
objective world. For Eisenstein, the doubling that S3D is capable of is mobilized to dismantle the binary 
distribution of spectator and spectacle, therefore by extension can serve to dismantle the unnatural limit 
between the classes in order to restore the original unity of society. For Balázs, the very telos of cinema is 
to trouble the limit between oppositional terms such as visible and invisible, text and image, etc.  
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5.3.1 Immersion 
 
Throughout their historical development, immersive media have deployed different 
strategies, from shutting off the viewer perceptually from the actual world in hermetically 
closed rooms -as in the case of early architectural organizations such as the Great Frieze 
in the Villa dei Misteri at Pompeii, or the 20th century virtual environments such as 
CAVE- to expanding the image to beyond the visual field of the viewer to the extent that 
the viewer is surrounded by the image in its entirety, such as panoramic image and Imax. 
However, what makes VR unique and different from previous attempts is that it would 
seem to have perfected the concept of absolute immersion: given the supposed absence of 
any visible spatial boundary in its objectivity, VR is considered to provide the unlimited 
character of reality in terms of spatiality. Concomitant to the absence of spatial limitation 
as is the case in screen-based image systems, the viewer is presumed to be emancipated 
from the mediations of an artist whose fundamental operation is to limit the image in time 
and space. Free to look wherever she or he wants to, it is presupposed that the viewer in 
VR is given power and control over the visual perception. Accordingly, this presumed 
limitlessness of VR is delegated to the viewer as the power to perform her or his own 
selections. Therefore VR, as the result of this putative absolute immersion, is considered 
to be immediate image since, first, it represents the unlimited character of reality, and 
second, it cancels the mediation of the artist.  
However, even in perfected cases where this utopic claim of unbounded image 
system is supposed to be realized, or even if we ignore the material limitations inherent to 
computer processers or headsets which are technologically far from realizing this 
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hyperbolic promise, one limitation persists: that is, the limitations of human vision in its 
optical organization. The purported limitlessness of image cannot be experienced as 
unlimited at once; on the contrary, the experience is always conditioned by the optical 
limitations of the viewer. In fact, I argue that it is the limitation of human vision through 
which the unlimitedness claim of VR image is established. Immersion in the visual 
regime of VR can be posited as unlimited only insofar as it transgresses the peripheral 
vision of the viewer, to the extent that it occults the material limitations of the 
computer.326 For instance, referring to the early state of technology, N. Katherine Hayles 
argues that “every existing simulation has boundaries that distinguish it from the 
surrounding environment. Virtual reality environments are limited by the length of the 
cables attaching the body apparatus to the computer.” 327  Therefore the claim of 
limitedness is only possible with phantasmagoric mechanisms which, as Adorno points 
out, operate through the occultation of production by means of the outward appearance. 
The perfection of higher perceptual realism as unlimited image is the perfection of the 
illusion that the work of art is a reality sui generis.328 Therefore inverting the negative 
connotations of subjective finitude, immersive strategies in VR require the finitude of the 
viewer as the condition of limitlessness and of freedom.   
																																																								
326 Concealing the material conditions of virtual space which is in fact determined by the limitation inherent 
to power and speed of computer. For instance as a physical device, it can process only a limited amount of 
information due to the constraints of energy and the amount of information that it can process is limited by 
the number of degrees of freedom it possesses. 
327 N. Katherine Hayles, “In Response To Jean Baudrillard (Hayles, Porush, Landon, Sobchack, Ballard).” 
Accessed August 2, 2019. https://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/forum55.htm. 
328 Theodor W Adorno, In Search of Wagner. (New York: Verso, 2005.) 
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5.3.2 Interactivity  
 
Similar to the spatial organization of the visual field in accordance with the 
limitations of subjective vision, interactivity in VR also doubles the function of viewer by 
integrating it into image through its bodily determinations. Aiming to increase the control 
of the viewer/user on the visual and temporal structure of image, interactivity enforces a 
circular experience where it allows the viewer to experience its power over image, as 
both the maker and the viewer. Even though VR is considered to be realizing a more 
advanced level of interactivity than previous technologies, which are confined either to 
altering the temporal ordering of narrative structure or the visual organization, it still 
presents the same logic of doubling the function of viewer as both the subject and the 
object. For instance, tracing the historical background of interactivity in the 19th century, 
in her book Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and 
Electronic Media,329 Marie-Laure Ryan argues that hyperlink as an early interactive 
medium has promoted the double function of user where it is both the reader and the 
writer at once. She writes: “The history of Western art has seen the rise and fall of 
immersive ideals, and their displacement, in the twentieth century, by an aesthetics of 
play and self-reflexivity that eventually produced the ideal of an active participation of 
the appreciator—reader, spectator, user—in the production of the text.”330 Similar to 
																																																								
329  Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and 
Electronic Media. 1 edition. (Baltimore, Md.: Hopkins Fulfillment Service, 2003.)  
330 Furthermore she argues that hypertext “transposes the ideal of an endlessly self-renewable text from the 
level of the signified to the level of the signifier. In hypertext, the prototypical form of interactive textuality 
(though by no means the most interactive), the reader determines the unfolding of the text by clicking on 
certain areas, the so-called hyperlinks, that bring to the screen other segments of text. Although this process 
is restricted to a choice among a limited number of well-charted alternatives— namely, the branching 
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many approaches that have been discussed in this dissertation, she argues, “in the literary 
domain, no less than in the visual arts, the rise and fall of immersive ideals are tied to the 
fortunes of an aesthetics of illusion, which implies transparency of the medium.”331 
Delegating the creative process to the user or displacing the author within the interactive 
unfolding of narrative structure, interactivity has been framed as an immediate experience 
that couples reader and writer. While it creates an illusion of freedom where the reader 
can exercise its power on the text, this freedom is only possible with “the limitation of the 
reader’s movements to the paths designed by the author.”332  
Even though in VR the user/viewer goes beyond the power of altering the narrative 
structure or temporal distribution of the virtual image, it also enforces the same illusion 
of freedom in its immediacy claim where the user/viewer is posited as both the maker and 
the viewer of the virtual environment. It assigns a dual role to the viewer with its bodily 
determinations in the sense that it is an integral part of the image, as interface or as the 
transcendental condition of the image, but it is also external to the image as an observer. 
This double function of viewer, in fact, as Crary argues, following Foucault’s analysis,333 
is the result of a 19th century paradigm where the bodily condition of the subject is 
integrated into image making. Initiated by Kant’s transcendental subject, in this paradigm 
shift in the optics and visual culture which developed in the 19th century, Crary argues, 
the image becomes perceptible to the extent that it corresponds to the conditions of the 																																																																																																																																																																					
possibilities designed by the author—this relative freedom has been hailed as an allegory of the vastly more 
creative and less constrained activity of reading as meaning formation.” (Ibid., 2.) 
331 Ibid., 4.  
332 Ibid., 9.  
333 Foucault defines that shift as follows: “There are those that operate within the space of the body, and – 
by studying perception, sensorial mechanisms, neuro-motor diagrams, and the articulation common to 
things and to the organism – function as a sort of transcendental aesthetic; these led to the discovery that 
knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within the structures of the 
body, that it may have a privileged place within it…” Foucault, Michel. Archaeology of Knowledge. 
(Psychology Press, 2002.): 153. 
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body as interface. For instance, the emergence of proto-cinematic devices, stereoscopic 
3D and cinema is the result of this paradigm, which quantifies human perception and 
corporeal mechanisms such as binocularity and retinal afterimage. Thus doubling the 
function of subjective limitations, I argue, the immersive and interactive strategies 
inherent to VR communicate a certain idea of freedom and subjectivity that first emerged 
in the 19th century. In the next section I will map the discursive fabric inherent to this 
paradigm that Foucault terms “analytic of finitude.”   
5.4 Doubles of Subject: Analytic of Finitude  
 
For Foucault, as is epitomized in the first sentence334 of Kant’s The Critique of 
Pure Reason, in the governing episteme of modernity “man is possible only as a 
figuration of finitude.”335 Delimited by the conditions in which it emerges, Foucault 
argues, man in modernity “is marked by the spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, 
and the time of language”336 yet these limitations are “expressed not as a determination 
imposed upon man from outside, but as a fundamental finitude which rests on nothing but 
its own existence as fact, and opens upon the positivity of all concrete limitation.”337 For 
instance, in the Kantian model, knowledge is both transcendental and empirical at once in 
the sense that it finds its possibility through the synthetic operations of human 
																																																								
334 Kant writes “Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with 
questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but 
which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason.” Kant, Immanuel. 
Critique of Pure Reason. (Cambridge University Press, 1998.): 99.  
335 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994.): 346.  
336 Ibid., 343. 
337 Ibid., 343. 
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understanding and intuition.338 While the latter furnishes us with the external sensations 
through a priori forms such as space and time, the former supplies a priori categories that 
function to structure the formless inputs received from the sensible world. 339  For 
Foucault, this double nature of knowledge, as a middle ground of idealism and 
empiricism, is one of the three doubles340 of man that construct the dominant logic of 
modernity where subject is both “constituting and constituted in relation to 
exteriority.”341 Determined by the empirical conditions that are external to itself and 
posited as the transcendental subject that determines them, the subject is the synthetic 
locus with its finitude in its body, language and labour. Moreover, while the subject is 
limited by the natural laws that transcend it, it also furnishes the transcendental grounds 
of them. Trapped in a logical impasse of this specific episteme which “offends or 
reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but 																																																								
338 This is why, in the Kantian model, thought that is produced by human understanding without the content 
of the sensible world is empty, and intuitions that are received from the sensible world that are not 
subsumed under concepts are blind. For instance, reason can construct ideas of the soul, of the world as a 
whole and of God; however, these three ideas are the source of a transcendental illusion, because they are 
merely subjective ideas as the product of human understanding and they cannot be experienced empirically. 
339 Moreover, in terms of morality, Kant has a peculiar way of defining human morality as the freedom to 
delimit itself. Moral autonomy consists of a double sense of freedom as independent from any 
external/empirical determinations and as the capacity to impose its own law. Kant’s notion of autonomy of 
the will thus involves, as Andrews Reath has written, “not only a capacity for choice that is motivationally 
independent, but a lawgiving capacity that is independent of determination by external influence and is 
guided by its own internal principle–in other words, by a principle that is constitutive of lawgiving” (Reath 
2006). Therefore rational agents can act autonomously by imposing “upon themselves –to legislate for 
themselves– the moral law.” 
340 The other doublet is the mutual dependence of thought and the unthought, in the sense that in modernity 
the thought is conditioned by the unthought. In contradistinction to the self-transparency that marked the 
Cartesian cogito, Foucault claims that the modern cogito is conditioned by the unthought such “that all 
attempts at self-knowledge are necessarily blurred and marked by regions of opacity.” (Murphy, Ann V. 
“The Double.” In The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, edited by Leonard Lawlor and John Nale. Cambridge 
University Press, 2014.) The third and final double relates to the relationship between historicity and 
subjectivity in the modern episteme; this double concerns the return and retreat of the origin. In his 
discussions of the origin, Foucault references the fact that man is marked and determined by a history that 
is not transparent to him, even as he is charged with rendering this history intelligible; hence man is the 
product and origin of history at once. As the main characteristic of modernity man as finitude is a 
breakthrough from philosophical models of the Classical age, where for instance the Cartesian model 
presupposes the transparency of cogito. 
341 Ann V. Murphy, “The Double.” In The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, edited by Leonard Lawlor and 
John Nale. (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
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liberate and enslave,” Foucault argues, “man appears in his ambiguous position as an 
object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed 
spectator.”342  
Building upon Foucault’s analysis, I argue that this same logic constitutes the 
immersive and interactive strategies inherent to VR as doubling the function of subjective 
finitude. As discussed in the previous section, the immersive strategies that VR deploys 
towards its claim of being an unlimited image system stems from the doubling of the 
function of the limitations of viewer. Concealing the material and spatial conditions of 
image beyond the sightline of the viewer in order to create the illusion of limitedness, the 
autonomy claim of VR requires a certain idea of subjectivity whose limitation functions 
to open towards its outside. It is the subjective interiority with its limitations that 
constructs the very exteriority that is limitless and unformed in its objectivity. In its 
phantasmagoric structure that conceals the material limitations of VR, the presupposed 
power of the viewer is only possible because of the finitude of the viewer. The subject is 
liberated through its limitation. Similarly, in its claim of freedom and immediacy in terms 
of interactivity, VR also doubles the function of viewer as subject and object at once. 
This is why I argue that what VR communicates is this paradoxical logic of modernity 
where the limitation is the condition of unlimited image experience. In its technological 
configuration as an immersive and interactive medium, VR embodies this peculiar idea of 
freedom where it is the viewer’s finitude in its visual and corporeal configuration that 
allows it to experience this freedom. 
Moreover, following Byung-Chul Han’s problematization of the contemporary 																																																								
342 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994.): 340.  
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political subject in the context of neo-liberalism, I argue that the formal structure of VR 
as an immersive and interactive medium communicates a similar idea of freedom, where 
the subject is trapped within its own internal limitations. Epitomized by the internet, 
which, for Han, “was celebrated as a medium of boundless liberty,”343 the neo-liberal 
idea of freedom in general and the contemporary media environment in particular 
promote the illusion of transparency and “unlimited freedom and mobility.” However, 
this subject is caught in a tragic moment: the new subject that turns itself into a project 
deemed to be “free of external and alien limitations” subjugates “itself to internal 
limitations and self-constraints, which are taking the form of compulsive achievement 
and optimization.” Equipped with new discursive and technological apparatuses, the 
subject becomes both its own master and slave. Similar to Foucault’s “enslaved 
sovereign” or “observed spectator,” the contemporary subject is trapped in the duality of 
freedom: “But now freedom itself, which is supposed to be the opposite of constraint, is 
producing coercion.”344 In fact, for Han, this new paradigm of neo-liberalism where 
freedom functions to produce coercion, which is different from the disciplinary power of 
the late 19th century, results in a proliferation of the psychological maladies that stem 
from the impossible task of self-management: “Psychic maladies such as depression and 
burnout express a profound crisis of freedom.”345 However, according to Han, what is 
more striking in this idea of freedom, where the subject auto-exploits itself in its 
isolation, is that “no political We is even possible that could rise up and undertake 
																																																								
343 Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. Translated by Erik 
(Butler: Verso, 2017.): 8.  
344 Ibid., 2.   
345 Ibid., 2.   
	 155	
collective action.”346 Given power through its limitation, this new tragic subject is an 
enslaved sovereign in its hermetical limitations to act and to see. I argue that this political 
power that is deemed to be inherent to VR and particularly to 360-degree documentaries 
which aim to create empathy reinforces the contradictory subjectivity that regresses into 
its own isolated and hermetic omnipotence.  
5.5 Conclusion: Reinstating Boundaries 
 
The third section of this dissertation, which addresses the question of autonomy 
through my artistic experiment in VR viewership, will critically engage with the 
theoretical and methodological framework I have developed throughout the dissertation. 
This particular section aims to develop a conceptual link between the way that I have 
addressed the methodology and the archaeology of VR conventions. For instance, the 
general mechanism of the autonomy claim in VR can be boiled down to one single 
discursive operation: “cancelling-by-concealing boundaries that define visual structure.” 
Therefore, in order to respond to this set of conventions, I reinstate the boundary as a 
problem in virtual space. As a technology which both separates and juxtaposes the 
elements that it mediates, boundary, I argue, is a unique aesthetic means to re-examine 
the associations and disassociations of the sets of concepts that define the artistic 
experience in VR such as autonomy and heteronomy, real and image, actual and virtual 
etc. Boundary separates as soon as it brings elements together, associates and 
disassociates, bounds and unbounds at once. A boundary is always double, but this 
doubling is neither determinate nor indeterminate. It is the locus that neither belongs to 																																																								
346 Ibid., 6.  
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any of those that it brings together, nor is dependent from them. It is the contact point 
where two elements express difference and sameness at once. It is neither autonomous 
nor heteronomous but both at once. Therefore, problematizing the boundary will also 
function to problematize the question of autonomy, as I have suggested in the 
methodological model that I have developed.  Since I provide a detailed description of 
my VR experience supported with visuals in the report that is attached as an appendix, 
here I will simply outline the general formal structure.  
In this context, my intention is to push the immediacy claim to its limits to create a 
crisis in its conventions in such a way that the question of autonomy becomes visible as a 
problem. In order to do that, following the Cavellian formula, I have reconfigured the 
very technological structure of the VR headset. To re-examine the associations and 
disassociations of the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy that define contemporary 
VR conventions, along with immediacy and mediation, passivity and activity, visible and 
visible etc., my VR experience formally deploys immersive and interactive techniques 
that aim at problematizing the concept of boundary. It aims to make the boundaries of the 
viewer and the very boundary that separates the actual space from the virtual space 
appear as a problem in the very construction of the immersive and interactive aspects of 
the VR experience that I have developed. There are two different boundaries that are 
problematized: the visual boundaries of the viewer, and the boundaries between the 
actual and virtual environment. While the former has been deployed as an aesthetic 
means to unfold the narrative structure and interactivity, the latter is deployed to push to 
the extreme the discursive fabric of unlimited image where real and actual becomes 
indiscernible.  
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The first instance of the problematizing of boundary in virtual space, that is, the one 
which belongs to the viewer, is inspired by a VR game called Sightline: The Chair347 to 
which I was introduced in Graham Wakefield’s course. Produced by Tomáš Mariančík in 
2015, the game is based on a simple idea, yet is radically different in terms of 
interactivity and immersion from any other VR installation that I have experienced. It 
deploys a “gaze-detection” mechanism, which enables a shocking effect in the sense that 
visual changes in the virtual space occur only when the user looks away from the location 
where changes happen. Located on a chair, in this game the viewer is immersed in a room 
populated with mundane elements such as a desk, a computer, a plant, and a box of 
doughnuts sitting on the right-hand corner of the desk. At first glance nothing appears to 
be changing. However, at a seemingly unremarkable moment, when the viewer looks 
away from the doughnuts sitting on the table and then looks back again, the doughnuts 
have been replaced with an apple and some bananas. This displacement technique then 
governs the whole narrative unfolding of the game. Each of the elements in the room 
starts to disappear or is displaced with a new one, and gradually, with the continuous 
effect of shock and surprise, the viewer in the room finds itself on a lush hill, and in the 
next moment in the middle of a street. Toying playfully with the viewer, The Chair elicits 
claustrophobia one minute and an immense sense of scale the next.  
This surrealist effect that Mariančík and his team developed was very unique; it 
abnegates the postulated power given to the subject in VR conventions as both 
omnivoyant and omnipotent subject. What was even more unique was that the visual 
limitations of the viewer were that which defined the narrative unfolding, and the locus of 																																																								
347  Tomáš Mariančík, “SightLineVR on Steam.” Accessed June 26, 2019. 
https://store.steampowered.com/app/412360/SightLineVR/. 
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change was beyond the visual field. They had managed to incorporate the invisible areas 
in VR as the main element of the experience. The whole visible area was dictated by 
something that was beyond visibility. Unlike conventional VR works, which are based on 
the false promise of absolute transparency and accessibility of the visual field, in The 
Chair, it was the invisible which was governing the visible. This incorporation of 
invisible sections of virtual image revealed the phantasmagorical mechanism inherent to 
VR. However, more importantly, despite the fact that the displacements and replacements 
occur depending on the head movement of the viewer, it creates the opposite effect of 
classical interactive games: the viewer never knows the next result of her or his 
interaction. The transparent and direct relationship between the bodily movement of 
viewer and the alteration of image was replaced with this new opaque and obscure 
relationship. It is as if there is something beyond the control of the viewer and beyond its 
peripheral limits like the deceitful malin génie of Descartes.  
My VR experience will further “the gaze-detection mechanism” into a limit case. 
Instead of altering one virtual space to another or displacing the virtual object in the 
virtual space as is the case in The Chair, my work will radicalize the effect in the sense 
that the gaze-detection mechanism will work to switch between the live images from the 
cameras attached to the headset and a realistic 3D design of the actual space in which my 
VR experience will be taking place. Switching between different modalities of immersive 
media technologies (MR to VR), I aim to conceal the transition between these two 
images to crystallize the hyperbolic effect of unbounded image, whose ultimate promise 
is to create an image system where reality or the actual world becomes indiscernible from 
its image. The transition will be realized gradually: it will first displace the elements in 
	 159	
actual space such as the people in the room who are watching the actual VR viewer. 
When the gradual transformation from live image (from the front camera) to virtual 3D 
design is completed, the same gaze detection will be deployed to alter the virtual image. 
Contingent to the user’s head movement, it will change the position of elements in the 
room such as chairs and table.  
The VR experience starts with the live image from the camera attached on the front 
of the headset. Using the gaze-detection mechanism it will then switch to a 3D design of 
the actual room. When the gradual transformation from live image (from the front 
camera) to the virtual 3D design is completed, the same gaze detection will be deployed 
to alter the virtual image. First the elements that are in the actual room such as chairs and 
the sensors will disappear. Following that, again using the gaze detection mechanism, the 
structure of the room is altered. It will then gradually trace the same alteration back to the 
initial image that is provided by the camera. Therefore the headset, which normally 
functions to conceal or occult reality by shutting off the viewer perceptually, is 
transformed into a transparent mediation. In other words, I push to its limits the 
transparency argument that defines purported autonomy in VR as medium. The VR 
headset, which normally functions as the boundary between real space and the virtual 
environment as limitation from within, with the attachment of a camera, will be 
problematized. This is the second instance of problematizing the question of boundary. 
Aiming to encourage the viewer to reflect upon the immersive possibilities of VR, my 
virtual experience will take transparency rhetoric -by attaching a camera that feeds the 
live image to the headset- to a limit case. Even though the live feeds from both cameras 
are not the immediate image of reality in its visual structure, their temporal immediacy 
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(their “aliveness”) and indexical nature will be allegorically used as the reference image 
to reality. Concealing the effect of transition from the live feeds from the cameras to a 3D 
design of the actual space, I aim to create an allegory that VR can manipulate reality (the 
reference images from the camera).  
Started as a research-creation project that would engage with Stereoscopic 3D and 
later re-tooled to focus on VR as a research object, this project, from the outset, has 
always been informed by one specific methodological approach: that is, to engage with 
cinematic ontology from without. In other words, methodologically, instead of 
configuring an essentialist definition of cinematic image, I would engage with the 
technologies that can be considered to be on the periphery of cinema itself such S3D and 
VR. Indeed, this was the finding of my early research on the artistic and technological 
character of cinema in its historical development. Following an uneven trajectory, 
cinema’s identity has never been given at once in its historical development; in fact, it 
becomes more indistinct through its encounter with new technological development, and 
this constant transformation in its inner organization as technology has resulted in a 
permanent identity crisis. This is why I believe cinema can only be defined by its limit 
cases which both transgress and affirm it at the same time. In this context, VR, as the 
most recent periphery of the cinematic media landscape, struck me as an excellent 
opportunity to circumscribe cinema from without.  
This blurring of the lines between cinema and non-cinema is quite apparent in the 
recent media landscape. Rather than being an isolated locus within the recent media 
landscape, the expanded territory of cinema defines a broader scale of intersections of 
different platforms (theatres, smartphones, TV and computers), distribution methods 
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(Blu-ray, VOD, piracy), narration strategies (videogames, interactive media, etc.) and 
technological syntheses that constitute the larger system of the cinematic media 
landscape such as S3D, VR, AR, TV, etc. This expansion has been so radical that cinema, 
or at least the normative form of cinema, has reached a crisis point where it has become 
impossible to identify it as one singular practice. Nevertheless, for many theorists, thanks 
to the very proliferation of different platforms that incorporate moving image technology, 
cinema is more alive, more abundant, and more omnipresent than ever (Gaudreault and 
Marion, 2015). Moreover, it is impossible to take either its origin – or at least a particular 
instance from the history of cinema — or its future as the privileged reference point. In 
fact, the historical development of cinematic technology, as Jens Schröter observes, is 
oriented “more spatially and topologically where several media are related synchronically 
to each other in a systematic relationship or exist and develop diachronically within a 
specific constellation.”348 That is, as a process, which can be defined by neither an origin 
nor a future, cinema follows a non-linear history in which its identity becomes more 
indistinct through its encounter with each new technological development (sound, colour, 
S3D, TV, Digital etc.). In other words, the historical development of cinema results in a 
permanent identity crisis.  
Moreover, this identity crisis inherent to cinema as a technology not only marks its 
historical development, but it has been the ultimate defining gesture in its artistic 
practices since its inception. Cinema, I argue, functions as a sensible means to create 
crisis between the concepts, events and activities that it brings together with its temporal 
structure and image regime; it is an artistic means that reconfigures the relations between 																																																								
348 Jens Schröter, 3D: History, Theory and Aesthetics of the Transplane Image. Revised edition. (New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.) 	
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the terms (image and reality, spectator and spectacle, temporal and spatial etc.) that it 
brings together through an aesthetic, epistemological, political and ontological crisis. As 
defined in my methodological approach, however, these relationships are always 
singular, and therefore they only emerge as sensible crises within the pre-existing model. 
In other words, the identity crisis that emerges through cinema’s technological 
development is also what defines its aesthetic promise. In fact, cinema has been charged 
with the task of dragging into crisis the very language in which it has been located within 
the dominant social, political and cultural context. In this context, I aimed to capitalize on 
VR as an instance of identity crisis of the cinematic medium; I argue VR is cinematic in 
the sense that it affirms the very identity crisis that defines cinema. In other words, as an 
epistemological model, cinema — hybrid in its historical development, its technological 
determinations and its aesthetic strategies — has provided me with the conceptual and the 
historical framework to investigate the possible crisis that VR is capable of producing.  
However, despite this initial motivation, I discovered that VR is technologically 
organized as a means to develop a realistic image, and defies the established methods of 
generating crisis within the associations and disassociations in cinematic language. In 
fact, my experimental attempts informed by cinematic identity crisis in VR appeared to 
be technological problems rather than an aesthetic one. For instance, in my early attempt 
to communicate the headset and the camera attached to the headset, I discovered that VR, 
in its most recent configuration, does not allow such a process. First, it proved impossible 
to integrate the image registered from the camera into VR image without loss in image 
quality; there was almost no way to accommodate classical cinematic image. Second, it 
was impossible to imitate the low image quality of the camera within VR image in terms 
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of resolution, contrast or brightness. VR is technologically organized to provide only 
great quality image in terms of these parameters for high perceptual realism. More 
importantly, this connection ultimately created discomfort in my VR installation. In fact, 
I discovered that most of the technological research on VR aims to eliminate these 
uncomfortable results such as headache, stomach awareness, nausea, vomiting, pallor, 
sweating, fatigue, drowsiness, disorientation, and apathy. My attempts to push the 
technological configuration of the VR headset to its limits cannot be accommodated in 
VR, not due to an aesthetic problem but rather as a technological problem that resulted in 
the phenomenon called “virtual reality sickness.” As embodied experience, VR does not 
permit most artistic practices that are established in cinema which engage with the inner 
mechanism of image production, as in the case of the medium-specific approaches of 
Stan Brakhage, Michael Snow or Zbigniew Rybczyński which informed my artistic 
practice. Therefore, despite the conceptual connection between VR and cinema that 
informed my historical research, my artistic practices in VR ultimately revealed the ways 
in which it differs from medium-specific approaches in cinema which are generally 
organized according to certain audiovisual-centric applications. Despite its conceptual 
and historical connections with cinema, it is not possible to translate the conventions of 
modernistic approaches in cinema to VR.  		
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6. Conclusion 
What is it […] that divides the atmosphere from the water? 
It is necessary that there should be a common boundary which is 
neither air nor water but is without substance, because a body 
interposed between two bodies prevents their contact, and this 
does not happen in water with air. […] Therefore a surface is the 
common boundary of two bodies which are not continuous, and 
does not form part of either one or the other, for if the surface 
formed part of it, it would have divisible bulk, whereas, 
however, it is not divisible and nothingness divides these bodies 
the one from the other. — Leonardo da Vinci349 																																																								349	Leonardo da Vinci, Notebooks. Edited by Irma A. Richter and Martin Kemp. (OUP Oxford, 2008.): 
120.	
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Naming an artwork is an emblematic moment where the tension that traverses the 
entire process of research-creation inquiry, is crystallized. In this process of naming the 
artwork, pushed to the limit, the artist-researcher has to engage, at least symbolically, 
with the fundamental challenge of the hybrid dissertations that is to define a relationship 
between an artwork and a text that functions as name. But how a text functions as a name 
is a puzzling process. A name always has a double position: it is external to that which it 
supplements but also an integral part of it. Once it emerges it divides itself, both as 
complement and supplement. It’s a complement, as Derrida formulates, an “addition 
[that] comes to make up for a deficiency.”350 But what is deficient in an artwork that its 
name claims to make up for? Or can a work of art ever be said to be completed? A name 
is also a supplement that comes after the artwork; however, it supplements something that 
is already present in the artwork. While it adds to it, it also claims to be in the place of it 
or speak on behalf of it. At the same time, while demonstrating and exposing the artwork, 
the name, as complement and supplement, is, in return, exposed by the artwork as well. 
As Nancy suggests, both the artwork and its name discern themselves in the other. The 
name demonstrates both itself and that which it supplements or complements. In fact, as 
Nancy suggests, signalling the common etymological background of “demonstrate” and 
“monstrous,” the name and image “show that there are at least two kinds of showing, 
heterogeneous and yet stuck to one another, collated, pressed and compressed together 
(like the stones in an arch), attracting and repelling one another. Each is monstrative and 
																																																								350  Jacques Derrida, cited in, Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty “Preface” in Derrida, Jacques. Of 
Grammatology. Edited by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. (Corr edition. Baltimore: Hopkins Fulfillment 
Service, 1998.) 
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monstrous to the other.”351  
It is through this constant negotiation, tension and monstrous double operation that 
this dissertation has unfolded. Its uneven and spiral structure oscillated within the 
dichotomous positioning of research and creation, theory and practice, text and image etc. 
In writing and making it, the relative position of each component (textual and visual) in 
regard to the other has gone through a tumultuous trajectory that has involved constant 
revision of one component according to the experiments and funding that emerged in the 
other. Different in language, methods and means, each one was regulated and redefined 
ultimately in and by the other. While they complement each other in problematizing each 
other, they converge in addressing the relation between historically polarized concepts. 
Ultimately the central problem has been to re-examine the associations and 
disassociations between the concepts, events and methods of the conventions of both 
research-creation scholarship and VR aesthetics. Through a threefold inquiry on the 
question of autonomy and heteronomy, this dissertation has aimed to problematize the 
very context that made it possible. First, I problematized the autonomy of art purported to 
be the grounding gesture of the critical nature of research-creation; second, the autonomy 
purported to be inherent to VR as an immersive and interactive image technology was 
called into question; and third, as the extension of the second, I problematized the 
autonomy of the viewer and virtual images in the VR experience that constitutes the 
artistic experiment component of the dissertation.  
For instance, the ultimate question in research-creation, due to its hybrid structure, 
is to re-examine how the events and concepts which are historically deemed to be 
																																																								351 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image. (Fordham Univ Press, 2005.): 64.  
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incompatible and oppositional, such as theory and practice, research and creation, and 
image and text, are related to each other. Each schema I scrutinized attempts to set a 
framework for the relationship between the incommensurable elements whose connection 
is impossible to subsume under a universal and essentialist formula. This is why, for 
them, research-creation is an experiential, procedural, liquid inquiry method; in fact, 
according to these schemata it is not even a method: it is essentially anti-essentialist. 
With its inherent impasses, tensions and paradoxes it is posited as being autonomous 
from external criteria, and in fact its task is to challenge universalist, determinist, 
hierarchical and essentialist formulas. However, the problem is that, pushed to the 
extremes, research-creation’s critical function stems from its supposed hybrid essence 
that is supposed to be autonomous from the precedent means, formulas, genres and 
concepts etc., or in general from the historical context in which it became possible as a 
scholarship and methodology. It is thus impossible to frame what research-creation is; yet 
this very impossibility is both its necessity and possibility.  
However, this autonomy claim that guarantees its possibility is not only paradoxical 
but also problematic. First, the schemata I examined reinforce a certain essentialism 
wherein research-creation functions as critical due to its anti-essentialist essence. Since in 
its very essence it’s anti-essentialist and anti-dualist due to its hybrid nature, it is claimed 
that each research-creation project is a rupture from the academic knowledge production 
process and from forms which are defined by an essentialist, dualist and binary logic. 
However, these schemata reinforce binary logic in order to dismantle it. For instance, 
they have to first distribute elements in binary positions in order to bring them together: 
the binary distribution has to be established not only historically but also essentially. 
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More precisely, in order to frame the hybrid nature of research-creation as autonomous 
from a given historical context, the schemata have to posit those elements as essentially 
oppositional and therefore autonomous from each other. However, research and creation 
are in fact never separate: they can only emerge in the mutual dynamic relationship 
between activities and concepts which are both autonomous from and heteronomous to 
one another, such as theory and practice, art and science, sensuous and material, 
subjective and objective, universal and particular etc.  
In this context, I argue that autonomy is not a given; it can only emerge as a 
problem. In fact, as Lütticken suggests, autonomy is not a fact that the artist-researcher 
can possess, and more radically, artistic practices ultimately aim to problematize the 
question of autonomy. In other words, the creative task is to problematize the 
conventions claimed to be inherent to the medium itself in order to challenge the 
historical, material, social and ideological context in which it became possible. For this 
reason, I argue that the very task of research-creation is to excavate the political, aesthetic 
and social coordinates of the artistic practices and their technological and material 
conventions within the historical context in which they emerged. Thus this dissertation 
consists of three moments of historicizing. First, I historicized the autonomy claim of 
research-creation. I mapped out its conceptual connections within one specific instance of 
the autonomy claim in aesthetic theory, which, I believe, is crystallized by cinema. I 
specifically looked at the philosophical conceptualization of cinema in the work of three 
figures of post-war philosophy: Deleuze, Rancière and Badiou. Similar to research-
creation, cinema’s critical function, according to these three figures, stems from its 
hybrid nature. Due to its temporal structure and its visual regime that congregate in 
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different art forms, cinema is posited as an event that drags the truth into crisis. It is 
therefore an anti-essentialist and anti-metaphysical art form. However, I contend that 
there is no essential link between the hybrid nature of cinema and its critical function. 
The critical function is never a priori given, nor guaranteed in the material structure of 
the medium. For this reason, artists first and foremost are archaeologists in a Foucauldian 
sense. Their ultimate task is to excavate the conditions of existence of their artistic 
practices in their material, aesthetic and socio-political determinations.  
The second moment of historicizing consisted of mapping out the historical 
background of the very aesthetic, technological and political conventions of VR which 
emerged as both a model and an integral part of a particular techno-utopic paradigm that 
seeks to develop an image system autonomous from both the mediation of artist and the 
material and socio-political determinations of reality. I specifically scrutinized three 
instances of this paradigm: early immersive architectural and pictorial images, cinema, 
and cybernetics. For instance, within the history of cinema, VR emerged as a future 
model that can realize the promise of cinema. In this context, the second chapter of this 
dissertation is dedicated to mapping out the aesthetic coordinates of future cinema whose 
last iteration was VR. The early model for future cinema, particularly in early film theory 
such as that of Münsterberg, Balázs and Eisenstein, was stereoscopic 3D which was 
supposed to realize the artistic promise of cinema. Through its spatial capacity to blur the 
limit between screen and proscenium, according to early schemata, it would reveal the 
artistic essence of cinema, whose promise was to create an image where spectacle and 
spectator, image and reality, would reach a state of indiscernibility. Similar to S3D, the 
early approaches to VR also converge in the same objective: to eliminate the boundaries 
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that separate oppositional elements. The other instance where VR is posited as a model is 
in cybernetics, particularly the third wave of cybernetics that Hayles argues is instantiated 
by VR. With the advent of the computer, research in cybernetics, particularly in the 
postwar era, has focused on developing autopoietic or autonomous images which VR 
instantiated with its immersive and interactive structure.  
In general, the aesthetic coordinates of VR conventions prioritize the ideas of 
empathy, immediacy, and by extension, autonomy. Given the supposed absence of any 
visible spatial boundary in its objectivity, VR ostensibly provides not only the unlimited 
character of reality in terms of spatiality, but also this presumed limitlessness of VR is 
delegated to the viewer as the power to perform her or his own selections. Concomitant to 
the absence of spatial limitation, as is the case in screen-based image systems, the viewer 
in the virtual environment is presumed to be emancipated from the mediations of an artist 
whose fundamental operation is to limit the image in time and space. It is presupposed 
that, free to look wherever she or he wants, the viewer in VR is given power and control 
over the image itself. Therefore, VR, as the result of this putative autonomy, is 
considered to be an immediate image. For instance, for Sutherland, VR can change the 
ways in which we define reality by eliminating the differences between image and 
matter; for Lanier it can restore the sense of being part of a community through its 
unlimited imagery in which social differences are cancelled; for Heilig it can function as 
the ultimate medium that can bring together other media and eliminate the difference 
between image technologies; for Krueger, as an interactive medium, it can function to 
dismantle the limit that distributes the viewer and maker in binary opposition as is the 
case in non-interactive image technologies.  
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Similarly, within the contemporary media landscape, VR has been framed as the 
ultimate image that can, first, represent the unlimited character of reality, and second, 
cancel out the mediation of the artist. Built upon the hyperbolic presumption that VR 
enables a non-mediated experience wherein the viewer can interact or identify with 
different subjectivities, contemporary VR aesthetics is in large part characterized by the 
concept of empathy. It is asserted that, with its higher perceptual realism relative to 
cinematic image and its absolute control over representation through digital information, 
VR enables not only a technological utopia where ontological differences between image 
and reality are suspended, but also a democratic and autonomous site where social, class, 
gender and racial differences can be eliminated. The general mechanism of the autonomy 
claim can be boiled down to one single discursive and technological operation: 
cancelling-by-concealing the boundaries that define visual structure. The locus of this 
immediacy claim—as autonomous from the mediation of the artist and objective 
determinations of the medium itself—is the very finitude of the viewer. It assigns to the 
finitude of human vision a dual role as both the condition and means to transgress these 
limitations. It is only an unlimited image system insofar as it conceals its means of 
production beyond the very visual field of the viewer. Therefore the autonomy claim is 
not only phantasmagorical but also there is no necessary link between the autonomy of 
VR and its projected political outcomes. More importantly, it reinforces a certain illusion 
that immersion in virtual space is capable of stripping away immersants from their bodily 
determinations, and by implication their socio-political background and the complex 
network of socio-political determination in which a subject is embedded. Complementary 
to this hyperbolic argument in regard to virtual representation, VR is posited as a utopic 
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site that can facilitate the construction of a democratic and neutral platform where the 
boundaries that define material, spatial, gender, racial and class difference can be 
abolished and replaced with a harmonious alternative reality. However  its political claim 
to restore the lost community through technological means is ultimately non-
communitarian. It enforces a circular logic where the subject is re-configured as 
omnipotent and omnivoyant through its own finitude and charged with allegorical 
political activity where freedom functions as self-regulation and self-exploitations. It 
enforces a certain illusion that with the right technologies, which regulates the image 
according the subjective conditions of viewer, subjects can experience certain freedom in 
order to develop an altruistic understanding autonomous from the power relations that 
made the very technology itself possible.  
It is in this context that I problematize the boundary as an aesthetic means to re-
examine the associations and disassociations of the core concepts that define 
contemporary VR conventions—e.g., autonomy and heteronomy, immediacy and 
mediation, passivity and activity, invisibility and visibility. My VR experience formally 
deploys immersive and interactive techniques that aim to reinstate boundary within the 
virtual environment which has been epitomized as a shorn boundary. Appearing as a 
problem, boundary—both the perceptual boundaries of the viewer and the boundary that 
separates actual space from the virtual—serves to critically engage with contemporary 
VR conventions. While the finitude of subject (determined by its visual boundaries) is 
deployed as an aesthetic means for the interactive structure of my VR experience, the 
boundary between the image and reality is deployed to push the discursive fabric of the 
unlimited image into the extreme in order for it to emerge as a problem. Therefore the 
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entire dissertation—in its methodology, its theoretical and historical research and artistic 
practices—attempts to find a specific formal strategy to challenge the conventions of the 
contemporary VR aesthetic. It oscillates within the dynamic relationship between what is 
heteronomous and what is autonomous in the very configuration of its artistic practices, 
and from there it abstracts and distils one specific concept and technique –boundary- that 
can enable a new configuration of the concepts, the events and the activities that define 
its conventions. It is with all of these considerations in mind that the VR experience that I 
made evocates its name: Boundaries.352 
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